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Three ways of worrying about 'causation'

Spurrett, David and Ross, Don (2003) Three ways of worrying about 'causation'. UNSPECIFIED. (Unpublished)

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    Abstract

    Our point of departure is Russell’s (1913) argument for the ‘complete extrusion’ of the word ‘cause’ from the philosophical vocabulary. We argue that at least three different types of philosophical project concerning ‘cause’ should be carefully distinguished, and that failures to distinguish them lie at the root of some apparently recalcitrant problems. We call them the ‘cognitive’, the ‘scientific’ and the ‘metaphysical’.


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    Item Type: Other
    Keywords: Causation, information, anticipation, metaphysics of causation
    Subjects: General Issues > Causation
    Depositing User: David Jon Spurrett
    Date Deposited: 05 Aug 2003
    Last Modified: 07 Oct 2010 11:11
    Item ID: 1279
    Public Domain: No
    URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/1279

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