Information Causality, the Tsirelson Bound, and the ‘Being-Thus’ of Things*,†

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Abstract
The principle of ‘information causality’ can be used to derive an upper bound—known as the ‘Tsirelson bound’—on the strength of quantum mechanical correlations, and has been conjectured to be a foundational principle of nature. To date, however, it has not been sufficiently motivated to play such a foundational role. The motivations that have so far been given are, as I argue, either unsatisfactorily vague or appeal to little if anything more than intuition. Thus in this paper I consider whether some way might be found to successfully motivate the principle. And I propose that a compelling way of so doing is to understand it as a generalisation of Einstein’s principle of the mutually independent existence—the ‘being-thus’—of spatially distant things. In particular I first describe an argument, due to Demopoulos, to the effect that the so-called ‘no-signalling’ condition can be viewed as a generalisation of Einstein’s principle that is appropriate for an irreducibly statistical theory such as quantum mechanics. I then argue that a compelling way to motivate information causality is to in turn consider it as a further generalisation of the Einsteinian principle that is appropriate for a theory of communication. I describe, however, some important conceptual obstacles that must yet be overcome if the project of establishing information causality as a foundational principle of nature is to succeed.

1 Introduction

Answering the question of precisely what distinguishes our experience with quantum as opposed to classical physical phenomena has historically been a central element of the overall

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†I am indebted to the late William Demopoulos for sharing a draft of the chapter “Quantum Reality” with me from his as of yet unpublished monograph On Theories. The present paper is motivated, illuminated, and informed both by that chapter and by my conversations with Bill during the years 2013–2017. Thanks also to Jeffrey Bub, Laura Felline, Sona Ghosh, Markus Müller, and Ryan Samaroo for their helpful and constructive comments on a previous draft of this paper. And thanks to those in attendance for my presentations of this paper at the University of Geneva and at the Workshop in Memory of William Demopoulos at the University of Western Ontario in September 2017 for their helpful and constructive questions. This project was supported financially by the Foundational Questions Institute (FQXi) and by the Rotman Institute of Philosophy. I hope for but do not claim the endorsement of my conclusions by any persons or institutions mentioned above.
project of interpreting quantum theory. For Schrödinger (1935), for instance, the sole distinguishing feature of quantum theory was none other than entanglement, while for Feynman the one and only quantum mystery was self-interference (Feynman et al., 1964, vol. 3, 1-1). The question continues to occupy many. However in much of the more recent literature it has taken on a different form. That is, it has become one of specifying a set of appropriately motivated constraints or ‘principles’ that serve to distinguish quantum from classical theory. Clifton, Bub, & Halvorson (2003), for instance, prove a theorem which they argue shows quantum mechanics to be essentially characterisable in terms of a small number of information-theoretic constraints. Spekkens (2007), meanwhile, shows that features often thought of as distinctively quantum can be manifested in a toy classical theory to which one adds a principled restriction on the maximal obtainable knowledge of a system.¹

One feature that quantum and classical theory have in common is that the correlations manifested between the subsystems of a combined system satisfy the condition that the marginal probabilities associated with local experiments on a subsystem are independent of which particular experiments are performed on the other subsystems. It is a consequence of this condition that it is impossible to use either a classically correlated or entangled quantum system to signal faster than light. For this reason the condition is referred to as the ‘no-signalling’ condition or principle, even though the condition is not a relativistic constraint per se.

Quantum and classical theory do not exhaust the conceivable ways in which the world could be. The world could be such that neither quantum nor classical theory are capable of adequately describing the correlations between subsystems of combined systems. In particular the world could be such that correlations stronger than quantum correlations are possible within it. In a landmark paper, Popescu & Rohrlich (1994) asked the question of whether all such correlations must violate the no-signalling condition. The surprising answer to this question is no. As they showed, there do indeed exist conceivable correlations between the subsystems of combined systems that are stronger than the strongest possible quantum correlations—i.e. such that they exceed the so-called ‘Tsirelson bound’ (Cirel’son, 1980)—and yet non-signalling.

Popescu & Rohrlich’s result raises the question of whether some motivated principle or principles can be given which would pick out quantum theory—or at least some restricted subset of theories which includes quantum theory—from among the space of conceivable non-signalling physical theories in which correlations at or above the Tsirelson bound occur. This question has developed into an active research program. A particularly important result emerging from it is that of Pawłowski et al. (2009), who show that one can in fact derive the Tsirelson bound from a principle they call ‘information causality’, which they describe as a generalisation of no-signalling applicable to experimental setups in which the subsystems of a combined system (e.g. spatially separated labs) may be subluminally communicating classical information with one another. Pawłowski et al. conjecture that information causality may be a foundational principle of nature.

Below I will argue that, suitably interpreted (Bub, 2012), the principle can be regarded as a useful and illuminating answer to the question of what the Tsirelson bound expresses about correlations which exceed it. However I will argue that if one wishes to think of information causality as a fundamental principle of nature—in the sense that theories which violate the principle should thereby be regarded as unphysical or in some other sense impossible—then it requires more in the way of motivation than has hitherto been given.

¹For a discussion of both Clifton et al.’s and Spekkens’ results, and of the project in general, see Myrvold (2010); and see also Felline (2016).
What has typically been appealed to previously to motivate the principle is the intuition that a world in which information causality is not satisfied would be ‘too simple’ (Pawłowski et al., 2009, p. 1101), or ‘too good to be true’ (Bub 2012, p. 180, Bub 2016, p. 187); that it would allow one to “implausibly” access remote data (Pawłowski et al., 2009, ibid.), and that “things like this should not happen” (Pawłowski & Scarani, 2016, p. 429). I will argue below that these statements are unsatisfactorily vague. Nevertheless I will argue that they gesture at something that is importantly right; although they are right in, perhaps, a different sense than their authors envision.

More specifically, in contrast to Bub (2012), who in his otherwise illuminating analysis of information causality argues that it is misleadingly characterised as a generalisation of the no-signalling principle, I will argue that information causality can indeed be regarded as generalising no-signalling in a sense. To clarify this sense I will draw on the work of Demopoulos, who convincingly shows that no-signalling can itself be thought of as a generalisation, appropriate for an irreducibly statistical theory such as quantum mechanics, of Einstein’s principle of the mutually independent existence of spatially distant things. Einstein regarded this principle as necessary for the very possibility of ‘physical thought’, and argued that it is violated by quantum mechanics (Howard, 1985, p. 187). However, suitably generalised and interpreted as a constraint on physical practice, Demopoulos convincingly argues that Einstein’s principle is in that sense satisfied both in Newtonian mechanics (despite its being an action-at-a-distance theory), and indeed (somewhat ironically) that it is satisfied in quantum mechanics, wherein it is expressed by none other than the no-signalling condition.

Coming back to information causality, I will then argue that it can likewise be thought of as a further generalisation of Einstein’s principle that is appropriate for a theory of communication. As I will clarify, in the context of the experimental setups to which the principle is applicable, a failure of information causality would imply an ambiguity in the way one distinguishes conceptually between the systems belonging to a sender and a receiver of information. This ambiguity (arguably) makes communication theory as we know it in the context of such setups impossible, similarly to the way in which the failure of the principle of mutually independent existence (arguably) makes physical theory as we know it impossible.

Before beginning let me emphasise that the general approach represented by the investigation into information causality is only one of a number of principle-theoretic approaches that one can take regarding the question of how to distinguish quantum from super-quantum theories. In the kind of approach exemplified by the investigation into information causality, one focuses on sets of static correlation tables associated with quantum and super-quantum theories, and in particular one disregards the dynamics of (super-)quantum systems. There is another family of principle-theoretic approaches to the question, however, wherein a richer framework is considered that does include dynamics. Popescu & Rohrlich’s seminal (1994) investigation is an example of the former type of approach, though they themselves consider the latter, dynamical, approach to have the potential for deeper insight. For my part I do not consider any particular approach to be superior.

Principle-theoretic approaches to the characterisation of quantum theory augment

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2I am referring to the chapter “Quantum Reality” of Demopoulos’s monograph On Theories, which is currently being prepared for posthumous publication.

3Demopoulos’s ‘judo-like’ argumentative manoeuvre is reminiscent of Bell’s (cf. Shimony, 1984, p. 41).

4For further references, as well as an accessible description of one of these reconstructions of quantum theory, see Koberinski & Müller (2018).
our understanding of the world by illuminating various aspects of it to us. Which particular aspect of the world is illuminated by an investigation will depend upon the particular question—and the framework which defines it—that is asked.\(^5\) I am highly skeptical of the idea that any one framework is sufficient by itself to illuminate all. Rather, these different frameworks of analysis should be seen as conveying to us information—in general neither literal nor complete—regarding different aspects of one and the same reality.

The rest of this paper will proceed as follows: I will introduce Popescu-Rohrlich (PR) correlations in §2. In §3 I will introduce the ‘guessing game’ by which the principle of information causality is standardly operationally defined. The principle of information causality itself will be introduced in §4, wherein I will also describe how it can be used to derive the Tsirelson bound. I will argue in that section that information causality has not been sufficiently motivated to play the role of a foundational principle of nature, and in the remainder of the paper I will consider how one might begin to provide it with such a motivation. This analysis begins in §5 where I describe an argument, due to Demopoulos, to the effect that the no-signalling condition can be viewed as a generalisation, appropriate to an irreducibly statistical theory, of Einstein’s principle of mutually independent existence interpreted as a constraint on physical practice. Then in §6 I argue that a promising route toward successfully motivating information causality is to in turn consider it as a further generalisation of no-signalling that is appropriate to a theory of communication. I describe, however, some important obstacles that must yet be overcome if the project of establishing information causality as a foundational principle of nature is to succeed.

2 Popescu-Rohrlich correlations

Consider a correlated state \(\sigma\) of two two-level subsystems.\(^6\) Let Alice and Bob each be given one of the subsystems, and instruct them to travel to distinct distant locations. Let \(p(A, B|a, b)\) be the probability that Alice and Bob obtain outcomes \(A\) and \(B\), respectively, after measuring their local subsystems with the respective settings \(a\) and \(b\). If \(A, B \in \{\pm 1\}\), the expectation value of the outcome of their combined measurement is given by:

\[
\langle a, b \rangle = \sum_{i,j \in \{1, -1\}} (i \cdot j) \cdot p(i, j|a, b),
\]

where \(A = i\) and \(B = j\). Less concisely, this is:

\[
\langle a, b \rangle = 1 \cdot p(1, 1|a, b) - 1 \cdot p(1, -1|a, b) - 1 \cdot p(-1, 1|a, b) + 1 \cdot p(-1, -1|a, b)
\]

\[= p(\text{same}|a, b) - p(\text{different}|a, b).\]

Since \(p(\text{same}|a, b) + p(\text{different}|a, b) = 1\), it follows that \(\langle a, b \rangle + 2 \cdot p(\text{different}|a, b) = 1\), so that:

\[
p(\text{different}|a, b) = \frac{1 - \langle a, b \rangle}{2}.
\]

Similarly, we have that

\[
p(\text{same}|a, b) = \frac{1 + \langle a, b \rangle}{2}.
\]

\(^5\)Thanks to Giulio Chiribella for expressing something like this statement in answer to a question posed to him at the workshop ‘Contextuality: Conceptual Issues, Operational Signatures, and Applications’, held at the Perimeter Institute in July, 2017.

\(^6\)Elements of the exposition in this and the next section have been adapted from Bub (2012, 2016) and Pawłowski et al. (2009).
Now imagine that $\sigma$ is such that the probabilities for the results of experiments with settings $a, b, a', b'$, where $a'$ and $b'$ are different from $a$ and $b$ but arbitrary (Popescu & Rohrlich, 1994, p. 382), are:

$$
p(1, 1|a, b) = p(-1, -1|a, b) = 1/2,
\quad p(1, 1|a, b') = p(-1, -1|a, b') = 1/2,
\quad p(1, 1|a', b) = p(-1, -1|a', b) = 1/2,
\quad p(1, -1|a', b') = p(-1, 1|a', b') = 1/2.
$$

(2.1)

In other words, if at least one of their settings is one of $a$ or $b$, then Alice's and Bob's results are guaranteed to be the same. Otherwise they are guaranteed to be different. These correlations are called ‘PR’ correlations after Popescu & Rohrlich (1994).

Alice's marginal probability $p(1_A|a, b)$ of obtaining the outcome 1 given that she measures $a$ and Bob measures $b$ is defined as: $p(1_A, 1_B|a, b) + p(1_A, -1_B|a, b)$.

The no-signalling condition requires that her marginal probability of obtaining 1 is the same irrespective of whether Bob measures $b$ or $b'$, i.e. that $p(1_A|a, b) = p(1_A|a, b')$, in which case we can write her marginal probability simply as $p(1_A|a)$. In general, no-signalling requires that

$$
p(A|a, b) = p(A|a, b'), \quad p(A|a', b) = p(A|a', b'),
\quad p(B|a, b) = p(B|a', b), \quad p(B|a, b') = p(B|a', b').
$$

(2.2)

The reader can verify that the PR correlations (2.1) satisfy the no-signalling condition (2.2).

If we imagine trying to simulate the PR correlations (2.1) with some bipartite general non-signalling system $\eta$, then the probability of a successful simulation (assuming a uniform probability distribution over the possible joint measurements $(a, b)$, $(a, b')$, $(a', b)$, and $(a', b')$) is given by:7

$$
\frac{1}{4}(p(\text{same}|a, b) + p(\text{same}|a, b') + p(\text{same}|a', b) + p(\text{different}|a', b'))
= \frac{1}{4}\left(\frac{1 + \langle a, b \rangle}{2} + \frac{1 + \langle a, b' \rangle}{2} + \frac{1 + \langle a', b \rangle}{2} + \frac{1 - \langle a', b' \rangle}{2}\right)
= \frac{1}{2}\left(1 + \frac{\langle a, b \rangle + \langle a, b' \rangle + \langle a', b \rangle - \langle a', b' \rangle}{4}\right).
$$

Notice that $\langle a, b \rangle + \langle a, b' \rangle + \langle a', b \rangle - \langle a', b' \rangle$ is just the Clauser-Horne-Shimony-Holt (CHSH) correlation expression (Clauser et al., 1969). So the probability of a successful simulation of the PR correlations by $\eta$ is:

$$
p(\text{successful sim}) = \frac{1}{2}\left(1 + \frac{\text{CHSH}}{4}\right),
$$

(2.3)

with $\text{CHSH} = 4$ if $\eta$ is itself a PR-system.8 As is well known, classically correlated systems are bounded by $|\text{CHSH}| \leq 2$. Thus the optimum probability of simulating PR correlations with a bipartite classical system is given by $1/2(1 + 2/4) = 3/4$. Quantum correlations are bounded by $|\text{CHSH}| \leq 2\sqrt{2}$. 

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7By a 'successful simulation' I mean a single joint measurement in which Alice and Bob get opposite outcomes—(1, -1) or (-1, 1)—if their settings are $(a', b')$, or the same outcome—(1,1) or (-1,-1)—otherwise.

8The reader may be familiar with the use of the term 'PR-box' to refer to systems whose subsystems are correlated as in (2.1). I find the term 'box' to be misleading since it conveys the idea of a spatially contiguous region occupied by a combined system. Bub's (2016) banana imagery is far less misleading in this sense. Below I will not use figurative language at all, but will (boringly) refer merely to such entities as 'PR-systems', 'PR-correlated systems', and so on.
3 Alice and Bob play a guessing game

At this point it will be convenient to change our notation. From now on I will refer to the
measurement settings $a$ and $a'$ as 0 and 1, respectively, and likewise for $b$ and $b'$. The
outcomes 1 and -1 will also be respectively relabelled as 0 and 1. This will allow us to
describe PR correlations more abstractly using the exclusive-or (alternately: modulo two
addition) operator as follows:

\[ M_1 \oplus M_2 = m_1 \cdot m_2 \]  \hspace{1cm} (3.1)

where capital letters refer to measurement outcomes and small letters to measurement
settings. To illustrate, for a given 01-experiment (formerly $(a, b')$) there are two possible
outcomes: 00 and 11 (formerly: (1,1) and (-1,-1)), and we have: $0 \oplus 0 = 0 \cdot 1$ and $1 \oplus 1 = 0 \cdot 1$, respectively.

Now imagine the following game. At the start of each round of the game, Alice and
Bob receive random and independently generated bit strings $a = a_{n-1}a_{n-2} \ldots a_0$ and
$b = b_{n-1}b_{n-2} \ldots b_0$, respectively, with $N = 2^n$. They win a round if Bob is able to
guess the value of the $b$th bit in Alice’s list. For example, suppose Alice receives the
string $a_0a_1a_2a_3a_4a_5a_0$, and Bob receives the string 110. Then Bob must guess the value of $a_6$.
They win if Bob is able to guess correctly over any sequence of rounds.

Besides this the rules of the game are as follows. Before the game starts, Alice and
Bob are allowed to determine a mutual strategy and to prepare and share non-signalling
physical resources such as classically correlated systems, or quantum systems in entangled
states, or PR-systems, or other (bipartite) systems manifesting non-signalling correlations.
They then go off to distinct distant locations, taking with them their portions of whatever
systems were previously prepared. Once separated, Alice receives her bit string $a$ and
Bob his bit string $b$. She is then allowed to send Bob one additional classical bit $c$, upon receipt
of which Bob must guess the value of Alice’s $b$th bit.

Alice and Bob can be certain to win the game if they share a number of PR-systems. I
will illustrate the case of $N = 4$, which requires three PR-systems (per round) labelled I, II, and III.
Upon receiving the bit string $a = a_3a_2a_1a_0$, Alice measures $a_0 \oplus a_1$ on her part
of system I and gets the result $A_I$. She then measures $a_2 \oplus a_3$ on her part of system II
and gets the outcome $A_{II}$. She then measures $(a_0 \oplus A_I) \oplus (a_2 \oplus A_{II})$ on her part of system III
and gets the result $A_{III}$. She finally sends $c = a_0 \oplus A_I \oplus A_{III}$ to Bob. Meanwhile, Bob, who has
previously received $b = b_1b_0$, measures $b_0$ on his parts of systems I and II, and
gets back the results $B_I$ and $B_{II}$. He also measures $b_1$ on system III with the result $B_{III}$.

Bob’s next step depends on the value of $b$, i.e. on which of Alice’s bits he has to guess.
When $b = b_1b_0 = 00$ (i.e. when Bob must guess the 0th bit) or $b = b_1b_0 = 01$ (i.e. when
Bob must guess the 1st bit) his guess should be:

\[ c \oplus B_{III} \oplus B_I = a_0 \oplus A_I \oplus A_{III} \oplus B_{III} \oplus B_I. \]  \hspace{1cm} (3.2)

For since $A_{III} \oplus B_{III} = \left((a_0 \oplus A_I) \oplus (a_2 \oplus A_{II})\right) \cdot b_1$, we have:

\[ a_0 \oplus A_I \oplus A_{III} \oplus B_{III} \oplus B_I \]
\[ = a_0 \oplus A_I \oplus b_1(a_0 \oplus A_I) \oplus b_1(a_2 \oplus A_{II}) \oplus B_I \]
\[ = a_0 \oplus A_I \oplus B_I \]
\[ = a_0 \oplus b_0(a_0 \oplus a_1). \]  \hspace{1cm} (3.3)
If \( b = 00 \) then (3.3) correctly yields \( a_0 \). If \( b = 01 \) then (3.3) correctly yields \( a_1 \).

Suppose instead that \( b = 10 \) or \( b = 11 \). In this case, Bob’s guess should be

\[
\chi \oplus B_{III} \oplus B_{II} = a_0 \oplus A_I \oplus A_{III} \oplus B_{III} \oplus B_{II}.
\]

(3.4)

This is

\[
= a_0 \oplus A_I \oplus b_1(a_0 \oplus A_I) \oplus b_1(a_2 \oplus A_{II}) \oplus B_{II} \\
= (a_0 \oplus A_I) \oplus (a_0 \oplus A_I) \oplus (a_2 \oplus A_{II}) \oplus B_{II} \\
= a_2 \oplus A_{II} \oplus B_{II} \\
= a_2 \oplus b_0(a_2 \oplus a_3).
\]

(3.5)

If \( b = 11 \) then (3.5) correctly yields \( a_3 \). If \( b = 10 \) then (3.5) correctly yields \( a_2 \).

In general, given \( N - 1 \) PR-correlated systems per round,\(^9\) and a single classical bit per round communicated by Alice to Bob, Alice and Bob can be certain to win the game for any value of \( N \). In other words, given these resources and a single classical bit communicated to him by Alice, Bob can access the value of any single bit from her data set, however large that data set is. This result further generalises to the case where Alice is allowed to send not just one but \( m \) bits \( c_{m-1} \ldots c_0 \) to Bob in a given round, and Bob is required to guess an arbitrary set of \( m \) bits from Alice’s data set. Note that if Alice is not allowed to send anything to Bob, i.e., when \( m = 0 \), then Bob will not be able to access the values of any of Alice’s bits irrespective of how many PR-systems they share. This is a consequence of the fact that PR-correlations satisfy the no-signalling principle (2.2).

4 Information causality and the Tsirelson bound

As we saw in the last section, Alice and Bob can be certain to win the guessing game described there if they share a number of PR-correlated systems prior to going off to their respective locations. Note that if they do not use any correlated resources, they can still be sure to win the occasional round if Alice always sends Bob the value of whatever bit is at a previously agreed-upon fixed position \( a_k \) in her list. In this case, Bob will be guaranteed to guess correctly whenever \( b \) singles out \( k \) (but only then; otherwise he must rely on blind luck). If Alice and Bob share a sequence of classically correlated random bits, on the other hand, then Bob will be able to access the value of a single in general different \( a_i \) in Alice’s list on each round.

Now consider the case where Alice and Bob share general no-signalling systems, i.e. bipartite systems such that the correlations between their subsystems satisfy the no-signalling condition. Recall that the probability that a non-signalling system simulates a PR-system on a given run depends on the value of CHSH in (2.3) that is associated with it. For convenience we will define \( E = \frac{\text{CHSH}}{4} \) so that (2.3) becomes:

\[
p(\text{successful sim}) = \frac{1}{2} (1 + E).
\]

(4.1)

\(^9\)These are to be arranged in an inverted pyramid so that the results of Alice’s (respectively, Bob’s) local measurements on the first \( 2^{n-1} \) PR-systems are used to determine the local settings for her (his) next \( 2^{n-2} \) measurements, and so on, for \( (n - i) \geq 0 \). Note that the cost in the number of PR-systems needed scales exponentially with respect to the length of \( b \). I will return to this point later.
When \( E = 1 \) for a given non-signalling system, then it just is a PR-system, and the probability of a successful simulation is 1. When \( E < 1 \), then for given settings \( m_1, m_2 \), the values of the outcomes \( M_1, M_2 \), will in general not satisfy the relation (3.1), i.e. \( M_1 \oplus M_2 \) will not always equal \( m_1 \cdot m_2 \). For a given attempted simulation, let us say that \( M_2 \) is ‘correct’ whenever (3.1) holds, and ‘incorrect’ otherwise.\(^{10}\)

Recall that in the \( N = 4 \) game above, at the end of each round, Bob guesses either (i) \( c \oplus B_{III} \oplus B_I \), or (ii) \( c \oplus B_{III} \oplus B_{II} \), depending on the value of \( b \). We will consider only case (i), as the analysis is similar for (ii). If both \( B_I \) and \( B_{III} \) are ‘correct’, then for that particular round, the non-signalling systems will have yielded the same guess for Bob as PR-systems would have yielded:

\[
(c \oplus B_{III} \oplus B_I)_{NS} = (c \oplus B_{III} \oplus B_I)_{PR}.
\] (4.2)

Note that if both \( B_I \) and \( B_{III} \) are incorrect, (4.2) will still hold, since in general \( x_1 \oplus x_2 = \overline{x_1} \oplus \overline{x_2} \). So either way Bob will guess right. The probability of an unsuccessful simulation is

\[
1 - \frac{1}{2}(1 + E) = \frac{1}{2}(1 - E).
\]

Thus the probability that Bob makes the right guess on a given round in the \( N = 4 \) game is:

\[
\left(\frac{1}{2}(1 + E)\right)^2 + \left(\frac{1}{2}(1 - E)\right)^2 = \frac{1}{2}(1 + E^2).
\]

In the general case, for \( N = 2^n \), one can show (Pawłowski et al., 2009; Bub, 2012, 2016) that the probability that Bob correctly guesses Alice’s \( b^{th} \) bit is

\[
p_b = \frac{1}{2}(1 + E^n).
\] (4.3)

The binary entropy \( h(p_b) \) associated with \( p_b \) is given by

\[
h(p_b) = p_b \log_2 p_b - (1 - p_b) \log_2 (1 - p_b).
\]

In the case where Bob has no information about Alice’s \( b^{th} \) bit, \( p_b = 1/2 \) and \( h(p_b) = 1 \). If Alice then sends Bob \( m \) bits, then in general Bob’s information about that bit will increase by some non-zero amount. Pawłowski et al. (2009) propose the following constraint on this quantity, which they call the ‘information causality’ principle:

The information gain that Bob can reach about a previously unknown to him data set of Alice, by using all his local resources and \( m \) classical bits communicated by Alice, is at most \( m \) bits (2009, p. 1101).

For example, assuming that the \( N = 2^n \) bits in Alice’s bit string \( a \) are unbiased and independently distributed, then if Alice sends Bob a single bit (i.e. when \( m = 1 \)), information causality asserts that Bob’s information about the \( b^{th} \) bit in Alice’s string may increase by no more than \( 1/2^n \), i.e.,

\[
h(p_b) \geq 1 - \frac{1}{2^n}.
\] (4.4)

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\(^{10}\)There is of course no reason why we should not say that \( M_1 \) rather than \( M_2 \) is incorrect, but for the analysis that follows it is convenient to take Bob’s point of view.
As Pawłowski et al. (2009) show, the principle is satisfied within quantum mechanics. But within any theory which permits correlations with a value of $E$ exceeding $1/\sqrt{2}$ (i.e. any theory which allows correlations above the Tsirelson bound), one can find an $n$ such that for a given $m$ the principle is violated (for example, let $E = .72$, $m = 1$, and $n = 10$).\(^{11,12}\)

Given that any correlations above the Tsirelson bound will demonstrably violate the principle in this sense, it is tempting to view information causality as the answer to the question (i) of why nature does not allow correlations above this bound. And since the Tsirelson bound represents the maximum value of the CHSH expression for quantum correlations, one is further tempted to view information causality as the answer to the question (ii) of why only quantum correlations are allowable in nature. Indeed, Pawłowski et al. suggest that information causality “might be one of the foundational properties of nature” (2009, p. 1101).

There is a subtlety here, however. The set of quantum correlations forms a convex set which can be represented as a multi-dimensional region of points such that the points within this region that are furthest from the centre are at the Tsirelson bound (Bub, 2016, §5.1). Information causality disallows correlations beyond this bound, as we saw. It also disallows some correlations below the bound that are outside of the quantum convex set (for a discussion, see Pawłowski & Scarani, 2016). However there is numerical evidence that there exist correlations within the bound but outside of the quantum convex set that satisfy the information causality principle (Navascués et al., 2015). So it appears unlikely (though this was not known in 2009) that information causality can provide an answer to question (ii). It nevertheless remains promising as a principle with which to answer question (i) and can arguably still be thought of as a fundamental principle in that sense. Analogously, the fact that super-quantum no-signalling correlations are possible does not, in itself, undermine the status of no-signalling as a fundamental principle.

The information causality principle must be given some independent motivation if it is to play this explanatory role, however. For even a conventionalist would agree that some stipulations are better than others (DiSalle, 2002). Thus some independent reason should be given for why one might be inclined to accept the principle. Of course, the statement that the communication of $m$ bits can yield no more than $m$ bits of additional information to a receiver about a data set unknown to him is an intuitive one. But foundational principles of nature should require more for their motivation than such bare appeals to intuition. After all, quantum mechanics, which the principle aims to legitimate, arguably already violates many of our most basic intuitions. Pawłowski et al. (2009) unfortunately do not say very much to motivate information causality. But two ideas can be gleaned from statements made in their paper. The first is that in a world in which violations of information causality could occur, “certain tasks [would be] ‘too simple’” (p. 1101). The second is that in such a world there would be “implausible accessibility of remote data” (ibid.). The former idea has been expressed in this general context before. Van Dam (2013 [2005]), notably,

\(^{11}\) Note that when $E = 1$ the principle is always violated for any $m$ and $n$.

\(^{12}\) I have followed Bub in expressing information causality as a constraint on binary entropy, as conceptually this is a more transparent way of expressing Pawłowski et al.’s ‘qualitative’ statement of the principle in terms of concrete information-theoretic quantities. While Pawłowski et al. also relate information causality to the binary entropy (2009, p. 1102 and Supplementary Information §III), their general results (that information causality is satisfied within quantum mechanics and that it is violated within any theory which allows correlations above the Tsirelson bound) begin with the formulation of information causality as a condition on mutual information rather than binary entropy. For our purposes it is immaterial which formulation one chooses; in particular, Bub (2012, §§11.4–11.5) has shown that (4.4) is entailed by Pawłowski et al.’s formulation and moreover proves that (4.4) is satisfied when $E = 1/\sqrt{2}$.\[^9\]
shows that in a world in which PR-correlations exist and can be taken advantage of, only a trivial amount of communication (i.e. a single bit) is required to perform any distributed computational task. Van Dam argues (ibid., p. 12) that this is a reason to believe that such correlations cannot exist, for they violate the principle that “Nature does not allow a computational ‘free lunch’” (ibid., p. 9). Bub (2012, pp. 180-181) echoes this thought by listing examples of distributed tasks (‘the dating game’ and ‘one-out-of-two’ oblivious transfer) which would become implausibly trivial if PR-correlated systems could be used.

Later in this paper I will argue that although such statements are unsatisfactorily vague, they nevertheless get at something that is importantly right; although they are right in, perhaps, a different sense than their authors envision. For now let me just say that even if one accepts van Dam’s argument that pervasive trivial communication complexity is implausible and should be ruled out—and that this should constitute a constraint on physical theory—not all correlations above the Tsirelson bound in fact result in the trivialisation of communication complexity theory. Brassard et al. (2006) have extended van Dam’s result by showing that (probabilistic) pervasive trivial communication complexity can be achieved for values of $E > \sqrt{6}/3$. But this still leaves a range of values for $E$ open; physical correlations with associated values of $E$ between the quantum mechanical maximum of $1/\sqrt{2}$ and $\sqrt{6}/3$ have not been shown to result in pervasive trivial communication complexity and cannot—at least not yet—be ruled out on those grounds. Thus the avoidance of pervasive trivial communication complexity cannot be used to motivate information causality in the way suggested by the statements of Pawłowski et al. (2009). In fairness, to say as they do that certain tasks would be ‘too simple’ in a world in which information causality is violated is not the same as saying that they would be trivial. The task remains, then, of expressing more precisely what is meant by ‘too simple’ in a way that is sufficient to motivate ruling out theories which violate the information causality principle in a less than maximal way (in particular with a value of $E \leq \sqrt{6}/3$). We will return to this point later.

Regarding their second idea—that a world in which information causality is violated would manifest “implausible accessibility of remote data” (p. 1101)—Pawłowski et al. (2009) again do not say enough, although the idea is perhaps alluded to implicitly in another assertion they (too briefly) make, namely that information causality generalises the no-signalling principle (ibid., p. 1103). We will come back to this point later. In any case, the idea of implausible accessibility is fortunately expanded upon by Bub (2012), who motivates it in the following way:

> when the bits of Alice’s data set are unbiased and independently distributed, the intuition is that if the correlations can be exploited to distribute one bit of communicated information among the $N$ unknown bits in Alice’s data set, the amount of information distributed should be no more than $\frac{1}{N}$ bits, because there can be no information about the bits in Alice’s data set in the previously established correlations themselves (p. 180).

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14Communication complexity theory aims to quantify the communicational resources—measured in transmitted bits—required to solve various distributed computational problems. A good reference work is that of Hushilevitz & Nisan (1997).

15Pawłowski & Scarani (2016, p. 429) do expand on the idea of implausible accessibility slightly: “we have transmitted only a single bit and the PR-boxes are supposed to be no-signalling so they cannot be used to transmit the other. Somehow the amount of information that the lab of Bob has is larger than the amount it received. Things like this should not happen.” I do not think this adds anything substantial to the idea expressed by Pawłowski et al. (2009) that such a situation is ‘implausible’.
Partly for this reason, Bub argues that the principle is misnamed. Drawing on the idea of implausible accessibility he argues that ‘information causality’ should rather be referred to as information neutrality: “The principle really has nothing to do with causality and is better understood as a constraint on the ability of correlations to enhance the information content of communication in a distributed task” (ibid., emphasis in original). Bub reformulates the principle as follows:

Correlations are informationally neutral: insofar as they can be exploited to allow Bob to distribute information communicated by Alice among the bits in an unknown data set held by Alice in such a way as to increase Bob’s ability to correctly guess an arbitrary bit in the data set, they cannot increase Bob’s information about the data set by more than the number of bits communicated by Alice to Bob (ibid.).

Stated in this way the principle sounds plausible and seems, intuitively, to be correct. However if the principle is to be of aid in ruling out classes of physical theory then it should be more than just intuitively plausible. If the goal of answering the question ‘Why the Tsirelson bound?’ is to give a convincing reason why correlations that are above the bound should be regarded as impossible, then if the fact that such correlations violate informational neutrality is to be one’s answer, one should give an independent motivation for why correlations must be informationally neutral. One might, for instance, motivate information neutrality by showing how it generalises or gives expression in some sense to a deeper underlying principle that is already well-motivated, or by pointing to ‘undesirable consequences’ of its failure. The consequence of a ‘free computational lunch’ given the existence of correlations above the bound, if it could be demonstrated, could (perhaps) constitute an example of the latter kind of motivation.

This said, there is a different way to think of the question ‘Why the Tsirelson bound?’ for which Bub’s explication of information causality in terms of informational neutrality is both a full answer and indeed an illuminating and useful one. In this sense the question represents a desire to understand what the Tsirelson bound expresses about correlations which violate it. Information neutrality answers this question by directing attention to a feature that no correlations above the bound can have. This feature, moreover, is one that we can easily grasp and explicitly connect operationally with our experience of correlated physical systems. On such a reading of the question, to answer ‘information neutrality’ is not of course to rule out that the world could contain non-informationally-neutral physical correlations. But on this view ruling out such a possibility is not the point, which is rather to provide a physically meaningful principle to help us to understand what our current physical theories, assuming they are to be believed, are telling us about the structure of the world.

In the remainder of this paper, however, I will continue to consider the information causality/neutrality principle as a possible answer in the first sense to the question ‘Why the Tsirelson bound?’. I will continue to consider, that is, whether there is some independent way of motivating the conclusion that correlations which violate the condition should be ruled out.

5 The ‘being-thus’ of spatially distant things

Our goal is to determine whether there is some sense in which we can motivate the idea that information causality must be satisfied by all physical theories which treat of corre-
lated systems. I will now argue that some insight into this question can be gained if we consider the analogous question regarding no-signalling. As I mentioned earlier, the no-signalling condition (2.2) is not a relativistic constraint per se—in itself it is merely a restriction on the marginal probabilities associated with experiments on the subsystems of combined systems—but its violation entails the ability to instantaneously signal, which is in tension if not in outright violation of the constraints imposed by relativistic theory. Indeed, the independently confirmed relativity theory can in this sense be thought of as an external motivation for thinking of the no-signalling principle as a constraint on the marginal probabilities allowable in any physical theory.

There is an arguably deeper way to motivate no-signalling, however, that can be drawn from the work of Einstein and which has been expanded upon by Demopoulos. In the course of expressing his dissatisfaction with the ‘orthodox’ interpretation of quantum theory, Einstein described two foundational ideas—what Demopoulos calls local realism and local action. Realism in general, for Einstein, is a basic presupposition of any physical theory. It amounts to the claim that things in the world exist independently of our capability of knowing them; i.e.

the concepts of physics refer to a real external world, i.e., ideas are posited of things that claim a ‘real existence’ independent of the perceiving subject (bodies, fields, etc.), and these ideas are, on the other hand, brought into as secure a relationship as possible with sense impressions (Einstein 1948, as translated by Howard 1985, p. 187).

Local realism—alternately: the ‘mutually independent existence’ of spatially distant things—is the idea that things claim independent existence from one another insofar as at a given time they are located in different parts of space. Regarding this idea, Einstein writes:

Without such an assumption of the mutually independent existence (the ‘being thus’) of spatially distant things, an assumption which originates in everyday thought, physical thought in the sense familiar to us would not be possible (ibid.).

In the concrete context of a physical system made up of two correlated subsystems $S_1$ and $S_2$ (such as that described in the thought experiment of Einstein et al. 1935), local realism requires that

every statement regarding $S_2$ which we are able to make on the basis of a complete measurement on $S_1$ must also hold for the system $S_2$ if, after all, no measurement whatsoever ensued on $S_1$ (Einstein 1948, as translated by Howard 1985, p. 187).

In other words the value of a measurable theoretical parameter of $S_2$ must not depend on whether a measurement is made on a system $S_1$ that is located in some distant region of space. (And of course it must also not depend upon the kind of measurement performed on $S_1$; cf. Howard 1985, p. 186.) Demopoulos notes that local realism as it is applied in such a context is a condition imposed on the measurable properties of the theory and hence it is

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16For a discussion of signalling in the context of special and general relativity see Maudlin (2011, Ch. 4).
17This is done in Demopoulos’s monograph On Theories; see fn. 2.
a condition that is imposed at a theory's 'surface' or operational level. This is an important point that I will return to later.

In the same *Dialectica* article Einstein also formulated a second principle:

For the relative independence of spatially distant things (A and B), this idea is characteristic: an external influence on A has no immediate effect on B; this is known as the 'principle of local action'... The complete suspension of this basic principle would make impossible the idea of the existence of (quasi-) closed systems and, thereby, the establishment of empirically testable laws in the sense familiar to us (Einstein 1948, as translated by Howard 1985, p. 188).

The thought expressed in the second part of this statement seems similar to Einstein's earlier assertion that 'physical thought' would not be possible without the assumption of local realism. However Demopoulous convincingly argues that the principle of local realism, though it receives support from the principle of local action, is a conceptually more fundamental principle than the latter. For conceivably the principle of local realism—i.e. of 'mutually independent existence'—could be treated as holding, Demopoulous argues, even in the absence of local action. Indeed this is so in Newtonian mechanics. For example, Corollary VI to the laws of motion (Newton, 1999 [1687], p. 423) states that a system of bodies moving in any way whatsoever with respect to one another will continue to do so in the presence of equal accelerative forces acting on the system along parallel lines. This makes it possible to treat the system of Jupiter and its moons, for example, as a quasi-closed system with respect to the sun. For owing to the sun's great distance (and relative size), the actions of the forces exerted by it upon the Jovian system will be approximately equal and parallel. Corollary VI, moreover, is used by Newton to prove Proposition 3 of Book I (Newton, 1999 [1687], p. 448), which enables one to distinguish forces that are internal to a given system from forces that are external to it, and which provides a criterion (i.e. that the motions of the bodies comprising a system obey the Area Law with respect to its centre of mass) for determining when the gravitational forces internal to a system have been fully characterised. Thus despite its violation of local action, Demopoulous argues convincingly that Einstein would not (or anyway should not) have regarded a theory such as Newtonian mechanics as unphysical. It is still a basic methodological presupposition of Newtonian mechanics that spatially distant systems have their own individual 'being thus-ness', the description of which is made possible via the theory's characteristic methodological tool of successive approximation, in turn made possible by, for example, Corollary VI, Proposition 3, and the notion of quasi-closed system implied by them.\(^{18}\)

Einstein's principle of local realism or mutually independent existence presupposes the framework of classical physics, which itself presupposes the framework of classical probability theory. Demopoulous argues, however, that the conceptual novelty of quantum theory consists in the fact that it is an 'irreducibly statistical theory', precisely in the sense that its probability assignments, unlike those described by classical probability theory, cannot in general be represented as weighted averages of two-valued measures over the Boolean algebra of all possible properties of a physical system (see also Pitowsky, 1989, 2006; Dickson, 2011). This raises the question of whether one can formulate a generalisation of the

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\(^{18}\)Demopoulous does not specifically mention either Corollary VI or Proposition 3 in his discussion, but I take them to be implicit therein. For a detailed analysis of Newton's method of successive approximations and the methodological role therein played by Corollary VI and Proposition 3, see Harper (2011). For a discussion of the same in relation to general relativity, see DiSalle (2006, 2016).
mutually independent existence condition that is appropriate for an irreducibly statistical
theory such as quantum mechanics.¹⁹

Recall that Einstein's mutually independent existence condition is a condition that is
imposed on the level of the measurable parameters of a theory and hence at its 'surface'
or operational level. It requires, in particular, that the value of a measurable property of a
system \( S_1 \) in some region of physical space \( R_1 \) is independent of what kind of measurement
(or whether any measurement) is performed on some system \( S_2 \) in a distant region of space
\( R_2 \), irrespective of whether \( S_1 \) and \( S_2 \) have previously interacted.

Demopoulos argues that in the context of an irreducibly statistical theory such as quan-
tum mechanics, it is in fact the no-signalling condition which generalises the mutually
independent existence condition. It does so in the sense that like mutually independent
existence, no-signalling is a surface-level constraint on the local facts associated with a
particular system, requiring that these facts be independent of the local surface-level facts
associated with other spatially distant systems. Unlike the mutually independent existence
condition, however, these local facts refer to the marginal probabilities associated with a
system’s measurable properties rather than with what one might regard as those proper-
ties themselves. Specifically, no-signalling asserts that the marginal probability associated
with a measurement on a system \( S_1 \) at a given location \( R_1 \) is independent of what kind
of measurement (or whether any measurement) is performed on some system \( S_2 \) in a dis-
tant region of space \( R_2 \).²⁰

In this way no-signalling allows us to coherently treat systems in different regions of physical space as if they had mutually independent existences—i.e.
as quasi-closed systems in the sense described above—and thus allows for the possibility
of ‘physical thought’ in a methodological sense and for “the establishment of empirically
testable laws in the sense familiar to us” (Einstein 1948, as translated by Howard 1985,
p. 188). Demopoulos argues that quantum mechanics, even under its orthodox interpreta-
tion, is in this way legitimated by the principle and may be thought of as a local theory of
nonlocal correlations.

6 Mutually independent existence and communication

In the previous section we saw that no-signalling can be regarded as generalising a criterion
for the possibility of ‘physical thought’ originally put forward by Einstein. And we saw that
since quantum mechanics satisfies no-signalling, one may think of that theory, even under
its orthodox interpretation, as in this sense legitimated methodologically by the principle.
As we saw in §§2-4, however, other conceivable physical theories—some of which allow for
stronger-than-quantum correlations—satisfy the no-signalling condition as well. In light of
this, ‘information causality’ (or ‘information neutrality’, in Bub’s terminology) was put for-
tward by Pawłowski et al. (2009) as an additional foundational principle for more narrowly
circumscribing the class of physically sensible theories. But in §4 I argued that the principle
requires further motivation before it can legitimately be seen as playing this role. With our
recent discussion of no-signalling in mind, let us now consider the proposal of Pawłowski
et al. again.

**No-signalling** asserts that the marginal probabilities associated with Alice’s local mea-
surements on a system \( S_A \) in a region \( R_A \) are independent of what kind of measurement (or

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¹⁹I am not claiming here that Einstein himself would have been inclined to follow this line of reasoning.
²⁰It is worth noting that the parameter independence condition (Shimony 1993) is just the no-signalling
condition extended to include a hypothetical, possibly hidden, set of *underlying* parameters.
whether any measurement) is performed by Bob locally on a system $S_B$ in a distant region $R_B$. Information causality asserts that Bob can gain no more than $m$ bits of information about Alice’s data set if she sends him only $m$ bits. Pawłowski et al. (2009, p. 1101) remark that “The standard no-signalling condition is just information causality for $m = 0$”. Bub (2012, p. 180) considers this remark to be misleading, but presumably all that Pawłowski et al. intend is that if Alice and Bob share signalling correlations, then Alice may provide Bob with information about her data set merely by measuring it, i.e. without actually sending him any bits. The information causality principle disallows this for any value of $E$, as does no-signalling.\textsuperscript{21}

On the other hand when (for instance) $m = 1$, then in the case where they have previously shared PR-correlated systems (i.e. systems such that $E = 1$), one might argue that there arises a subtle sense in which the probabilities of Bob’s measurement outcomes can be influenced by Alice’s remote measurement settings. Consider the outcome of Bob’s combined measurement $G = \Delta c \oplus B_{II} \oplus B_I$, i.e. his ‘guess’ (3.4). From (3.5) it would appear that Bob’s outcome is in part determined by the setting of Alice’s measurement on system $II$, $a_2 \oplus a_3$, since this appears explicitly in the equation. However in this case appearances are misleading, for the reader can verify that $G$ is probabilistically independent of $a_2 \oplus a_3$ (see figure 1). $G$ is nevertheless probabilistically dependent on both of $a_2$ and $a_3$ considered individually. So one might say that although the outcome of $G$ is not influenced by any of Alice’s measurement settings per se, it does seem to be influenced by the particular way in which those settings have been determined (despite the fact that neither $a_2$ nor $a_3$ are directly used by Alice to determine the value of the bit that she sends to Bob, $c$). Put a different way, the constituents of Alice’s measurement setting on system $II$ respectively determine the two possible outcomes of Bob’s guess whenever he performs the measurement $G$ (for a given $b_0$). Likewise in the case where Bob measures $G' = c \oplus B_{II} \oplus B_I$ (i.e. his guess (3.2)); the two possible outcomes of $G'$ are, respectively, determined by the constituents of Alice’s measurement settings on system $I$, $a_0$ and $a_1$ (for a given $b_0$).

Note that since $a_2$ and $a_3$ (respectively: $a_0$ and $a_1$), besides being the constituents of Alice’s measurement settings on $II$ (respectively: $I$), are also in fact the values of bits in Alice’s list $a$, the above considerations resonate with Bub’s remark (quoted above) that Tsirelson-bound-violating correlations are such that they may themselves include information about Alice’s data set in the context of a game like that described in §3. These considerations

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
$b_0$ & $a_2$ & $a_3$ & $a_2 \oplus a_3$ & $G$ \\
\hline
0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 \\
0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 1 \\
0 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 1 \\
1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
1 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 \\
1 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\
1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 1 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{A summary of the possible outcomes associated with Bob’s measurement $G$ (his ‘guess’) in the guessing game of §3, based on Eq. (3.5). If all atomic variables are assumed to be equally likely to take on a value of 0 or 1, then $G$ is probabilistically independent of Alice’s measurement setting $a_2 \oplus a_3$, but not of its components $a_2$ and $a_3$, since, for example, $p(G = 0|a_2 = 0) = 3/4 \neq p(G = 0|a_2 = 1)$, and $p(G = 0|a_3 = 0) = 3/4 \neq p(G = 0|a_3 = 1)$.}
\end{table}
further suggest a sense, pace Bub, in which it could be argued that the name ‘information causality’ is indeed apt. For the bit of information $c$ that Alice sends to Bob can be thought of as the ‘enabler’ or ‘cause’, at least in a metaphorical sense, of Bob’s ability to use this aspect of the correlations to his advantage (cf. Pawłowski & Scarani, 2016, §3.4).\(^\text{22}\)

Thus one can think of information causality as generalising no-signalling (in the context of the protocol under which information causality is operationally defined) in two ways. On the one hand information causality generalises no-signalling in the sense alluded to by Pawłowski et al.; i.e. it reduces to no-signalling for $m = 0$. On the other hand information causality generalises no-signalling in the sense that, like the no-signalling principle, it expresses a restriction on the accessibility of the remote measurement settings of a distant party; but this restriction now applies not just to those remote measurement settings themselves, but also more generally to the components by which those measurement settings are determined. Since, as we saw in the previous section, no-signalling is already well-motivated in the sense that it gives expression within quantum mechanics to an arguably fundamental assumption that is implicit in physical practice, the very fact that information causality generalises no-signalling can be taken as a compelling motivation for it.

Such a conclusion would be too quick, however, for it does not follow from the fact that information causality generalises no-signalling that it continues to give expression to the condition of mutually independent existence. But it is mutually independent existence which, as we saw, motivates no-signalling as a constraint on physical theories. Thus we must still ask whether a violation of information causality would result in a violation of the mutually independent existence condition in some relevant sense. Arguably this is indeed the situation one is confronted with in the context of the guessing game described above when it is played with Tsirelson-bound-violating correlated systems. On the one hand, when Alice and Bob share maximally super-quantum systems (i.e. PR-systems, for which $E = 1$), then after receiving $c$ there is a sense in which Alice’s system can be said to be ‘a part’ of Bob’s system in the context of the game being played. For after receiving $c$ Bob has immediate access to the value of any single bit of Alice’s that he would like. Alice’s bits may as well be his own for the purposes of the game. Indeed, from this point of view the fact that the communication complexity associated with any distributed computational task is trivial when PR-correlations are used seems natural; for once Alice’s and Bob’s systems are nonlocally joined in this way there is naturally no need for further communication. On the other hand, when Tsirelson-bound-violating correlations that are non-maximal are used, trivial communication complexity has not been shown to result in all cases. But mutually independent existence is nevertheless violated in the sense that the correlations shared prior to the beginning of the game, upon being ‘activated’ by Alice’s classical message $c$ to Bob, contribute information over and above $c$ to the information Bob then gains about Alice’s data set; they ‘implausibly’ enhance the accessibility of Alice’s data set by nonlocally joining Alice to Bob, at least to some extent, in the sense just described.

Now it is one thing to claim that information causality gives expression to a generalised sense of mutually independent existence. It is another, however, to claim that mutually independent existence should be thought of as necessary in this context. Recall that in the last section we saw that mutually independent existence (arguably) must be presupposed if ‘physical thought’ is to be possible—in other words that it is (arguably) a fundamental presupposition implicit in physical practice as such. And we saw that a form of this principle holds in the context of Newtonian mechanics, which may be thought of as in that sense a local theory of nonlocal forces. We also saw that a form of mutually independent existence

\(^{22}\)Perhaps, though, a better name would be the ‘no information causality’ principle.
appropriate for an irreducibly statistical theory—i.e. the no-signalling principle—holds in the context of quantum mechanics, and that it may thus be thought of analogously as a local theory of nonlocal correlations. The context of our current investigation is one which involves considering communicating agents capable of building and manipulating physical systems—thought of now as resources—for their own particular purposes. Our context, that is, is the ‘practical’ one associated with quantum computation and information theory, recently described by Cuffaro (2017, forthcoming-). As Cuffaro has argued, this context of investigation is in fact distinct from the more familiar ‘theoretical’ context that is associated with traditional foundational investigations of quantum mechanics. A different way of putting this is that quantum computation and information theory are ‘resource’ or ‘control’ theories similarly to the science of thermodynamics (Myrvold, 2011; Wallace, 2014; Ladyman, 2018). Thus the question of whether mutually independent existence is necessary for the practice of quantum information and communication complexity theory is a distinct question from the question of whether it is necessary for physical practice in the traditional sense.

Without the presupposition of mutually independent existence—according to which systems that occupy distinct regions of space are to be regarded as existing independently of one another—the idea of a (quasi-) closed system that can be subjected to empirical test, and in this sense ‘physical thought’, would not be possible (or anyway so argued Einstein). Analogously, one could argue that in the context of a theory of communication—i.e. of the various resource costs associated with different communicational protocols and their interrelations—that it is necessary to presuppose that an operational distinction can be made between the parties involved in a communicational protocol. One might argue, that is, that it is constitutive of the very idea of communication that it is an activity that takes place between what can be effectively regarded as two mutually independently existing entities, and moreover that such a distinction is presupposed when one quantifies the complexity of a particular protocol. For without the ability to make such an effective distinction between the systems belonging to the sender and the receiver of information, it is not at all obvious how one should begin to quantify the amount of information that is required to be sent from Alice to Bob in the context of a particular protocol. From this point of view it is indeed not surprising that communication complexity theory becomes impossible (in the sense that all communicational problems become trivially solvable) when PR-correlated systems are available to use.

### 7 Objections

An objection to this line of thought is the following. Cannot something similar be said in the context of the information causality game when Alice and Bob share an entangled quantum system? For arguably (cf. Howard, 1989) Alice and Bob will become likewise inseparable or ‘nonlocally joined’ in such a scenario. And yet no one imagines the very possibility of the sciences of quantum information theory and quantum communication complexity to have been undermined as a result. So why should one believe them to be undermined by the possibility of sharing systems whose correlations violate the Tsirelson bound? This objection, however, involves a description of the situation regarding the sharing of an en-

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Similar ideas have been expressed by Pitowsky (1990, 1996, 2002).

tangled quantum system that is below the surface-level characterisation that is relevant to our discussion. It therefore does not undermine the considerations of the previous section.

Consider the description of a classical bipartite communication protocol. Both before and after communication has taken place, such a description may be regarded as decomposable into three parts: a sending system, a receiving system, and something communicated between them. For a quantum protocol the possibility of such a decomposition is in general far less obvious as a result of the well-known conceptual intricacies associated with entangled quantum states. However whether or not Alice and her system, and Bob and his system, are ‘in reality’ inseparably entangled with one another, it remains the case, both before (because of quantum mechanics’ satisfaction of the no-signalling condition) and after the communication of a classical message (because of quantum mechanics’ satisfaction of the information causality condition), that Alice’s system, Bob’s system, and the message \( c \) may be operationally distinguished from one another in the sense that Bob cannot take advantage of the underlying connection he has with Alice and her system via the correlations he shares with her to gain information about her data set over and above what has been provided to him via \( c \). It is true that previously shared quantum correlations enable one to communicate with greater efficiency than is possible using only previously shared classical correlations. As (4.3) shows, Bob has a higher probability of guessing correctly in the information causality game if he and Alice have previously shared quantum as opposed to classical correlations.\(^{25}\) And the question arises regarding the source of this increased communicational power. But whatever that source is, it is not the case that it manifests itself in nonlocality or nonseparability at the operational level.\(^{26}\) This is in contrast to systems whose correlations violate the Tsirelson bound.

But the game described by Pawłowski et al. (2009) involves the communication of classical bits from Alice to Bob. Might not this limitation in Bob’s ability to take advantage of his underlying connection with Alice be overcome if we allow her to send him qubits rather than only classical bits? Indeed, it is well known that if Alice sends a qubit to Bob that is entangled with a qubit that is already in his possession, then Alice and Bob can implement the ‘superdense coding’ protocol (Nielsen & Chuang, 2000, §2.3); Alice’s sending of a single qubit to Bob according to this protocol will allow him to learn two bits’ worth of classical information.\(^{27}\) Does this not undermine the claim that quantum correlations contribute nothing over and above whatever message is sent between Alice and Bob to the information gained by him?

It does not. On the one hand, before the transmission of the qubit(s) from Alice to Bob, no-signalling implies that Alice and Bob can be considered as operationally separable despite their sharing an entangled system, as we have seen above. On the other hand, in the superdense coding protocol, after Alice transmits her message to Bob, all of the correlated quantum system that was initially shared is now in Bob’s possession. So after transmission there is no sense in which Bob can take advantage of correlations shared with Alice at that time. In a sense Alice’s message to Bob ‘just is’ information regarding the correlations that

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\(^{25}\)This is true in other contexts besides that of the information causality game. See, e.g., Buhrman et al. (2001); Brukner et al. (2002, 2004).

\(^{26}\)Compare this with Buhrman et al. (2001), who writes that entanglement enables one to “circumvent (rather than simulate) communication” (p. 1831, emphasis in original), and also with Bub (2010)’s discussion of entanglement in the context of quantum computation, which he argues allows a quantum computer to compute a global property of a function by performing fewer, not more, computations than classical computers.

\(^{27}\)In the context of a suitably generalised version of the information causality game, it turns out that a two-bit information gain per qubit constitutes an upper bound (Pitalúa-García, 2013).
exist between them at the time at which she sends it.\footnote{This conclusion is essentially that of Spekkens (2007, p. 032110-20). Fascinatingly, Spekkens also shows that the superdense coding protocol can be implemented in his toy classical theory.}

As we have seen, when Alice and Bob share PR-correlated systems, they can win a round with certainty in the $m = 1$ game for any $N$ by exchanging a single classical bit. Earlier I also mentioned van Dam’s (2013 [2005]) result to the effect that PR-correlated systems allow one to perform any distributed computational task with only a trivial amount of communication. These results are striking. However the reader may nevertheless feel somewhat unimpressed by them for the following reason: the number of PR-correlated systems required to implement these protocols, as we have seen, is great. With respect to the length $n$ of Bob’s bit string $b$ (arguably the most appropriate measure of input size for the game), implementing the solution described above requires that they share $2^n - 1$ PR-systems; i.e. the number of PR-systems required grows exponentially with the input size. Likewise for van Dam’s protocol.\footnote{Specifically, van Dam’s (2013 [2005]) protocol requires a number of systems that can grow exponentially with respect to the input size of an instance of the Inner Product problem, after which the solution can be efficiently converted into a solution to any other distributed computational problem.} A reduction in communication complexity has therefore been achieved only at the expense of an increase in computational complexity. One might argue that it is in this sense misleading to consider the complexity of implementing the protocol with PR-correlated systems to be trivial—that they provide us with a ‘free lunch’.

I will return to this point later. But for now let me say that, arguably, this is not a relevant consideration in this context. The theories of communication complexity and computational complexity are distinct sub-disciplines of computer science. The goal of communication complexity is to quantify the amount of communication necessary to implement various communicational protocols. For this purpose one abstracts away from any consideration of how complicated a computational system must be in other respects (Hushilevitz & Nisan, 1997). The question addressed in van Dam (2013 [2005]) and in Pawłowski et al. (2009) and Pawłowski & Scarani (2016) concerns whether the availability of PR-correlated systems would make communicational, not computational, complexity theory superfluous. From this point of view any previously prepared PR-correlated systems are viewed as ‘free resources’ for the purposes of the analysis.

This said, one can imagine that the subsystems of PR-correlated systems employ some hidden means of communication with one another, and then argue that this must be included in the complexity ascribed to the protocol. This would of course constitute a descent below the empirically verifiable level. In itself this is obviously not objectionable. But it is hard to see what use this would be to a theory of communicational complexity, which after all, like computational complexity (Cuffaro, 2018), aims to be a practical science whose goal is to guide us in making distinctions in practice between real problems related to data transmission that are of varying levels of difficulty. In this sense appealing to unseen and unmanipulable communication between the subsystems of PR-systems does not help with the conclusion that communication complexity theory, at least in an operational sense, becomes superfluous if PR-correlated systems are available. The objection addressed in the previous two paragraphs is nevertheless an important one that I will return to.

Above I have motivated the idea, of Pawłowski et al. (2009, p. 1101), that the kind of accessibility of remote data that is possible given the existence of correlated systems which violate the Tsirelson bound is ‘implausible’. I have done so by describing, \textit{pace} Bub (2012), the sense in which information causality can be taken to generalise no-signalling. In so doing I have gestured at a connection between the idea of implausible accessibility and the
*prima facie* separate idea that a world in which Tsirelson-bound-violating correlated systems exist would be ‘too good to be true’ in a communicational complexity-theoretic sense. My arguments have been mainly conceptual. I have argued, that is, that a kind of conceptual ambiguity at the operational level between the parties to a communicational protocol may result if correlations which violate the Tsirelson bound are available to use. As we have seen, when such stronger-than-quantum correlations are strong enough (i.e. when $E > \sqrt{6}/3$), this results in the trivial communicational complexity of any distributed computational task. But trivial communicational complexity does not result, or anyway has not yet been shown to result, for values of $E$ above the Tsirelson bounded value of $1/\sqrt{2}$ that are below $\sqrt{6}/3$. This is despite the fact that the conceptual ambiguity I have described is present to some extent for all such values of $E$.

Thus one may wonder whether ‘a little’ ambiguity may be tolerable for practical purposes—whether, that is, a theory which admits correlations which only ‘weakly’ violate the Tsirelson bound should be admitted within the space of possible physical theories from the point of view of the information causality principle. The situation could be seen as analogous to the situation one is faced with in Newtonian Mechanics, in fact, for Corollary VI (which I described in §5) only guarantees that a system in the presence of external forces can be treated as (quasi-) closed when these forces act *exactly* equally upon it and are *exactly* parallel. Clearly this is not the case for the Jovian system *vis-á-vis* the sun, for example. Corollary VI—and Proposition 3—nevertheless function as methodological tools in that they allows us to maintain the idea of the mutually independent existence of spatially distant things as a methodological principle and treat the Jovian system, for the practical purpose of analysing its internal motions, as unaffected by the forces exerted upon it by the sun.

There is much work to be done before information causality can be considered as successful in ruling out—in the conceptual sense described in the previous two paragraphs—all theories whose correlations violate the Tsirelson bound. Irrespective of whether this goal can be achieved, however, this does not necessarily undermine the status of information causality motivated as a methodological principle in something like the way that I have done in this paper. In particular, information causality would be especially compelling if one could draw a relation between the degree of violation of the principle and the degree of ‘superfluousness’ of the resulting theory of communication complexity with an eye to distinguishing ‘weak’ violations of the Tsirelson bound from more objectionable violations. Thus there is much work to do in any case.

I close with the following more fundamental objection. Why should nature care whether beings such as us are able to engage in communication complexity theory? In fact there is no fundamental reason why nature should care. Analogously, there is no fundamental reason why nature should care whether beings such as us can do physics. But the goal of empirical science is not to derive the structure of the world or its constituent entities by way of a priori or ‘self-evident’ principles. It is rather to make sense of and explain our experience of and in the world, as well as to enable us to predict and to control aspects of that world for whatever particular practical purposes we may have. In fact we have a science which is called physics. And in fact we have a science which we refer to as communication complexity theory. The principle of mutually independent existence, and analogously the principle of information causality, may be thought of as answers to the question: ‘how are such facts possible?’ in the sense that they aim to identify the necessary suppositions implicit in any such theories and in our practice of them.\(^{30}\)

That said, these may not be definitive answers. The necessity of presupposing Einstein's mutual independence and local action principles for the purposes of theory testing has been questioned by Howard (1989). In a similar way, one might argue that it is wrong to think that the existence of correlated systems which 'strongly' violate the Tsirelson bound would make any science of communication complexity impossible. Rather, one might conclude instead that the idea of a science of communication complexity that is wholly independent of computational complexity-theoretic considerations is unachievable. This, one might argue, is the real lesson to take away from the fact that an exponential number of PR-correlated systems is required to implement Alice's and Bob's solution to their guessing game. Yet even if this were all that we learned from information causality, it would still represent a significant advance in our understanding of the structure of our theoretical knowledge—an understanding of the physically motivated constraints under which two mathematical theories may be regarded as mutually independent.

8 Summary

Above I have argued that the principle of information causality has not yet been sufficiently motivated to play the role of a foundational principle of nature, and I have described a way in which one might begin to provide it with such a motivation. More specifically, I described an argument, due to Demopoulos, to the effect that the no-signalling condition can be viewed as a generalisation, appropriate to an irreducibly statistical theory, of Einstein's principle of mutually independent existence interpreted as a constraint on physical practice. I then argued that information causality can in turn be motivated as a further generalisation of no-signalling that is appropriate to a theory of communication. I closed by describing a number of important obstacles that are required to be overcome if the project of establishing information causality as a foundational principle is to succeed.

References


