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Zero Probability

November, Dan D (2018) Zero Probability. [Preprint]

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Abstract

In probability textbooks, it is widely claimed that zero probability does not mean impossibility. But what stands behind this claim? In this paper I offer an explanation to this claim based on Kolmogorov's formalism. As such, this explanation is relevant to all interpretations of Kolmogorov's probability theory. I start by clarifying that this claim refers only to nonempty events, since empty events are always considered as impossible. Then, I offer the following three reasons for the claim that nonempty events with zero probability are considered as possible: The main reason is simply because they are nonempty. Hence, they are considered as possible despite their zero probability. The second reason is that sometimes the zero probability is taken to be an approximation of some infinitesimal probability value. Such a value is strictly positive and as such does not imply impossibility in a strict sense. Finally, the third reason is that there are interpretations according to which the same event can have different probabilities. Specifically, it is assumed that an event with exactly zero probability (that does not approximate an infinitesimal value) can have strictly positive probabilities. This means that such an event can be possible which implies that its zero probability does not mean impossibility.


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Item Type: Preprint
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CreatorsEmailORCID
November, Dan Ddanny.november@mail.huji.ac.il
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics
Depositing User: Mr. Dan D November
Date Deposited: 15 Jan 2019 22:42
Last Modified: 15 Jan 2019 22:42
Item ID: 15590
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics
Date: 27 December 2018
URI: https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/15590

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