Eagle, Antony (2003) Pragmatic Causation. UNSPECIFIED. (Unpublished)
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Two arguments due to Russell are examined, and found to show that the notion of causation as full determination doesn’t mesh easily with deterministic global physics and the distinction between effective and ineffective strategies. But a local notion of causation as involving a certain kind of counterfactual dependence is, I argue, compatible with Russell’s conclusions. I defend it from a resurgent form of Russell’s microphysical determinism argument by deploying a pragmatic account of the nature and function of scientific theories.
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|Subjects:||General Issues > Causation|
General Issues > Determinism/Indeterminism
|Depositing User:||Antony Eagle|
|Date Deposited:||13 Nov 2003|
|Last Modified:||07 Oct 2010 11:12|
Available Versions of this Item
- Russell, Causation, Determinism. (deposited 31 Jul 2003)
- Pragmatic Causation. (deposited 13 Nov 2003)[Currently Displayed]
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