WHAT, PRECISELY, IS CARTER’S DOOMSDAY ARGUMENT?

Abstract. Paying strict attention to Brandon Carter’s several published renditions of anthropic reasoning, we present a “nutshell” version of the Doomsday argument that is truer to Carter’s principles than the standard balls-and-urns or otherwise “naive Bayesian” versions that proliferate in the literature. At modest cost in terms of complication, the argument avoids commitment to many of the half-truths that have inspired so many to rise up against other toy versions, never adopting posterior outside of the convex hull of one’s prior distribution over the “true chance” of Doom. The hyper-pessimistic position of the standard balls-and-urn presentation and the hyper-optimistic position of naive self-indicators are seen to arise from dubiously extreme prior distributions, leaving room for a more satisfying and plausible intermediate solution.

1. Introduction

Anthropic reasoning principles leading eventually to one version of the so-called Doomsday Argument (see also Gott 1993, Nielson 1989) arose in the seventies in two papers by theoretical physicists (Collins and Hawking 1973, Carter 1974). Brandon Carter in particular is often credited as the most important early proponent of this sort of reasoning in general and the Doomsday argument in particular. Leslie (1989, 1992, 1996), “working only from rumours about how Carter was running it”, proposed a balls-and-urn version of the Doomsday argument. Bostrom (1999, 2001) presents similar “nutshell” cases. The following is representative:

Doomsday: Assume two equally likely scenarios: humanity will suffer extinction sooner (Quick Doom), in which case there will be a total of 200 billion humans, or humanity will suffer extinction later (Later Doom), in which case there will be a total of 200 trillion humans. You learn first that you are a member of this indeterminately sized population. At this point your credence in Quick Doom is \( \frac{1}{2} \). Next, you learn that you are among the first 200 billion humans. That fact, conditional on Quick Doom, has probability one. Conditional on Later Doom, it has probability \( \frac{1}{1000} \). Therefore, you ought to update your credence in Quick Doom to \( \frac{1000}{1001} \) by, e.g., Bayes’ Theorem:

\[
P(Q|E) = \frac{P(Q)P(E|Q)}{P(Q)P(E|Q) + P(L)P(E|L)} = \frac{\frac{1}{2} \cdot 1}{\frac{1}{2} \cdot 1 + \frac{1}{2} \cdot \frac{1}{1000}} = \frac{1000}{1001}.
\]

(Here \( Q \) = Quick Doom, \( L \) = Later Doom and \( E \) = Early Birth Rank.)

Proceeding from the assumption that this is his argument, it would be very easy to get the impression (as many have) that Carter is badly mistaken. One might reach this conclusion, for example, by considering an augmentation in which for each “civilization” in an infinite cosmos, a fair coin is tossed once the population reaches 200 billion. If heads, the civilization is destroyed. If tails, the civilization is destroyed when the population reaches 200 trillion. The mistake in Doomsday,
one then reasons, is that at the point where you have learned you are human, but
have yet to learn your birth rank, your credence in *Later Doom* should be exactly
one thousand times greater than your credence in *Quick Doom*, for the reason
that (in any large enough region) one expects that one thousand times fewer of
your epistemic counterparts’ civilizations suffer early extinction than do not.¹

But *Doomsday* is an oversimplification—an extreme case of what Carter (1983)
actually describes.² We don’t claim that Leslie and Bostrom are confused on
this point; each makes numerous qualifications and offers scenarios in which the
Bayesian calculation of *Doomsday* is taken not to apply. Neither, however, offers
an argument that is both general enough to avoid the need for qualification and
formal enough to satisfy skeptics who insist that the favoring of *Quick Doom* be
rendered in *some* sort of “rigorous calculation”.³ Our purpose here is to show
what such a calculation looks like. This will expose, in particular, that Carter
wasn’t wrong at all—not, at least, for any of the reasons these skeptics have offered.

2. CARTER’S ANTHROPIC PRINCIPLE

Carter (1983) contains a concise formulation of the anthropic principle:

“In a typical application of the anthropic (self-selection) principle, one is
engaged in a scientific discrimination process of the usual kind in which one
wishes to compare the plausibility of a set of alternative hypotheses, *H(T₁)*,
say, to the effect that respectively one or other of a corresponding set of
theories *T₁, T₂, …* is valid for some particular application in the light of
some observational or experimental evidence *E*, say. Such a situation can
be analysed in a traditional Bayesian framework by attributing *a priori*
and *a posteriori* plausibility values (i.e. formal probability measures),
denoted by *pₓ* and *pₛ*, say, to each hypothesis respectively before and
after the evidence *E* is taken into account, so that for any particular
result *X* one has

\[ pₓ(X) = pₛ(X|E), \]

the standard symbol | indicating conditionality. According to the usual
Bayesian formula, the relative plausibility of two theories *A* and *B*, say, is
modified by a factor equal to the ratio of the corresponding conditional *a priori*
probabilities *pₛ(E|A)* and *pₛ(E|B)* for the occurrence of the result
*E* in the theories, i.e.

\[ \frac{pₓ(A)}{pₓ(B)} = \frac{pₛ(E|A)}{pₛ(E|B)} \left( \frac{pₛ(A)}{pₛ(B)} \right). \]

¹Such “self indication” (Bostrom’s terminology) reasoning is employed by Dieks (1992),
Bartha and Hitchcock (1999) and others in direct response to *Doomsday*, and appears to
be closely aligned with the majority thirdier response to the so-called “Sleeping Beauty”
problem. Bostrom’s (1999) thought-experiment (the *Presumptuous Philosopher*) cautions against its
too-liberal application, and is the most effective apologetic for Carter’s methods we know of.
²By analogy with other cases of anthropic reasoning; he didn’t publish on Doomsday *per se*.
³Leslie (1996) has on this point suggested that there isn’t *need* of a formal mathematical
presentation, but decades of entrenchment and thousands of pages of spilt ink suggest otherwise.
Carter stresses that the “Selected” or “Subjective” probability function \( p_S \) in (1) is related to an “Original” or “Objective” probability function \( p_O \) by \( p_S(\cdot) = p_O(\cdot|S) \), “where \( S \) denotes the totality of all the selection conditions that are implied by the hypothesis of application of the theory to a concrete experimental or observational situation, but which are not necessarily included in the abstract theory” on which \( p_O \) is based. In all three of the examples discussed in Carter (1983), one has

\[
\frac{p_S(E|A)}{p_S(E|B)} \neq \frac{p_O(E|A)}{p_O(E|B)},
\]

indeed, this is the hallmark of anthropic reasoning as Carter understands it.

It’s worth examining Carter’s explanation for this in the first of these examples, which he takes to be “the classic example of an argument based on the anthropic principle”. Here \( A \) is the hypothesis to the effect that the development of life is of common occurrence on ‘habitable’ planets, \( B \) is the hypothesis that life is very rare, even in favorable conditions, and \( E \) is the evidence consisting of the fact that on the only obviously ‘habitable’ planet we have yet been able to observe, namely our own, life does indeed exist.

“If future astronomical progress should one day enable us to observe a second example of occurrence of life on a randomly chosen ‘habitable planet’ belonging to a not too distant star in our Galaxy, the corresponding \textit{ab initio} probability ratio, \( \frac{p_A(E|A)}{p_A(E|B)} \gg 1 \), would justify the induction that hypothesis \( A \) (that life is common) was the most likely. However, so long as the only example at our disposal is our own, no such inference is permissible, since the anthropic selection principle ensures, as a virtual tautology, that one of the \textit{a priori} conditions, \( S \), that must be satisfied by the first planet available for investigation by us must be the prior occurrence of life, namely our own. Thus as in the previous example we obtain not only \( p_S(E|A) = 1 \) but also \( p_S(E|B) = 1 \), so that our observation has no discriminating power at all, and both...A and B remain equally viable.”

In a second example \( B \) is the hypothesis to the effect that gravitational coupling strength is fixed across time, while the evidence \( E \) is that of a seemingly fortuitous mathematical relationship between the Hubble time and the gravitational coupling constant. (Hypothesis \( A \) is that coupling strength increases across time to preserve this relationship.) According to Carter, in this case \( p_O(E|B) \ll 1 \) since the relationship can hold only in one particular epoch under the hypothesis that the coupling strength doesn’t vary, but \( p_S(E|B) \approx p_S(E|A) = 1 \) since “biological systems based on the same principles as our own” won’t exist in times where the relationship doesn’t hold. That is, the anthropic selection principle ensures that the seemingly fortuitous relationship between Hubble time and the gravitational coupling constant must be observed. As in the first example, then, hypothesis \( A \) is not confirmed by the observation.

In the third and final example, \( A \) is the hypothesis to the effect that the expected average time \( \bar{t} \) intrinsically most likely for the evolution of a system of observers intelligent enough to comprise a scientific civilization such as our own is geometrically small relative to the main sequence lifetime \( \tau \) of a typical star, during
which the energy output can maintain favorable conditions for life; hypothesis $B$ is that $t$ is geometrically large relative to $\tau$. Now $E$ is the evidence that the time $t_e \approx 4$ billion years necessary for the evolution of intelligent life on Earth is on the same order of magnitude (i.e., geometrically comparable) as the estimated main sequence lifetime $\tau_0 \approx 10$ billion years of the Sun. In this case, Carter would have us accept that $p_0(E|A)$ and $p_0(E|B)$ are both very small (and plausibly near each other). On the other hand $p_S(E|B) \approx 1$ (so that in particular $B$ is confirmed at the expense of $A$ by the observations), as Carter explains in this passage:

“...the observation that $t_e$ is comparable with the upper limit $\tau_0$ is just what would be expected if we adopt the alternative hypothesis that the intrinsically expected time $t$ is much longer than $\tau_0$: in this case self-selection ensures that ours must be one of the exceptional cases in which evolution has proceeded much faster than usual; (...) there is no particular reason why we should belong to the even more exceptional cases in which evolution proceeds even more rapidly although, with the assumption that the Universe is infinite, such cases must of course exist.”

We note two features common to these examples. First, in all of these cases $\frac{p_S(E|A)}{p_S(E|B)} < \frac{p_0(E|A)}{p_0(E|B)}$; because observations must occur from the first person perspectives of life forms in some respects similar to us, they are systematically predisposed to favor, conditional on $B$, positions, situation or scenarios consistent with $E$—despite the fact that positions, situations or scenarios consistent with $E$ might be comparatively rare conditional on $B$. (For $A$ as well, perhaps, but relatively more dramatically for $B$.) For this reason one should not, despite this comparative rarity, discredit $B$ on the basis of an observation of $E$. After all, that the first observation made would be consistent with $E$ is exactly what one should expect conditional on $B$, regardless of what vast volumes of spacetime one might have to scour in order to locate such an observation.

Second, the ratio $\frac{p_S(A)}{p_S(B)}$ is assumed to be equal to $\frac{p_0(A)}{p_0(B)}$. That is to say, the concrete “selection conditions” aren’t taken to favor the hypothesis $A$ over the hypothesis $B$ on the basis that “more” (in the sense of density if not actual numbers, in the apparently default case that the Universe is assumed infinite conditional on either hypothesis) observers are predicted conditional on $A$ than on $B$. Here is where it is essential that $A$ and $B$ are “theories”, i.e. families of probability laws on the set of complete Universe trajectories. Note that if, to the contrary, $A$ and $B$ were chance events or ineliminably indexical assertions (heads and tails or Quick Doom and Later Doom, for example), this assumption would run counter to frequentist views of credence.4 As it stands, the assumption is consistent with the majority

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4Compare Sleeping Beauty or the objections to Doomsday in Section 1 related to sequences of civilization in an infinite cosmos. Note however that Bostrom (1999) and possibly Leslie believe that whether such frequentist reasoning is appropriate in Doomsday is sensitive to the actual presence of said “outsiders”, i.e. other civilizations. Since Carter seems unconcerned that the infinitude of the Universe might affect his analyses, I have assumed that he would regard this issue as a red herring, and be sympathetic to the “theory” distinction alone. Compare also Antony Lewis’s SIA-C (Lewis 2001), which applies “within different probabilistic outcomes of a correct theory”, does not favor “wrong theories with a larger number of observers” (i.e. isn’t
response (no skewing of prior credences in favor of theories associated with greater expected population) to Bostrom’s “Presumptuous Philosopher” experiment.\footnote{I would urge more entrenched proponents of rival anthropic practices to grant some leeway here...perhaps view the whole paper as more descriptive than normative. (Though I do happen to believe that Carter is right, there’s a reason I didn’t entitle the paper “Why Carter’s Doomsday Argument is Right”.) I’m mainly trying to make it clear, by looking at a succession of examples, that Carter only employs (1) in cases where \(A\) and \(B\) are competing theories (as I’ve defined this notion); in particular, in cases in which one has no actual or nomologically possible counterparts for whom \(A\) and \(B\) have different truth values than they actually have. I don’t claim to be making any advance on the “Presumptuous Philosopher” intuitions that this practice is “correct”.}

3. An adequate formalization of Carter’s Doomsday argument

Before proceeding to my formulation of Carter’s Doomsday argument, I shall give a brief example showing how (1) is to be used. Consider a coin whose behavior is known to be correctly described by one of two theories. The first theory is “the probability that this coin lands heads on any particular toss is \(\frac{1}{2}\), independently of how it lands on other tosses” (call this theory \(T_{1/2}\)). The second is “the probability that this coin lands heads on any particular toss is \(\frac{1}{3}\), independently of how it lands on other tosses” (call this theory \(T_{1/3}\)). Say that, initially, we are indifferent as to which theory is true. That is, \(p_S(T_{1/2}) = \frac{1}{2} = p_S(T_{1/3})\).

Suppose next that we observe \(E\), i.e. that the coin presently lands heads when tossed. By (1), we have:

\[
\frac{p_E(T_{1/2})}{p_E(T_{1/3})} = \frac{p_S(E|T_{1/2}) p_S(T_{1/2})}{p_S(E|T_{1/3}) p_S(T_{1/3})} = \frac{(1/2)}{(1/3)} = \frac{3}{2}
\]

Then our posterior credences in the two theories under consideration are \(p_E(T_{1/2}) = \frac{3}{5}\) and \(p_E(T_{1/3}) = \frac{2}{5}\), respectively.

Note that, by virtue of affecting one’s credences in rival theories, the present observation of a chance event (such as heads) may affect one’s credence in another chance event. To return to our example (where \(E\) is the event that a present toss lands heads), let \(F\) be the event that a subsequent toss will land heads. Then

\[
p_S(F) = p_S(T_{1/2}) p_S(F|T_{1/2}) + p_S(T_{1/3}) p_S(F|T_{1/3}) = \frac{1}{2} \cdot \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2} \cdot \frac{1}{3} = \frac{5}{12},
\]

whereas

\[
p_E(F) = p_E(T_{1/2}) p_E(F|T_{1/2}) + p_E(T_{1/3}) p_E(F|T_{1/3}) = \frac{3}{5} \cdot \frac{1}{2} + \frac{2}{5} \cdot \frac{1}{3} = \frac{13}{30}.
\]

We are now ready to proceed. In the following, I shall restrict application of (1) to the only sort of hypotheses implicitly sanctioned by Carter’s own practice: hypotheses to the effect that one or another competing theory is true. In order to avoid straying too far away from the format of Doomsday (which might complicate comparison), I shall carry over the assumption that for human-like species there are only two equally (from an “outside” perspective) likely possibilities: Quick Doom (population 200 billion) and Later Doom (population 200 trillion).
The theories grounding the competing hypotheses for consideration in (1) that I shall consider are given by \{T_x : x \in [0,1]\}, where \(T_x\) is the assertion that the expected (and almost sure, should the Universe be infinite) density\(^6\) of \textit{Quick Doom} in human-like species, conditional on the actual complete theory, is \(x\). Of course for a unique \(x \in [0,1]\), \(T_x\) is the “correct” theory. Since the agent judges \textit{Quick Doom} and \textit{Later Doom} to be equally likely for any given human-like species, the expectation of \(x\) (from an “outside” perspective) is \(\frac{1}{2}\). On the other hand one should allow for the agent’s distribution for \(x\) to be potentially continuous and quite diffuse, for one cannot necessarily anticipate the extent to which the agent will be able to discredit, from first principles, potential (regions of) values for \(x\). Denote the probability density function for this distribution by \(g : [0,1] \to [0, \infty)\).

Now according to (1), upon observation of \(E = my\ birth\ rank\ is\ at\ most\ 200\ billion\), one ought to multiply the density function \(g\) by a factor proportional\(^7\) to
\[
p_S(E|T_x) = \frac{200,000,000,000x + 200,000,000,000(1-x)}{200,000,000,000x + 200,000,000,000,000(1-x)} = \frac{1}{1000 - 999x}.
\]
That is to say, the agent’s posterior density function for \(x\) will be
\[
h(x) = \frac{kg(x)}{1000 - 999x},\text{ where } k = \left(\int_0^1 \frac{g(x)}{1000 - 999x} \, dx\right)^{-1}.
\]
Posterior credence in \textit{Quick Doom} is now just posterior expectation of \(x\), i.e.
\[
p_E(D_1) = \int_0^1 xh(x) \, dx.
\]

**Examples:**\(^8\)

1. Let \(g(x) = 6x(1-x)\). Then \(h(x) \approx \frac{6x(1-x)}{.0029674(1000 - 999x)}\) and
\[
p_E(D_1) = \int_0^1 xh(x) \, dx \approx \int_0^1 \frac{6x^2(1-x)}{.0029674(1000 - 999x)} \, dx \approx .663683.
\]

2. Let \(g(x) = 1\), i.e. the uniform prior. Then \(h(x) = \frac{999}{\ln(1000)(1000 - 999x)}\) and
\[
p_E(D_1) = \int_0^1 xh(x) \, dx = \int_0^1 \frac{999x}{\ln(1000)(1000 - 999x)} \, dx \approx .856236.
\]

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\(^6\)For those who might be squeamish about densities, substitute “ideal subjective probability of” (still conditional on the actual complete theory).

\(^7\)A referee: “Perhaps you’re just using Bayes Theorem here, not (1).” It’s (1). Note in particular that \(h(x) = \lim_{x \to 0} p_{E|T_x}(T_x|s,x) = \lim_{x \to 0} \frac{p_{E|T_x}(T_x|s,x) \cdot p_{T_x}(T_x|s,x)}{p_{E|T_x}(T_x|s,x) \cdot p_{T_x}(T_x|s,x) + p_{E}(T_x)}\) a.e.

\(^8\)There is no implicit claim that the below distributions have direct relevance to our problem. They are simply common distributions (1 and 4 are Dirichlet distributions, 2 and 3 are uniform distributions of two different sorts) exhibiting a variety of concentration patterns. We’re calling attention to the dependence of \textit{Quick Doom}’s posterior credence on the pattern of concentration.
3. Let \( g(x) = k(\ln(1 - x) - \ln x) \) for \( 0 < x \leq \frac{1}{2} \), \( g(x) = k(\ln x - \ln(1 - x)) \) for \( \frac{1}{2} < x < 1 \), where \( k \approx 1.386284 \). Then \( h(x) \approx \frac{xg(x)}{0.0184138(1000 - 999x)} \), and

\[
p_E(D_1) = \int_0^1 xh(x) \, dx \approx \int_0^1 \frac{xg(x)}{0.0184138(1000 - 999x)} \, dx \approx .946642.
\]

4. Let \( g(x) = \frac{1}{\pi \sqrt{x(1-x)}} \). Then \( h(x) = \frac{10\sqrt{10}}{\pi \sqrt{x(1-x)(1000-999x)}} \) and

\[
p_E(D_1) = \int_0^1 xh(x) \, dx = \int_0^1 \frac{10\sqrt{10}}{\pi \sqrt{x(1-x)(1000-999x)}} \, dx \approx .969347.
\]

Though all non-singular distributions favor Quick Doom to some degree, this argument will never violate our intuitions by adopting a posterior credence outside the convex hull of our prior support for the true probability of Quick Doom. As to which distribution is apt, there is anecdotal evidence that Carter (1983) would opt for one concentrated toward the extremes. To wit:

“...the very complicated mechanisms governing the evolution of living systems cannot yet be analysed, still less predicted, in other than very vague qualitative terms. We certainly do not know enough to predict from first principles whether the expected average time \( \bar{t} \) which would be intrinsically most likely for the evolution of a system of ‘intelligent observers’, in the form of a scientific civilization such as our own, should take much less or much more time than is allowed by the external restraints that limit the duration of favourable conditions. In such a state of ignorance, both of these two alternative possibilities should therefore be retained for consideration as not implausible a priori. Only the intermediate borderline case, in which the intrinsically most likely evolution time came out to be of just the same order as the time allowed by external restraints, could be set aside in advance, as being much less plausible \( a \, priori \)...”

Reasoning similarly in the current case, one arrives at a posterior credence in Later Doom of perhaps just a few percent, as in the latter two examples above.

4. Conclusion

Apart from the historical virtue of coinciding with Carter’s original intention, the precisification of the Doomsday Argument given here exhibits two additional virtues. First, since the main extant rival positions appear as its extreme cases, the argument dissolves theoretical quarrels and entreats parties to relocate disagreement about the relative likelihood of “Early Doom” to a more plausible venue: namely, the different attitudes they may bring to bear on actual threats (wars, diseases, malevolent computers, high energy physics disasters, etc.)

Second, the argument given here has a vigorous claim to soundness. Getting people to take the argument seriously has been a problem for Doomsday proponents,

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\(^9\) As the expectation of ideal subjective probability, rational credence should never fall outside the support of ideal subjective probability’s distribution; Carter’s anthropic principle teaches that while selection effects may alter this distribution, they ought never to expand its support.
as Bostrom (1996) notes: “When people first encounter (Doomsday)...what happens is that most of them think that it is obviously false. Then any sign of consensus disappears when it comes to explaining what is wrong with it.” Admittedly, this property does seem characteristic of “good philosophical puzzles”. Not if it’s an artifact of oversimplified presentation, however, as is the case here.

We’ve maintained that the Doomsday argument as envisioned by Carter may be sound, but that its popularizers and the majority who have thought the argument “obviously false” have been talking past each other. If our nutshell presentation can boost majority confidence that this debate will soon reach its end (owing to the deaths of everyone on Earth), that ought to at least qualify as a silver lining.

References
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