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Why the Converse Consequence Condition cannot be accepted

Moretti, Luca (2003) Why the Converse Consequence Condition cannot be accepted. [Preprint]

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      Abstract

      Three confirmation principles discussed by Hempel are the Converse Consequence Condition, the Special Consequence Condition and the Entailment Condition. Le Morvan (1999) has argued that, when the choice among confirmation principles is just about them, it is the Converse Consequence Condition that must be rejected. In this paper, I make this argument definitive. In doing that, I will provide an indisputable proof that the simple conjunction of the Converse Consequence Condition and the Entailment Condition yields a disastrous consequence.


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      Item Type: Preprint
      Additional Information: This paper was published in Analysis 63, 4 (2003).
      Keywords: Converse Consequence Condition, confirmation principle, paradox, hypothetico-deductivism, Hempel, Le Morvan.
      Subjects: General Issues > Confirmation/Induction
      Depositing User: Luca Moretti
      Date Deposited: 22 Sep 2003
      Last Modified: 07 Oct 2010 11:12
      Item ID: 1402
      URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/1402

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