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Russell, Causation, Determinism

Eagle, Antony (2003) Russell, Causation, Determinism. UNSPECIFIED. (Unpublished)

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    Abstract

    Two arguments due to Russell are examined, and found to show that the notion of causation as full determination doesn’t mesh easily with deterministic global physics and the distinction between effective and ineffective strategies. But a concept of local causation as involving a certain kind of counterfactual dependence is, I argue, compatible with Russell’s conclusions. I defend it from a resurgent form of Russell’s microphysical determinism argument by using some slightly contentious claims about the autonomy of the events posited by the special sciences.


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    Item Type: Other
    Keywords: Bertrand Russell
    Subjects: Specific Sciences > Physics > Classical Physics
    General Issues > Causation
    General Issues > Reductionism/Holism
    Depositing User: Antony Eagle
    Date Deposited: 31 Jul 2003
    Last Modified: 07 Oct 2010 11:11
    Item ID: 1261
    Public Domain: No
    URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/1261

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