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A Third Route to the Doomsday Argument

Franceschi, Paul (2004) A Third Route to the Doomsday Argument. [Preprint]

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Abstract

In this paper, I present a solution to the Doomsday argument based on a third type of solution, by contrast to on the one hand, the Carter-Leslie view and on the other hand, the Eckhardt et al. analysis. I begin by strengthening both competing models by highlighting some variations of their ancestors models, which renders them less vulnerable to some objections. I describe then a third line of solution, which incorporates insights from both Leslie and Eckhardt's models and fits more adequately with the human situation corresponding to DA. I argue then that this two-sided analogy also holds when one takes into account the issue of indeterminism and the reference class problem. This leads finally to a novel formulation of the argument that could well be more consensual than the original one.


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Franceschi, Paul
Keywords: Doomsday argument, indeterminism, probability theory, analogy
Subjects: General Issues > Confirmation/Induction
General Issues > Determinism/Indeterminism
Depositing User: Paul Franceschi
Date Deposited: 26 Feb 2004
Last Modified: 07 Oct 2010 15:12
Item ID: 1631
Subjects: General Issues > Confirmation/Induction
General Issues > Determinism/Indeterminism
Date: February 2004
URI: https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/1631

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