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To illustrate this claim, I discuss Aizawa's rebuttal of embodied and enactive accounts of vision. While Aizawa's 236 Marcin Miłkowski argument is sound against a strong reading of the enactive account, it does not undermine the way embodied cognition proceeds, because the claim he attacks is one of fallible heuristics. These heuristics may be helpful in developing models of cognition in an interdisciplinary fashion. I briefly discuss the issue of whether this fallibility actually makes embodied cognition vulnerable to charges of being untestable or non-scientific. I also stress that the historical approach to this research tradition suggests that embodied cognition is not poised to become a grand unified theory of cognition. Keywords: embodied cognition, heuristics, research tradition, representational unification Streszczenie Zawodne heurystyki a ocena tradycji badawczych. Przypadek poznania ucieleśnionego Celem artykułu jest uzasadnienie tezy, że ucieleśnione poznanie, jak wiele innych tradycji badawczych w kognitywistyce, dostarcza zbioru zawodnych heurystyk badawczych, a nie ogólnych zasad obowiązujących we wszelkiego rodzaju procesach poznawczych. Teza ta jest zilustrowana przykładem polemiki Kennetha Aizawy z enaktywnymi i ucieleśnionymi koncepcjami widzenia. Podczas gdy argumentacja Aizawy jest poprawna materialnie w odniesieniu do mocnej interpretacji koncepcji enaktywnej, nie podważa ona ucieleśnionego poznania, gdyż wymierzona jest jedynie w zawodną heurystykę. Heurystyki takie mogą być pomocne w rozwijaniu modeli poznania w sposób interdyscyplinarny. Krótko opisuję problem, czy ta zawodność wystawia ucieleśnione poznanie na zarzut niesprawdzalności i pseudonaukowości. Podkreślam też, że historyczne podejście do tej tradycji badawczej sugeruje, iż nie może ona stać się wielką unifikacyjną teorią poznania. Słowa kluczowe: ucieleśnione poznanie, tradycje badawcze, unifikacja reprezentacyjna