PhilSci Archive

Kinds Of Probabilism

Galavotti, Maria Carla (2001) Kinds Of Probabilism. [Preprint]

[img] Microsoft Word (.doc)
Download (201Kb)

    Abstract

    The first part of the article deals with the theories of probability and induction put forward by Hans Reichenbach and Rudolf Carnap. It will be argued that, despite fundamental differences, Carnap's and Reichenbach's views on probability are closely linked with the problem of meaning generated by logical empiricism, and are characterized by the logico-semantical approach typical of this philosophical current. Moreover, their notions of probability are both meant to combine a logical and an empirical element. Of these, Carnap over the years put more and more emphasis on the logical aspect, while for Reichenbach the empirical aspect has always been predominant. Seen in this light, Carnap's and Reichenbach's theories of probability can be taken to represent the Viennese and Berlinese mainstreams of the common logical empiricist approach. The second part of the article contrasts the position of these authors with that of the Bruno de Finetti, who is the main representative of the subjective interpretation of probability. Though the latter is sometimes associated with the position taken by Carnap in his late writings, it will be argued that the two are in many ways irreconcilable.


    Export/Citation:EndNote | BibTeX | Dublin Core | ASCII/Text Citation (Chicago) | HTML Citation | OpenURL
    Social Networking:

    Item Type: Preprint
    Keywords: logical empiricism, probability
    Subjects: General Issues > Logical Positivism/Logical Empiricism
    Depositing User: Maria Carla Galavotti
    Date Deposited: 08 Feb 2001
    Last Modified: 07 Oct 2010 11:10
    Item ID: 133
    URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/133

    Actions (login required)

    View Item

    Document Downloads