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Defeating Dr. Evil with self-locating belief

Elga, Adam (2002) Defeating Dr. Evil with self-locating belief. [Preprint]

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    Abstract

    Dr. Evil learns that a duplicate of Dr. Evil has been created. Upon learning this, how seriously should he take the hypothesis that he himself <i>is</i> that duplicate? I answer: very seriously. I defend a principle of indifference for self-locating belief which entails that after Dr. Evil learns that a duplicate has been created, he ought to have exactly the same degree of belief that he is Dr. Evil as that he is the duplicate. More generally, the principle shows that there is a sharp distinction between ordinary skeptical hypotheses, and <i>self-locating</i> skeptical hypotheses.


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    Item Type: Preprint
    Keywords: self-locating belief, indifference principles, decision theory, de se belief, skepticism
    Subjects: General Issues > Decision Theory
    Depositing User: Adam Elga
    Date Deposited: 12 Mar 2003
    Last Modified: 07 Oct 2010 11:11
    Item ID: 1036
    URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/1036

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