PhilSci Archive

Mechanistic Causation and Constraints: Perspectival Parts and Powers, Non-Perspectival Modal Patterns

Winning, Jason (2018) Mechanistic Causation and Constraints: Perspectival Parts and Powers, Non-Perspectival Modal Patterns. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.

WarningThere is a more recent version of this item available.
[img]
Preview
Text
Winning_Mechanistic_Causation_and_Constraints_BJPS_postprint.pdf

Download (240kB) | Preview

Abstract

Any successful account of the metaphysics of mechanistic causation must satisfy at least five key desiderata. In this paper, I lay out these five desiderata and explain why existing accounts of the metaphysics of mechanistic causation fail to satisfy them. I then present an alternative account which does satisfy the five desiderata. According to this alternative account, we must resort to a type of ontological entity that is new to metaphysics, but not to science: constraints. In this paper, I explain how a constraints-based metaphysics fits best with the emerging consensus on the nature of mechanistic explanation.


Export/Citation: EndNote | BibTeX | Dublin Core | ASCII/Text Citation (Chicago) | HTML Citation | OpenURL
Social Networking:
Share |

Item Type: Published Article or Volume
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Winning, Jasonjason.winning@gmail.com0000-0002-9871-2684
Keywords: Constraints, Causal Powers, Mechanistic Causation, Structural Realism, Classical Mechanics, Mechanistic Explanation
Subjects: General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics
Specific Sciences > Biology
General Issues > Causation
Specific Sciences > Complex Systems
Specific Sciences > Physics > Classical Physics
General Issues > Explanation
General Issues > Laws of Nature
General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
Depositing User: Jason Winning
Date Deposited: 31 Mar 2018 02:51
Last Modified: 31 Mar 2018 02:51
Item ID: 14506
Journal or Publication Title: British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
Subjects: General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics
Specific Sciences > Biology
General Issues > Causation
Specific Sciences > Complex Systems
Specific Sciences > Physics > Classical Physics
General Issues > Explanation
General Issues > Laws of Nature
General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
Date: 2018
URI: https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/14506

Available Versions of this Item

Monthly Views for the past 3 years

Monthly Downloads for the past 3 years

Plum Analytics

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item