PhilSci Archive

Why Lewis', Shogenji's and Fitelsons's notions of coherence cannot be accepted

Moretti, Luca (2004) Why Lewis', Shogenji's and Fitelsons's notions of coherence cannot be accepted. [Preprint]

[img] Microsoft Word (.doc)
Download (67Kb)

    Abstract

    In this paper, I show that Lewis' definition of coherence and Fitelson's and Shogenji's measures of coherence are unacceptable because they entail the absurdity that any set of beliefs in general is coherent and not coherent at the same time. This devastating result is obtained if a simple and plausible principle of stability for coherence is accepted.

    Export/Citation:EndNote | BibTeX | Dublin Core | ASCII/Text Citation (Chicago) | HTML Citation | OpenURL
    Social Networking:
    Share |
    Item Type: Preprint
    Keywords: Coherence, coherence measure, Bayesian coherence, Lewis, Fitelson, Shogenji
    Subjects: General Issues > Confirmation/Induction
    Depositing User: Luca Moretti
    Date Deposited: 26 Feb 2004
    Last Modified: 07 Oct 2010 11:12
    Item ID: 1635
    URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/1635

    Actions (login required)

    		 View Item

    Document Downloads