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In Defence of Constructive Empiricism: Metaphpysics versus Science

Muller, F.A. (2003) In Defence of Constructive Empiricism: Metaphpysics versus Science. UNSPECIFIED. (In Press)

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    Abstract

    A defence of constructive empiricism against an attack of N. Maxwell by means of his pet-thesis that science implicitly and permanently accepts a metaphysical thesis about the nature of the universe. We argue that Maxwell's attack can be beaten off; that his arguments do not establish what Maxwell believes they establish; and that we can draw a number of valuable lessons from these attacks about the nature of science and of the libertatian nature of constructive empiricism.


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    Item Type: Other
    Additional Information: -
    Keywords: constructive empiricism, metaphysical realism
    Subjects: General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
    Depositing User: F.A. Muller
    Date Deposited: 05 Sep 2003
    Last Modified: 07 Oct 2010 11:12
    Item ID: 1371
    Public Domain: Yes
    Commentary on: -
    URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/1371

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