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Species Pluralism Does Not Imply Species Eliminativism

Brigandt, Ingo (2002) Species Pluralism Does Not Imply Species Eliminativism. [Preprint]

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    Abstract

    Marc Ereshefsky argues that pluralism about species suggests that the species concept is not theoretically useful. It is to be abandoned in favor of several concrete species concepts that denote real categories. While accepting species pluralism, the present paper rejects eliminativism about the species category. It is argued that the species concept is important and that it is possible to make sense of a general species concept despite the existence of different concrete species concepts.


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    Item Type: Preprint
    Keywords: Biology, Systematics, Species, Conceptual Change, Natural Kinds
    Conferences and Volumes: [2002] Philosophy of Science Assoc. 18th Biennial Mtg - PSA 2002: Contributed Papers (Milwaukee, WI; 2002) > PSA 2002 Contributed Papers
    Depositing User: Program Committee
    Date Deposited: 23 Mar 2003
    Last Modified: 07 Oct 2010 11:11
    Item ID: 1055
    URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/1055

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