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Pragmatic Causation

Eagle, Antony (2003) Pragmatic Causation. UNSPECIFIED. (Unpublished)

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    Abstract

    Two arguments due to Russell are examined, and found to show that the notion of causation as full determination doesn’t mesh easily with deterministic global physics and the distinction between effective and ineffective strategies. But a local notion of causation as involving a certain kind of counterfactual dependence is, I argue, compatible with Russell’s conclusions. I defend it from a resurgent form of Russell’s microphysical determinism argument by deploying a pragmatic account of the nature and function of scientific theories.


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    Item Type: Other
    Keywords: pragmatism causation
    Subjects: General Issues > Causation
    General Issues > Determinism/Indeterminism
    Depositing User: Antony Eagle
    Date Deposited: 13 Nov 2003
    Last Modified: 07 Oct 2010 11:12
    Item ID: 1468
    Public Domain: No
    URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/1468

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