Hicks, Michael Townsen (2017) Dynamic Humeanism. [Preprint]

Preview

Text Dynamic Humeanism Penultimate Draft.pdf Download (312kB) | Preview

Abstract

Humean accounts of laws of nature fail to distinguish between dynamic laws and static initial conditions. But this distinction plays a central role in scientific theorizing and explanation. I motivate the claim that this distinction should matter for the Humean, and show that current views lack the resources to explain it. I then develop a regularity theory which captures this distinction. My view takes empirical accessibility to be one of the primary features of laws, and I identify features laws must have to be empirically accessible. I then argue that laws with these features tend to be dynamic.

---

Export/Citation:

EndNote | BibTeX | Dublin Core | ASCII/Text Citation (Chicago) | HTML Citation | OpenURL

Social Networking:

Share |

---

Item Type:	Preprint
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Hicks, Michael Townsen hicksmt@gmail.com
Keywords:	Humean, physics, metaphysics, metaphysics of laws, Humeanism
Subjects:	General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics General Issues > Laws of Nature Specific Sciences > Physics
Depositing User:	Dr. Michael Townsen Hicks
Date Deposited:	15 Mar 2018 15:41
Last Modified:	15 Mar 2018 15:41
Item ID:	13097
Official URL:	https://academic.oup.com/bjps/advance-article/doi/...
DOI or Unique Handle:	https://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/axx006
Subjects:	General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics General Issues > Laws of Nature Specific Sciences > Physics
Date:	2017
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/13097

Monthly Views for the past 3 years

Monthly Downloads for the past 3 years

Plum Analytics

Altmetric.com

Actions (login required)

View Item