PhilSci Archive

In Defence of Constructive Empiricism: Metaphpysics versus Science

Muller, F.A. (2003) In Defence of Constructive Empiricism: Metaphpysics versus Science. UNSPECIFIED. (In Press)

[img]
Preview
PDF
Versus.PDF

Download (255kB)

Abstract

A defence of constructive empiricism against an attack of N. Maxwell by means of his pet-thesis that science implicitly and permanently accepts a metaphysical thesis about the nature of the universe. We argue that Maxwell's attack can be beaten off; that his arguments do not establish what Maxwell believes they establish; and that we can draw a number of valuable lessons from these attacks about the nature of science and of the libertatian nature of constructive empiricism.


Export/Citation: EndNote | BibTeX | Dublin Core | ASCII/Text Citation (Chicago) | HTML Citation | OpenURL
Social Networking:
Share |

Item Type: Other
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Muller, F.A.
Additional Information: -
Keywords: constructive empiricism, metaphysical realism
Subjects: General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
Depositing User: F.A. Muller
Date Deposited: 05 Sep 2003
Last Modified: 07 Oct 2010 15:12
Item ID: 1371
Public Domain: Yes
Commentary on: -
URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/1371

Monthly Views for the past 3 years

Monthly Downloads for the past 3 years

Plum Analytics

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item