1 Introduction

There are many interpretations of probabilities. Following Ian Hacking, we can say that they fall into two broad categories: belief-type and frequency-type interpretations. According to the belief-type interpretation, probabil-
ities “are degrees to which someone believes or should believe” (Hacking 2001, p.132). On the other hand, a frequency-type interpretation implies that a probability describes a physical property (i.e., a relative frequency, a propensity, or a disposition).

There is a vast philosophical literature on this topic (See Hajek 2012; Gillies 2000; Hacking 2001; Eagle 2010) and some have come to believe that there is no such thing as the correct interpretation:

Each interpretation that we have canvassed seems to capture some crucial insight into a concept of it, yet falls short of doing complete justice to this concept. Perhaps the full story about probability is something of a patchwork, with partially overlapping pieces. In that sense, the above interpretations might be regarded as complementary, although to be sure each may need some further refinement (Hajek 2012).

In this paper, I aim to provide more support to this claim by pointing out that we often combine various interpretations of probability when we make scientific inferences. Of course, links between the two interpretations have been made in the philosophical literature. They are usually to the effect that knowing the stochastic properties of a physical system should influence our degrees of beliefs about that system. Here is a classic example:

Knowing the objective probability of getting heads with a particular coin should, it seems reasonable to believe, also tell you how likely it is that the next toss of the coin will yield a head. (Howson and Urbach 2006, p.15-16).
But here I want to underscore something totally different. I want to show that a pluralist account of probability is desirable for its practical benefits. The fact is that a probability density function \( f(x) \) that represents our posterior belief about a parameter of interest within a Bayesian inferential framework, can be very difficult to compute. Yet, if we give a frequentist interpretation to that very same density \( f(x) \), then we can easily resolve that computational problem.

In other words, I aim to support a pluralist interpretation of probability by pointing out that a frequentist interpretation of probability is very useful in order to proceed with purely Bayesian inferences. Both interpretations complement each other in practice in a way that has not yet been addressed by philosophers (it will thus come as no surprise that I do not reference many philosophical papers). This absence from the philosophical literature can perhaps be attributed to a bias towards theoretical concerns as opposed to the actual computational challenges involved in making statistical inferences.

This paper is divided into three main parts. In the first part, I will introduce the basics of Bayesian inferences and the computational challenges that it faces. In the second part, I explain how we can meet those challenges with Markov Chains Monte Carlo (MCMC) algorithms. In the final part, I will underscore that such algorithms rest on a frequency-type interpretation of probability and that they also illustrate the importance of computer simulations in scientific inferences. They have received very little attention in philosophy circles and it is time to catch up with the scientific practice.
2 The Computational Challenge

The principle behind any Bayesian statistical inference is relatively simple. Before we obtain any data, we have prior beliefs about a parameter (it can be a vector) of interest. According to a belief-type interpretation of probability, we can express those prior belief with a probability density (or mass) function $f(\theta)$ over all the possible values that $\theta$ can take. That function is called “the prior”.

The Bayesian inferential procedure consists in updating our prior beliefs with the help of the data, by using the following rule (Bayes’ Theorem):

$$f(\theta|\text{data}) = \frac{f(\text{data}|\theta)f(\theta)}{f(\text{data})}$$

In that expression, $f(\text{data}|\theta)$ is called ”the likelihood” and $f(\theta|\text{data})$, ”the posterior distribution”. The latter is what we are ultimately looking to find. $f(\text{data})$ represents our prior beliefs about the data. It is also called ”the normalising constant”. In fact, we can write Bayes’ Theorem as follows:

$$f(\theta|\text{data}) \propto f(\text{data}|\theta)f(\theta)$$

As we can see, this inferential framework is quite straightforward and in some cases it can be easy to implement as well. To see this, let us consider the following example.

Suppose that we make 100 independent observations $(x_1, x_2, ... x_{100})$ generated by an exponential distribution with an unknown parameter $\lambda$ and that our goal is to estimate that parameter according to the Bayesian framework. A natural starting point would be to find the likelihood function:

$$f(x|\lambda) = \lambda^{100}e^{-100\lambda x}$$
Next, we might want to choose a gamma distribution for a prior because it is the conjugate prior to the likelihood of an exponential distribution. This means that the multiplication of a gamma distribution with the likelihood of an exponential distribution will result in another gamma distribution - a well known distribution. Conjugate priors are thus particularly useful because they allow us to determine a familiar posterior distribution without having to find the normalising constant. In the case at hand, it implies that we do not need to compute the following integral:

\[
\int f(x|\lambda)f(\lambda)d\lambda
\]

Indeed, given Bayes’ Theorem, we know that

\[
f(\lambda|x) \propto \lambda^{100}e^{-100\bar{x}\lambda} \lambda^{\alpha-1}e^{-\lambda\beta} \\
\propto \lambda^{(\alpha+100)-1}e^{-\lambda(100\bar{x}+\beta)}
\]

Thus we can immediately see that the posterior distribution is a gamma distribution with parameters \((\alpha + 100)\) and \((100\bar{x} + \beta)\). In sum, if we wish to make a Bayesian inference about \(\lambda\), all we need to do is to specify the parameters of the conjugate prior distribution (the hyperparameters) that best correspond to our prior beliefs and simply update the parameters of that conjugate prior in order to find the posterior distribution.

Unfortunately, we cannot always use this neat trick. It is not applicable in every context. The appropriate posterior function does not always have a familiar functional form. We thus eventually have to face the burden of solving complex and high dimensional integrals in order to find the normalising constant or posterior probabilities. In fact, Bayesian statistics relies heavily on our capacity to integrate complex and high dimensional
functions for calculating marginal posterior distributions or posterior ex-
pectations as well (Brooks 1998, p.69).

When an explicit evaluation of those integrals is not possible, then we
need to use algorithms that allow us to make reasonable approximations.
MCMC algorithms are a family of algorithms that are used precisely for
that purpose. "MCMC has proven to be extremely helpful for such Bayesian
estimates, and MCMC is now extremely widely used in the Bayesian sta-
tistical community" (Roberts et al. 2004, p.22).

According to some, those algorithms actually revolutionised the field of
Bayesian statistics:

Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) techniques [...] have rev-
olutionized the field of Bayesian statistics. Prior to Gelfand
and Smith (1990) demonstrating the applicability of MCMC to
problems of Bayesian inference in 1990, Bayesian statistics had
been a largely academic, and somewhat controversial, pursuit.
Since that time, however, a great many applied scientists, in all
fields of research, have embraced the ideas behind the Bayesian
paradigm (Lunn et al. 2009, p.1).

Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods are probably the
most exciting development in statistics within the last ten years.
The techniques comprising MCMC are extraordinarily general,
and their use has dramatically reshaped the way applied statist-
ticians go about their work. Models long thought to be in the
"too hard” basket are now well within the reach of quantitative
researchers. In short, MCMC constitutes a revolution in statisti-
tical practice, with effects just beginning to be felt within the
social sciences (Jackman 2000, p.375).

In the next section, I will explain the basic characteristics of such algorithms and give an elementary example of a Metropolis-Hastings MCMC algorithm. This will allow me to show how frequentist-type interpretation of probabilities play a crucial role in the application Bayesian inferences in science.

3 Markov Chains Monte Carlo Algorithms

MCMC algorithms rely on two basic ideas: Monte Carlo integrations and Markov chains. Monte Carlo methods consist in using repeated random sampling to estimate certain quantities. Their name is a reference to Monte Carlo casinos. It was given by a group of scientists working on the Manhattan Project.

A Monte Carlo integration of a function is an approximation of the integration of that function. To use it, we need to follow two simple steps. Firstly, we need to express the integration that we wish to estimate in the form of an expected value with respect to a density $g(x)$:

$$ I = \int f(x)dx = \int \frac{f(x)}{g(x)}g(x)dx = \mathbb{E}_g \left[ \frac{f(x)}{g(x)} \right]. $$

Secondly, we use the following estimator for $I$:

$$ \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^{n} \frac{f(X_i)}{g(X_i)} $$

where $(X_1, X_2, X_3, ..., X_n)$ are independent variables that follow the distribution $g(x)$. The justification for this estimator is that the Strong Law of
Large Numbers implies that it will converge almost surely toward 1 as \( n \) goes to infinity.

When the integral that we wish to estimate is a cumulative distribution function, which is often the case in Bayesian scenarios, the estimator is even more straightforward to obtain:

\[
I^* = \int_{\infty}^{t} f(x) dx = \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} f(x) \mathbb{1}_{[-\infty,t]}(x) dx = \mathbb{E}_f[\mathbb{1}_{[-\infty,t]}]
\]

Thus we are going to estimate this integral with the empirical cumulative distribution

\[
\frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^{n} \mathbb{1}_{[-\infty,t]}(x_i)
\]

and a sample of independent variables that follow the distribution \( f(x) \) (notice that the expected value here is with respect to \( f(x) \)).

In short, Monte Carlo estimators are very useful and they can be used in a wide variety of contexts. But we need to be able to draw a sample of independent and identically distributed variables that follow a specific density in order to use them and this is not always an easy task. In a Bayesian context for example, we might not even know the normalising constant of the density that we are trying to integrate. This is where Markov chains come in handy.

Markov chains describe a stochastic physical process. They describe the movement of a point in space and in time. With appropriate random number generators, Markov chains allow us to generate a sample from a distribution that we want to estimate. With that sample we can use Monte Carlo estimators and make inferences about the distribution of interest.

To understand this in more details, let \( X_t \) stand for the value of a random variable at time \( t \). Let \( t \) be a natural number (discrete time) and the
possible values of $X_t$, the real numbers (uncountable state space). Finally, let us define a density $K$, which is a kernel of transition, such that

$$P(a < X_{t+1} < b|X_t = x_t, X_{t-1} = x_{t-1}, ..., X_0 = x_0)$$

$$=$$

$$P(a < X_{t+1} < b|X_t = x_t)$$

$$=$$

$$\int_a^b K(x_{t+1}|X_t = x_t)$$

We have thus defined a Markov chain on an un-countable state space that can fully describe a random walk on that state space. Such a random walk can be seen a point (a particle) that moves in time on the real line according to the kernel of transition. In other words, the value of the variable $X$ can change at any given time according to $K$.

If it is possible to transition to any state from any state, then that chain is said to be irreducible. Moreover, if for any state we can occupy that state two consecutive times in a row, then that chain is said to be aperiodic and positively recurrent. If a Markov chain is irreducible, aperiodic, and positively recurrent, then it has a unique stationary distribution. This means that as time goes infinity, the sequence of random variables that define the chain will tend to follow a unique probability distribution $p(x)$.

Now the “magic” of MCMC algorithms is to create a Markov chain such that its stationary distribution is precisely the distribution from which we want to obtain a sample in order to use Monte Carlo integrations. With enough iteration of that chain, we will indeed obtain the appropriate sam-
ple that we need.

In simple terms, this means that if we are trying to compute a probability density \( f(x) \) that represents a posterior distribution within a Bayesian framework and that we can create a physical stochastic system such that its stationary density is precisely \( f(x) \), then we can use a Monte Carlo integration in order to estimate \( f(x) \) by sampling many times from the stationary distribution. Given that the Monte Carlo estimation of the stationary distribution is easier to find than to compute the posterior distribution, then we will use the frequentist interpretation of \( f(x) \) in order to solve a computational problem that stemmed from a subjective interpretation of \( f(x) \).

This interplay of interpretations in order to find convenient computational solutions to a given problem shows how both interpretations of probability are intertwined in the scientific practice. It is a vivid example of a pluralistic interpretation of a concept at play in the scientific practice.

3.1 A Metropolis-Hastings Algorithm

There are of course many MCMC algorithms. Here I will present a very simple one. It is a Metropolis-Hastings algorithm. Let \( f(x) \) be the density that we are trying to sample from. A specific version of the algorithm can be described as follows (See Brooks 1998 and the Appendix for more details. Here I use the notation from this reference which is coherent with the previous notation).

1. Choose a starting point on the support of \( f(x) \): \( x_0 \).

2. Generate \( x_{\text{new}} \) with a transition kernel centred on \( x_0 \): \( K(x_0 \rightarrow x_{\text{new}}) \).
   That kernel will be a symmetric density centred on \( x_0 \) that will guarantee that \( K(x_0 \rightarrow x_{\text{new}}) = K(x_{\text{new}} \rightarrow x_0) \).
3. Compute the probability $\alpha$ of transitioning to the state $x_{new}$:

$$\alpha = \min \left[ 1, \frac{f(x_{new})K(x_0 \rightarrow x_{new})}{f(x_0)K(x_{new} \rightarrow x_0)} \right]$$

4. Draw a random number $u$ from a uniform distribution on $[0, 1]$. If $u < \alpha$, then take $x_{new}$ as the new starting point and start over again. If not, then stay at $x_0$ and start over again.

Notice that the normalisation constant of $f(x)$ will be cancelled by the division in step 3. So we never need to know it in the first place. Moreover, we have just created a Markov chain with a unique stationary distribution. With the appropriate kernel of transition the state space of the Markov chain will be the support of $f(x)$; it will be possible to access any state from any state; and it is possible to remain in any state from any state. Also, the fact that stationary distribution is $f(x)$ is guaranteed by the choice of the kernel (See Tierney 1994).

To see this algorithm at work in a Bayesian context, let us apply it to the problem presented in section 2. This will provide a tidy and vivid illustration. We can also easily make all the computations with the program R (See the Appendix). Furthermore, we will be able to compare the results with the true posterior distribution.

For the sake of this example, let us say that $\lambda = 5$. With this information we will be able to generate a sample of a 100 independent observations from that exponential distribution and try to estimate $\lambda$. Once we have completed this step, we then define the likelihood function and the conjugate prior as we did before. We then choose the parameters for the conjugate prior (the hyperparameters). This choice is determined by our prior beliefs about $\lambda$. Let us agree on $\beta = 0.5$ and $\alpha = 2$. Finally, we compute a Metropolis-Hastings 100 000 times, with a starting value of 1 and a
Figure 1: An application of a Metropolis-Hastings algorithm to estimate the parameter of an exponential distribution

normal kernel of transition of variance equal to 1. It is important to let the chain run for a long time in order to approximate the stationary distribution. The resulting random walk $z1$ can be visualised in Figure 1.

If we make an histogram of the resulting sample, we can see (Figure 2) that we have a pretty good estimate of the true posterior distribution (represented in red) for the parameter $\lambda$. Even if our sample does not consist of independent observations, the convergence toward the stationary distribution allows for the application of Monte Carlo integrations. We can thus make various inferences about $\lambda$ by using the empirical cumulative distribution (See section 3). For example, we can estimate a 95% credibility interval for $\lambda$ (See Appendix):

$$CI = [3.859203; 5.688675]$$
Figure 2: An histogram estimate of the true posterior distribution (red line) based on a sample obtained with a MCMC algorithm.

This means that the probability that the true value for $\lambda$ belongs to $CI$ is 0.95.

4 Frequency-Type Interpretations of Probability and MCMC algorithms

In sum, the goal of the previous algorithm is to estimate an unknown density that represents our posterior belief about $\lambda$. One of the things that we know about that density is that we can also define it as the stationary density of a Markov chain. It is the exact same density! In other words, we know that the density can describe our posterior belief about $\lambda$ and that it can also describe the long run behavior of a Markov chain.
Knowing about this dual description, we therefore create a physical system, a Markov chain, that has the desired long run behavior. Consequently, we start the simulation and we let it run for a long time. We then compute appropriate Monte Carlo estimators with the resulting random walk. We finally end up estimating a density that describes the stationary distribution of the Markov chain our posterior belief about $\lambda$ at the same time.

What I want to underscore now is the use of random number generators in the MCMC algorithm. In order to create a sample from the posterior distribution (which is also a stationary density), we first had to generate a random sample that follows the density determined by the kernel of transition. This is the purpose of the R function “rnorm” in the code presented in the Appendix. It is used in order to complete step 2 of the algorithm. We also had to generate a sample from a uniform distribution in step 4 of the algorithm. This is why we used the R function “runif” in the Appendix. In other words, the validity of the MCMC algorithm and of the underlying Bayesian inference crucially depended on our capacity to generate numbers that follow a very specific probability density (the kernel of transition or the uniform distribution).

By definition random number generators are described by a frequency-type interpretation of probability (otherwise they would not be random). The theoretical foundation of a MCMC algorithms rests on genuine physical randomness. If the random walk did not objectively display the desired physical stochastic behaviour of the stationary density, regardless of our beliefs, then we would not be able to produce adequate estimates.

Of course, we only need physical processes that simulate genuine randomness in order to obtain satisfactory results. The R functions that I have used are only pseudo-random generators. But pseudo-random genera-
tors are useful insofar as they can approximate genuine physical randomness and genuine physical randomness only makes sense when we use a frequency-type interpretation of probability.

5 Conclusion

At last, we are in a position to assess the different interpretations of probability that are at play when we use a MCMC algorithm, like the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm, in a Bayesian context. Here is the main “take-away” argument in a nutshell:

- When a density \( f(x) \), representing our posterior beliefs about a parameter is difficult to compute, we often create a stochastic physical process such that its stationary density is precisely \( f(x) \). By using Monte Carlo integrations based on samples from that stationary density we can relatively easily estimate \( f(x) \). This shows how a frequency-type interpretation of probability can be used in some Bayesian inferences because the random walk created by the Markov chain need to objectively display (or approximate) the desired physical stochastic behaviour of the stationary density, regardless of our beliefs, in order to produce adequate estimates.

Note that I am not arguing that the resulting Bayesian inferences are actually a frequentist inferences. I am pointing out that different interpretations of probability yield different methods to estimate functions such that the same probability density \( f(x) \) can be estimated with more ease if we use its alternative interpretation. Hence, a pluralist account of probability is desirable for its practical benefits.
Some authors have already mentioned the possibility of a pluralist interpretation of probability. I have argued that it is already implemented in the scientific practice by shedding light on the importance of MCMC methods. This was missing from the philosophical literature.

This interplay of interpretation cannot be easily observed through the usual theoretical study of the notions of probability that we often encounter in the philosophical literature. It become apparent when we study the practical challenges of computing certain functions. This is an aspect of statistical inferences that has been ignored for too long in philosophy of science.

References


Simple Example

I give a simple example of a MCMC algorithm to estimate the posterior distribution of the parameter (\(\lambda\)) of an exponential distribution. I use the conjugate prior \(\text{beta}(2, 0.5)\).

For numerical stability, I use the log of the prior, of the likelihood, and of the posterior. Notice that I do not need to take any constant into account when I construct those functions.

Generate the sample from an exponential distribution (\(\lambda=5\))

```r
set.seed(3934)
n=100
x1<-rexp(n, 5)
```

Define the log-prior (conjugate), the log-likelihood, and the log-posterior

```r
logprior< function(bet, alph, lam){
  log(lam)*(alph-1)-(lam*bet)
}

loglikelihood< function(lam){
  n*log(lam)-lam*n*mean(x1)
}

logposterior=function(lam){
  loglikelihood(lam)+logprior(0.5, 2, lam)
}
```

Define the MCMC algorithm with a normal kernel

```r
MCMC <- function(niter, start, kernelsd){
  x<-rep(0,niter)
x[1]<-start
  for(i in 2:niter){
    currentx<-x[i-1]
    proposedx<-rnorm(1,mean=currentx,sd=kernelsd)
    A<-logposterior(proposedx)-logposterior(currentx)
    if(log(runif(1))<A){
      x[i]<-proposedx
    } else {
      x[i]<-currentx
    }
  }
}
Generate the random walk and an estimator for the posterior

\[ z_1 = \text{MCMC}(100000, 1, 1) \]

```r
# plot(z1, type="l", col=3)
# hist(z1, 50, freq=F, xlim=c(0.8, 8), ylim=c(0, 1), col="blue")
# curve(dgamma(x, 102, 0.5+n*(mean(x1))), xlim=c(0.8, 8), ylim=c(0, 1), col="red", lwd=3, add=T)
```

**Compute a 95% credibility interval for lambda**

```r
o <- z1[order(z1)]
lowerbound <- o[2501]
upperbound <- o[97500]
credibilityint <- c(lowerbound, upperbound)
credibilityint
## [1] 3.859203 5.688675
```