Pérez Otero, Manuel (2009) La regla de la aseveración y las implicaturas argumentativas. THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 24 (1). pp. 63-81. ISSN 2171-679X

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Abstract

Williamson defiende la regla del conocimiento, RK, sobre las aseveraciones: debemos aseverar que p sólo
si sabemos que p. En este trabajo exploro algunas consecuencias interesantes de RK: (a) en ocasiones, al
hacer una aseveración correcta transmitimos (como implicatura) un significado no literal verdadero, que
-- sin embargo -- no podría ser correctamente aseverado; (b) ese tipo de implicatura se da, entre otros casos,
en una cierta subclase de las implicaturas: las implicaturas argumentativas; (c) RK y la noción de implicatura argumentativa permiten explicar la tendencia a tratar de forma equivalente diferentes tipos de argumentos
antiescépticos inspirados en Moore.

Williamson defends the knowledge rule, KR, about assertions: one must: assert p only if one knows p. In
this work I explore some interesting consequences of KR: (a) sometimes, when making a correct assertion we transmit (as an implicature) a true non-literal meaning which @nevertheless@ could not be rightly asserted; (b) this kind of implicatures are present, for instance, in a certain subclass of implicatures: argumentative implicatures; (c) KR and the notion of argumentative implicature allow for an explanation of the tendency to treat different kinds of Moore-like antiskeptical arguments as if they were equivalent.

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Item Type:	Published Article or Volume
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Pérez Otero, Manuel perez.otero@ub.edu
Additional Information:	ISSN: 0495-4548 (print)
Keywords:	aseverar, argumentar, implicaturas argumentativas, petición de principio, argumentos antiescépticos, máxima conversacional, Williamson, Grice, Jackson, Moore, assertion, argumentation, argumentative implicatures, begging the question, antiskeptical arguments, conversational maxims
Depositing User:	Users 15304 not found.
Date Deposited:	28 Feb 2014 00:10
Last Modified:	28 Feb 2014 00:10
Item ID:	10379
Journal or Publication Title:	THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science
Publisher:	Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea / Universidad del País Vasco
Official URL:	http://www.ehu.es/ojs/index.php/THEORIA/article/vi...
DOI or Unique Handle:	10.1387/theoria.384
Date:	November 2009
Page Range:	pp. 63-81
Volume:	24
Number:	1
ISSN:	2171-679X
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/10379

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