McDonald, Jennifer (2018) The Proportionality of Common Sense Causal Claims. In: UNSPECIFIED.

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Abstract

This paper defends strong proportionality against what I take to be its principal objection – that proportionality fails to preserve common sense causal intuitions – by articulating independently plausible constraints on how to represent causal situations. I first assume an interventionist formulation of proportionality, following Woodward. This views proportionality as a relational constraint on variable selection in causal modeling that requires that changes in the cause variable line up with those in the effect variable. I then argue that the principal objection derives from a failure to recognize two constraints on variable selection presupposed by interventionism: exhaustivity and exclusivity.

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Item Type:	Conference or Workshop Item (UNSPECIFIED)
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID McDonald, Jennifer jenniferrosemcdonald@gmail.com
Keywords:	proportional causation, causation, causal models, interventionism
Subjects:	General Issues > Causation General Issues > Models and Idealization
Depositing User:	Ms Jennifer McDonald
Date Deposited:	29 Oct 2018 19:50
Last Modified:	29 Oct 2018 19:50
Item ID:	15211
Subjects:	General Issues > Causation General Issues > Models and Idealization
Date:	28 October 2018
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/15211

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• The Proportionality of Common Sense Causal Claims. (deposited 29 Oct 2018 19:50) [Currently Displayed]
  • Strong Proportionality and Causal Claims. (deposited 14 Jan 2020 01:55)

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