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Why Lewis', Shogenji's and Fitelsons's notions of coherence cannot be accepted

Moretti, Luca (2004) Why Lewis', Shogenji's and Fitelsons's notions of coherence cannot be accepted. [Preprint]

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Abstract

In this paper, I show that Lewis' definition of coherence and Fitelson's and Shogenji's measures of coherence are unacceptable because they entail the absurdity that any set of beliefs in general is coherent and not coherent at the same time. This devastating result is obtained if a simple and plausible principle of stability for coherence is accepted.


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Item Type: Preprint
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Moretti, Luca
Keywords: Coherence, coherence measure, Bayesian coherence, Lewis, Fitelson, Shogenji
Subjects: General Issues > Confirmation/Induction
Depositing User: Luca Moretti
Date Deposited: 26 Feb 2004
Last Modified: 07 Oct 2010 15:12
Item ID: 1635
URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/1635

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