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Functional Analysis and the Autonomy of Psychology

Feest, Uljana (2002) Functional Analysis and the Autonomy of Psychology. [Preprint]

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    Abstract

    This paper examines the notion that psychology is autonomous. It is argued that we need to distinguish between (a) the question of whether psychological explanations are autonomous, and (b) the question of whether the process of psychological discovery is autonomous. The issue is approached by providing a re-interpretation of Robert Cummins� notion of functional analysis (FA). A distinction is drawn between FA as an explanatory strategy and FA as an investigative strategy. It is argued that the identification of functional components of the cognitive system may draw on knowledge about brain structure, without thereby jeopardizing the explanatory autonomy of psychology.


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    Item Type: Preprint
    Keywords: Psychology/Psychiatry, Function/Teleology, Cognitive Science, Specific Sciences, autonomy, functional analysis, reductionism, multiple realization, functionalism, Cummins
    Conferences and Volumes: [2002] Philosophy of Science Assoc. 18th Biennial Mtg - PSA 2002: Contributed Papers (Milwaukee, WI; 2002) > PSA 2002 Contributed Papers
    Depositing User: Program Committee
    Date Deposited: 23 Mar 2003
    Last Modified: 07 Oct 2010 11:11
    Item ID: 1065
    URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/1065

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