Darling, Karen Merikangas
Motivational Realism: The Natural Classification for Pierre Duhem.
This paper addresses a central interpretive problem in understanding Pierre Duhem`s philosophy of science. The problem arises because there is textual support for both realist and antirealist readings of his work. I argue that his realist and antirealist claims are different. For Duhem, scientific reasoning leads straight to antirealism. But intuition (reasons of the heart) motivates, without justifying, a kind of realism. I develop this idea to suggest a motivational realist interpretation of Duhem`s philosophy.
|Darling, Karen Merikangas|
||Realism/Anti-Realism, Philosophers of Science, History of Philosophy of Science, General Philosophy of Science
||23 Mar 2003
||07 Oct 2010 15:11
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