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Object and Event Concepts: A Cognitive Mechanism of Incommensurability

Chen, Xiang (2002) Object and Event Concepts: A Cognitive Mechanism of Incommensurability. [Preprint]

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    Abstract

    In this paper I examine a cognitive mechanism of incommensurability. Using the frame model of concept representation to capture structural relations within concepts, I reveal an ontological difference between object and event concepts: the former are spatial but the latter temporal. Experiments from cognitive sciences further demonstrate that the mind treats object and event concepts differently. Thus, incommensurability can occur in conceptual change across different ontological categories. I use a historical case to illustrate how the ontological difference between an object and an event concept actually caused incommensurability in the context of 19th-century optics. The cognitive and historical analyses indicate that incommensurability can be a local phenomenon and does not necessarily imply incomparability.


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    Item Type: Preprint
    Keywords: Theory Change, Cognitive Science, History of Science Case Studies, General Philosophy of Science
    Conferences and Volumes: [2002] Philosophy of Science Assoc. 18th Biennial Mtg - PSA 2002: Contributed Papers (Milwaukee, WI; 2002) > PSA 2002 Contributed Papers
    Depositing User: Program Committee
    Date Deposited: 23 Mar 2003
    Last Modified: 07 Oct 2010 11:11
    Item ID: 1060
    URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/1060

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