The Evidential Conditional

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This paper outlines an account of conditionals, the evidential account, which rests on the idea that a conditional is true just in case its antecedent supports its consequent. As we will show, the evidential account exhibits some distinctive logical features that deserve careful consideration. On the one hand, it departs from the material reading of ‘if then’ exactly in the way we would like it to depart from that reading. On the other, it significantly differs from the non-material reading of ‘if then’ implied by the suppositional theories advocated by Adams, Stalnaker, Lewis, and others.

1 overview

Logicians have always been tempted by the thought that ‘if then’ expresses a relation of support. The meaning of ‘support’ can be articulated in various ways by using everyday words: one is to say that the antecedent of a conditional must provide a reason to accept its consequent, so that the latter is justifiably inferred from the former; another is to say that, if the consequent of a conditional holds, it must hold in virtue of its antecedent, or because its antecedent holds. What makes this thought intuitively appealing is that, in most cases, conditionals can indeed be paraphrased by using such words. Here are some examples:

(1) If it’s pure cashmere, it will not shrink
(2) If you drink a beer, you’ll feel better
(3) If it is snowing, then it is cold

It seems correct to say that the antecedent of (1) provides a reason to accept its consequent, and that if the consequent of (1) holds, it holds in virtue of its antecedent. Accordingly, the following reformulations of (1) seem acceptable:

(4) If it’s pure cashmere, we can infer that it will not shrink
(5) If it will not shrink, it’s because it’s pure cashmere

Similar considerations hold for (2) and (3). What one wants to say when one utters (2) is that drinking a beer makes you feel better, so that if you drink it, you’ll experience that effect. In the case of (3), again, the antecedent provides a reason to accept the consequent. Although in this case the event described by the antecedent does not cause the event described by the consequent, the consequent clearly depends on the antecedent is some explanatory sense.

Of course, there are cases in which no paraphrase in terms of ‘reason’, ‘infer’, ‘in virtue of’, or ‘because’ is available. Typically, concessive conditionals do not admit reformulations along the lines suggested. Suppose that
we intend to go out for a walk and we hope that it will be sunny. We can nonetheless assert what follows:

(6) If it will rain, we will go

In this case it would be inappropriate to say that the rain provides a reason to go, or that if we will go, it is because it will rain. Instead, what we mean by uttering (6) is that we will go anyway, that is, in spite of the rain. So the following seem correct reformulations of (6):

(7) Even if it will rain, we will go

(8) If it will rain, we will still go

More generally, concessive conditionals are suitably phrased by using ‘even if’ or ‘still’, and do not imply support in the sense considered.

However, the range of cases in which the notion of support seems pertinent is sufficiently large and representative to deserve separate study. Despite the plain intelligibility of paraphrases such (4) and (5), the notion of support proves hard to capture at the formal level. This explains the heterogeneity and the multiplicity of the attempts that have been made so far to define a connective with the property desired. At least two main lines of thought have been explored. One option is to treat conditionals as strict conditionals and define support in terms of necessitation: a conditional is true just in case its antecedent necessitates its consequent\(^1\). Another option is to provide a non-monotonic formal treatment of conditionals which somehow captures the intuition of support\(^2\). The account that will be outlined here belongs to the second category, even though it significantly differs from its main exponents.

We will call ‘evidential’ the interpretation of ‘if then’ that our account is intended to capture, and accordingly we will call ‘evidential’ the account itself. The evidential interpretation may be regarded as one coherent reading of ‘if then’, although it is not necessarily the only admissible reading. We will not address the thorny question of whether there is a unique correct analysis of ‘if then’, because the main points that we will make can be acknowledged without assuming that an affirmative answer can be given to that question. If different readings of ‘if then’ are equally admissible, the evidential interpretation is one of them.

Interestingly, the notion of support seems to apply equally well to indicative conditionals and to counterfactuals. Although we will focus on indicative conditionals, what we will say about this notion can easily be extended to counterfactuals. In particular, the distinction between evidential and concessive readings of ‘if then’ is orthogonal to the distinction between indicative and subjunctive conditionals. For example, the following sentences exhibit the same difference that obtains between (1) and (6):

(9) If it were cashmere, it would not shrink

(10) If it were raining, we would go

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\(^1\) This option has been developed in different ways by Lycan [23], Gillies [13], Kratzer [20], Iacona [15], and others.

\(^2\) Among the most recent attempts, Rott [27] contains a pioneering discussion of ‘if’ and ‘because’, relying on a variation of the belief revision formalism. The ranking-theoretic account offered in Spohn [30] explicitly involves the idea of the antecedent as providing a reason for the consequent. The approach to conditionals outlined in Douven [8] and Douven [9] employs the notion of evidential support from Bayesian epistemology. K. Krzyzanowska, S. Wenmackers, and I. Douven [17] and R. van Rooij and K. Schulz [33] provide further examples.
While (9) can be paraphrased by means of sentences that resemble (4) and (5), the most appropriate reformulations of (10) are sentences that resemble (7) and (8).

The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 provides a first informal sketch of the evidential account. Section 3 introduces a modal language that includes the symbol $\triangleright$, which represents our reading of ‘if then’. Sections 4-8 spell out some important logical properties of $\triangleright$. Section 9 explains how $\triangleright$ differs from the suppositional conditional as understood by Adams, Stalnaker, Lewis, and others. Finally, section 10 points out that the evidential interpretation can also be framed in terms of assertibility.

2 THE CORE IDEA

The intuition that underlies the evidential account is very straightforward. Let ‘If A, then C’ be any conditional. The following table displays the four combinations of values that A and C can take:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>✓</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>×</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to the material reading of ‘if then’, one of these four combinations is bad, 10, while the others are good, 11, 01, 00. The badness of 10 is understood as follows: if 10 is actually realized, that is, if A is true and C is false, then ‘If A, then C’ is false, otherwise it is true.

Yet there is another way of looking at the same table, that is, there is another way of seeing 10 as the bad combination. Instead of understanding its badness as the claim that 10 must not actually occur, one can understand it as the claim that 10 must not be likely to occur. To illustrate, consider (2). According to the reading of the table we are suggesting, (2) is true just in case the combination 10 is not likely to occur, that is, it is not likely that you drink a beer without feeling better. Otherwise, (2) is false. We take this reading to be very plausible. Or at least, it is definitely no less plausible than the reading according to which the truth or falsity of (2) depends on whether you actually drink a beer, or whether you actually feel better.

What does it mean that the combination 10 is not likely to occur? It means that the worlds in which it occurs — the 10-worlds — are distant from the actual world if compared with those in which it does not occur. For example, the following diagram describes a case in which (2) is true:

```
— — — 11
— — — — — 10
01
— — 00
```

Here the length of each dashed line indicates the distance from the actual world of the closest world in which the respective combination occurs. That is, any world in which you drink a beer without feeling better is more distant

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3 This symbol is borrowed from Spohn [30].
from the actual world than some world in which this does not happen. The following diagram, instead, describes a case in which (2) is false:

```
  11
  10
  01
  00
```

In this case the closest world in which you drink a beer without feeling better is less distant from the actual world than the closest world in which you drink a beer and feel better.

In other words, the second reading of the table is modal rather than material, as it concerns what happens in a set of worlds that may differ in several respects from the actual world. The contrast between materiality and modality is a fundamental point of dispute that emerged from the very beginning of the debate on conditionals. According to Sextus Empiricus, the Stoics disagreed with each other on at least two views of conditionals. One of them was attributed to Philo:

> a true conditional is one which does not have a true antecedent and a false consequent

The other was attributed to Chrysippus:

> a conditional holds whenever the denial of its consequent is incompatible with its antecedent

Chrysippus’ view can be construed in different ways, because incompatibility can be understood in different ways. The account just sketched may be regarded as one of them: to say that the denial of the consequent is incompatible with the antecedent is to say that the worlds in which the antecedent and the negation of the consequent are both true are distant from the actual world.

In order to provide a perspicuous representation of comparative measures of distance, we will employ Lewis’s system of spheres. We will imagine non-actual worlds as ordered in a set of spheres around the actual world, depending on their degree of similarity to the actual world. In this framework, to say that $\phi$ is not likely to be realized is to say that some sufficiently inclusive sphere is $\phi$-free, that is, it contains no $\phi$-worlds.

The qualification ‘sufficiently inclusive’ is intended to rule out two cases: one is that in which the sphere contains no world where the antecedent is true, the other is that in which the sphere contains no world where the consequent is false. In each of these two cases, the sphere is $\phi$-free solely in virtue of the modal status of one of the two constituents of the conditional — the unlikeliness of $\phi$ or the likeliness of $\psi$ — independently of its relation with the other. To give substance to the idea that $\phi$ supports $\psi$, we will require that there is a $\phi$-free sphere in which $\phi$ is true in some world and $\psi$ is false in some world.

These two further conditions guarantee the connection between $\phi$ and $\psi$ in the following sense. First, if there is a $\phi$-free sphere in which $\phi$ is true

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6 This reading of Chrysippus’s view differs from a stronger reading that is sometimes adopted, as in Sanford [29], p. 25, namely that a conditional is true when there are no worlds in which the antecedent and the negation of the consequent are both true.
7 Lewis [22], pp. 13-19.
in some world, then some 11-worlds are closer to the actual world than any 10-world. This is essentially the Ramsey Test as understood by Stalnaker and Lewis: in the closest world (or worlds) in which A is true, C must be true as well\textsuperscript{8}. Second, if there is a 10-free sphere in which C is false in some world, then some 00-worlds are closer to the actual world than any 10-world. This amounts to a different test, call it the \textit{Chrysippus Test}: the falsity of C must make the falsity of A more likely than its truth. The Chrysippus Test characterizes the evidential interpretation as we understand it, for it accounts for the intuition that if C holds, it holds in virtue of A. If this test fails, then the closest 10-world may well be distant, but not more than the closest 00-world. Thus, even if the falsity of C is kept away from the actual world, it is not because of the truth of A.

Consider again (2). The first of the two diagrams above describes a case in which (2) is true. In that case there is a 10-free sphere in which the antecedent is true in some world and the consequent is false in some world. Instead, the second diagram describes a case in which (2) is false. In that case there is no 10-free sphere in which the antecedent is true in some world, although there is some 10-sphere, so the Ramsey Test fails. There are worlds in which you drink a beer, and the closest worlds in which you drink a beer are worlds in which you don’t feel better. In order to show a violation of the Chrysippus Test we need a different diagram:

```
— — 11
— — 10
01
— — 00
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In this case (2) is false because there is no 10-free sphere in which the consequent is false in some world, although there is some 10-free sphere. The problem is that the closest worlds in which you don’t feel better are worlds in which you drink a beer rather than being worlds in which you don’t drink a beer. This implies that if you feel better, it is not because of the beer.

The role of the Chrysippus Test emerges clearly when we consider examples such as the following:

(11) If you drink a beer, the sun will rise tomorrow

(11) passes the Ramsey Test: the closest worlds in which you drink a beer are worlds in which the sun will rise tomorrow. But it does not pass the Chrysippus Test: it is not the case that the closest worlds in which the sun will not rise tomorrow are worlds in which you don’t drink a beer. Even if the absence of sunrise is a remote possibility, its distance from the actual world does not depend on your beer. Thus, an account based solely on the Ramsey Test will predict that (11) is true. Instead, an account that combines the Ramsey Test with the Chrysippus Test will predict that (11) is false. The latter prediction is exactly what one should expect from the evidential interpretation: if the consequent of (11) holds, it does not hold in virtue of its antecedent\textsuperscript{9}.

The hypothesis that emerges from these initial informal remarks is that ‘If A, then C’ is non-vacuously true just in case there is a 10-free sphere in which A is true in some world and C is false in some world. This account

\textsuperscript{8} The Ramsey Test comes from Ramsey \cite{Ramsey26}. Stalnaker \cite{Stalnaker31} and Lewis \cite{Lewis22} adopt the modal interpretation suggested.

\textsuperscript{9} Douven \cite{Douven8} discusses similar examples.
of non-vacuous truth, as we shall see, can plausibly be combined with a standard characterization of vacuous truth. If A is impossible — that is, true in no world — then there are no 10-worlds at all, so it is unlikely that 10 occurs no matter what C says. Similarly, if C is necessary — that is, true in every world — then there are no 10-worlds at all, so it is unlikely that 10 occurs no matter what A says.

3 Definitions

To phrase in more formal terms what we have just said, we will define a modal language called L. The symbols of L are the letters p, q, r, ..., the connectives \( \neg, \lor, \land, \vee, \Rightarrow, \Box, \Diamond \), and the brackets ( ). The formulas of L are defined by induction in the usual way: p, q, r, ..., are formulas; if \( \alpha \) is a formula, \( \neg\alpha, \Box\alpha, \Diamond\alpha \) are formulas; if \( \alpha \) and \( \beta \) are formulas, \( \alpha \lor \beta, \alpha \land \beta, \alpha \vee \beta, \alpha \Rightarrow \beta \) are formulas. The interpretation of L is based on Lewis’s notion of system of spheres.

**Definition 1** Given a non-empty set \( W \), a system of spheres \( O \) over \( W \) is an assignment to each \( w \in W \) of a set \( O_w \) of non-empty sets of elements of \( W \) — a set of spheres around \( w \) — such that:

1. if \( S \in O_w \) and \( S' \in O_w \), then either \( S \subseteq S' \) or \( S' \subseteq S \);
2. \( \{w\} \in O_w \);
3. if \( S \neq \bigcup O_w \), then there is a \( S' \) such that \( S \subseteq S' \) and \( S' \subseteq S'' \) for every \( S'' \) such that \( S \subseteq S'' \).

Clause 1 says that \( O_w \) is nested. This condition is essential, otherwise we would have two spheres \( S, S' \) and two worlds \( w', w'' \) such that \( w' \in S \) but \( w' \notin S' \), and \( w'' \in S' \) but \( w'' \notin S \). That is, \( w' \) would be more similar to \( w \) than \( w'' \) and \( w'' \) would be more similar to \( w \) than \( w' \).

Clause 2 implies that \( O_w \) is centered on \( w \). If \( \{w\} \in O_w \), then by clause 1 we have that, for every \( S \in O_w \), \( \{w\} \subseteq S \), given that \( S \) is assumed to be non-empty. This means that \( w \) belongs to every sphere around \( w \). The idea that underlies centering is that the innermost sphere is a singleton because no other world is as similar to \( w \) as \( w \) itself is.

Clause 3 states the limit assumption, according to which, for every sphere smaller than \( \bigcup O_w \), there is a smallest sphere around \( S \): getting closer and closer to \( S \) we eventually reach a limit. In the specific case in which \( S = \{w\} \), this means that there is a sphere that contains the worlds closest to \( w \). Without the limit assumption, we would have infinitely descending chains, that is, we would have that, no matter how \( w' \) is close to \( w \), there is always another \( w'' \) such that \( w'' \) is closer to \( w \) than \( w' \). Although Lewis finds this assumption questionable for metaphysical reasons, we think that we can live with it.

Further constraints on \( O \) might be added. One is closure under union: if \( S \subseteq O_w \) and \( \bigcup S \) is the set of all \( w' \) such that \( w' \) belongs to some member of \( S \), then \( \bigcup S \in O_w \). Another is closure under intersection: if \( S \subseteq O_w \) and \( \bigcap S \) is the set of all \( w' \) such that \( w' \) belongs to every member of \( S \), then \( \bigcap S \in O_w \). A third constraint is uniformity: for every \( w, w' \in W \), \( \bigcup O_w = O_w \). Since clause 2 entails that, for every \( w \in W \), \( w \in \bigcup O_w \), from the uniformity of \( O \) we get that, for each \( w \in W \), \( \bigcup O_w = W \), that is, every world lies within some

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10 Lewis [22], pp. 19-21. Several authors have defended the limit assumptions, see for example Warmbrod [36] and Diez [7].
sphere around w. Each of these constraint is reasonable. However, we will not assume them as part of the definition of O because they are not strictly necessary for our purposes.

A model for L is defined in terms of a system of spheres as follows:

**Definition 2** A model M for L is an ordered triple \((W, O, V)\), where W is a nonempty set, O is a system of spheres over W, and V is a valuation function such that, for each atomic formula \(\alpha\) of L and each \(w \in W\), \(V(\alpha, w) \in \{1, 0\}\).

The truth of a formula of L in a world \(w\) in a model M is defined as follows:

**Definition 3**

1. If \(\alpha\) is atomic, \([\alpha]_{M,w} = 1 \iff V(\alpha, w) = 1;\)
2. \([\neg \alpha]_{M,w} = 1 \iff [\alpha]_{M,w} = 0;\)
3. \([\alpha \land \beta]_{M,w} = 1 \iff [\alpha]_{M,w} = 1 \text{ and } [\beta]_{M,w} = 1;\)
4. \([\alpha \lor \beta]_{M,w} = 1 \iff \text{ either } [\alpha]_{M,w} = 1 \text{ or } [\beta]_{M,w} = 1;\)
5. \([\alpha \rightarrow \beta]_{M,w} = 1 \iff \text{ either } [\alpha]_{M,w} = 0 \text{ or } [\beta]_{M,w} = 1;\)
6. \([\alpha \land \beta]_{M,w} = 1 \iff \text{ the following conditions hold:}\)
   - (a) for every \(w'\), if \([\alpha]_{M,w'} = 1 \text{ and there are no } w'' \text{ and } S \text{ such that } w'' \in S, w' \notin S, \text{ and } [\alpha]_{M,w''} = 1, \text{ then } [\beta]_{M,w''} = 1;\)
   - (b) for every \(w'\), if \([\beta]_{M,w'} = 0 \text{ and there are no } w'' \text{ and } S \text{ such that } w'' \in S, w' \notin S, \text{ and } [\beta]_{M,w''} = 0, \text{ then } [\alpha]_{M,w''} = 0;\)
7. \([\Box \alpha]_{M,w} = 1 \iff \text{ for every } w' \text{ in every } S \in O_w, [\alpha]_{M,w'} = 1;\)
8. \([\Diamond \alpha]_{M,w} = 1 \iff \text{ for some } w' \text{ in some } S \in O_w, [\alpha]_{M,w'} = 1.\)

In clause 6, (a) expresses the Ramsey Test, or at least one of the most widespread understanding of it: \(\beta\) must be true in the closest worlds in which \(\alpha\) is true. (b) expresses the Chrysippus Test: \(\alpha\) must be false in the closest worlds in which \(\beta\) is false. Note that if \(\alpha\) is impossible, the antecedent of (a) is false for every world, and the consequent of (b) is true for every world. Similarly, if \(\beta\) is necessary, the consequent of (a) is true for every world, and the antecedent of (b) is false for every world. This means that \(\alpha \land \beta\) is vacuously true when \(\alpha\) is impossible or \(\beta\) is necessary. Instead, when \(\alpha\) is true in some world and \(\beta\) is false is some world, (a) entails that there is a 10-free sphere where \(\alpha\) is true in some world, and (b) entails that there is a 10-free sphere where \(\beta\) is false in some world. Since one of the two spheres must include the other, there is a sphere that is sufficiently inclusive in the sense explained. This means that \(\alpha \land \beta\) is non-vacuously true when it is verified by a sufficiently inclusive sphere.

Validity, indicated by the symbol \(\vdash\), is defined in terms of truth in a world \(w\) in a model M:

**Definition 4** \(\vdash \alpha\) if \(\alpha\) is true in every world in every model.

Logical consequence is defined accordingly for every finite set of formulas \(\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_n\) and every formula \(\beta\):

**Definition 5** \(\vdash \alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_n \vdash \beta\) if \(\vdash (\alpha_1 \land \ldots \land \alpha_n) \rightarrow \beta.\)

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11 Lewis [22], pp. 14-15, 120-121.
In the following sections we will employ these definitions to prove some remarkable facts about the evidential interpretation. As we will show, ⌢ differs from ⊃ exactly in the way we would like it to differ from ⊃.

4 SOME RELATIVELY UNCONTROVERSIAL PRINCIPLES

Although it is commonly taken for granted that conditionals as they are used in ordinary language do not behave in accordance with the material interpretation, there is little agreement on the nature and the extent of such deviation. Different non-material accounts of conditionals tend to privilege different intuitions, and there is no obvious answer to the question of which of them is the correct one. However, this does not mean that the logical principles that hold for ⊃ are all equally controversial. Some of these principles are widely accepted as sound, and hold in most non-material interpretations. Others are highly controversial, and fail in most non-material interpretations. In between, there are principles which are neither clearly controversial nor clearly uncontroversial, as they hold in some non-material interpretations but fail in others. We will consider each of these three categories in order to elucidate the logical properties of ⌢.

In the proofs that follow, $M$ is a model $⟨W, O, V⟩$, $w$ is a world in $M$, and the symbol $\vDash_{PL}$ indicates logical consequence in a classical propositional language.

Let us start with some relatively uncontroversial principles that hold for ⊃. The first is Modus Ponens: ‘If A, then C’ and A entail C. This is the simplest and most fundamental rule of inference involving conditionals, and most theorists of conditionals agree on its centrality. The evidential account validates Modus Ponens.

**Fact 1** $α ⌢ β, α \vDash β$ (Modus Ponens ✓)

*Proof.* Assume that $[α ⌢ β]_M,w = 1$ and $[α]_M,w = 1$. Since there are no $w'$ and $S$ such that $w' \in S$, $w \notin S$, and $[α]_{M,w'} = 1$, by (a) we get that $[β]_{M,w'} = 1$.

Modus Ponens holds because the combination $10$ does not occur in the worlds that are most similar to the actual world, and the actual world itself is one of them.

The second principle, Superclassicality, says that ‘If A, then C’ is true whenever C logically follows from A. The evidential account validates Superclassicality, as it is reasonable to desire.

**Fact 2** If $α \vDash_{PL} β$, then $\vDash α ⌢ β$ (Superclassicality ✓)

*Proof.* Assume that $α \vDash_{PL} β$. Then, for every $w$, there is no $w'$ such that $[α]_{M,w'} = 1$ and $[β]_{M,w'} = 0$. It follows that (a) and (b) are both satisfied, so that $[α ⌢ β]_{M,w} = 1$.

Logical consequence may be regarded as the strongest form of support. If β logically follows from α, then α provides a conclusive reason for accepting β. Note that a direct corollary of fact 2 is that $\vDash α ⌢ β$, given that $α \vDash_{PL} α$.

Two further principles, which involve the modal operator $□$, are Necessary Consequent and Impossible Antecedent: ‘If A, then C’ is true whenever C is necessary or A is impossible. The evidential account validates these two principles, as they follow directly from definition 3:

**Fact 3** $□α \vDash β ⌢ α$ (Necessary Consequent ✓)

*Proof.* Assume that $[□α]_{M,w} = 1$. Then by definition $[β ⌢ α]_{M,w} = 1$.
\[\Box \neg a \nrightarrow a \triangleright \beta \ (\text{Impossible Antecedent } \checkmark)\]

Proof. Assume that \([\Box \neg a]_{M,w} = 1\). Then by definition \([a \triangleright \beta]_{M,w} = 1\).

\[\square \]

5 SOME HIGHLY CONTROVERSIAL PRINCIPLES

Now we will show that the evidential account invalidates some highly contentious principles that hold for \(\triangleright\). In the material interpretation, the mere falsity of \(A\) or the mere truth of \(C\) suffices for the truth of ‘If \(A\), then \(C\)’, that is, False Antecedent and True Consequent hold for \(\triangleright\). This is commonly regarded as a reason to doubt the material interpretation. For example, it is quite implausible that the following sentences are true:

(12) If the Colosseum is in Paris, then I will win the lottery

(13) If the Colosseum is in Paris, then it is in Rome\[12\]

\(\triangleright\) differs from \(\triangleright\) in this respect. On the evidential account, (12) and (13) are false. More generally, the evidential account invalidates False Antecedent and True Consequent.

**Fact 5** \(\neg a \nrightarrow a \triangleright \beta \ (\text{False Antecedent } \times)\)

Proof. Suppose that \([a]_{M,w} = 0\) and that, for some \(w'\), \([a]_{M,w'} = 1\), \([\beta]_{M,w'} = 0\), and \(w' \in S\) for every \(S \neq \{w\}\). In this case \([\neg a]_{M,w} = 1\). But \([a \triangleright \beta]_{M,w} = 0\), for \(w'\) violates (a). \[\square\]

**Fact 6** \(\beta \nrightarrow a \triangleright \beta \ (\text{True Consequent } \times)\)

Proof. Suppose that \([\beta]_{M,w} = 1\) and that, for some \(w'\), \([a]_{M,w'} = 1\), \([\beta]_{M,w'} = 0\), and \(w' \in S\) for every \(S \neq \{w\}\). In this case \([a \triangleright \beta]_{M,w} = 0\), for \(w'\) violates (b). \[\square\]

A closely related principle that holds for \(\triangleright\) is Linearity: for every \(A\) and \(C\), either ‘If \(A\), then \(C\)’ or ‘If \(C\), then \(A\)’ is true. For example, the following disjunction is true in the material interpretation:

(14) Either if it is snowing then I will win the lottery or if I will win the lottery then it is snowing

Again, \(\triangleright\) differs from \(\triangleright\) in this respect. On the evidential account, (14) is false because in each disjunct the antecedent and the consequent are not related in the right way. More generally, the evidential account invalidates Linearity.

**Fact 7** \(\nrightarrow (a \triangleright \beta) \lor (\beta \triangleright a) \ (\text{Linearity } \times)\)

Proof. Suppose that \([a]_{M,w} = 0\) and \([\beta]_{M,w} = 0\). Let \(w'\) and \(w''\) be such that \([a]_{M,w'} = 1\), \([\beta]_{M,w'} = 0\), \([a]_{M,w''} = 0\), \([\beta]_{M,w''} = 1\), and that \(w' \in S\) and \(w'' \in S\) for every \(S \neq \{w\}\). In this case \([a \triangleright \beta]_{M,w} = 0\) because \(w'\) violates (a). Moreover, \([\beta \triangleright a]_{M,w} = 0\) because \(w''\) violates (a). \[\square\]

Another principle that is closely related to False Antecedent and True Consequent is Conditional Proof: if \(A\), together with a set of premises, entails \(C\), then ‘If \(A\), then \(C\)’ follows from those premises. If Conditional Proof holds, the same goes for False Antecedent and True Consequent. This is why the evidential account does not validate Conditional Proof.

\[12\] Edgington [11], section 2.3, presents False Antecedent and True Consequent as “the best-known objection to the material account”.

9
FACT 8 Not: if $\Gamma, \alpha \models_{PL} \beta$, then $\Gamma \models \alpha \triangleright \beta$ (Conditional Proof $\times$)

Proof. Conditional Proof fails because it entails False Antecedent and True Consequent. Suppose that if $\Gamma, \alpha \models_{PL} \beta$, then $\Gamma \models \alpha \triangleright \beta$. Since $\sim \alpha, \alpha \models_{PL} \beta$ and $\beta, \alpha \models_{PL} \beta$, we get that $\sim \alpha \models \alpha \triangleright \beta$ and $\beta \models \alpha \triangleright \beta$, contrary to facts 5 and 6.

Two further properties of the material interpretation are widely regarded as counterintuitive. One is Monotonicity: ‘If A, then C’ entails ‘If A and B, then C’. The other is Transitivity: ‘If A, then C’ and ‘If C, then B’ entail ‘If A, then B’. Examples such as the following, due to Adams, are commonly taken to show that conditionals as they are used in ordinary language are neither monotonic nor transitive:

If Brown wins the election, Smith will retire to private life. Therefore, if Smith dies before the election and Brown wins it, Smith will retire to private life.

If Brown wins the election, Smith will retire to private life. If Smith dies before the election, Brown will win it. Therefore, if Smith dies before the election, then he will retire to private life.

The evidential account can explain the apparent invalidity of these arguments. It is possible that the premise of the first argument is true but its conclusion is false, for only the former passes the Ramsey Test. Similarly, it is possible that the premises of the second argument are true but its conclusion is false, for only the former pass the Ramsey Test. More generally, the evidential account invalidates Monotonicity and Transitivity.

FACT 9 $\alpha \triangleright \gamma \not\models (\alpha \land \beta) \triangleright \gamma$ (Monotonicity $\times$)

Proof. Suppose that $[\alpha \triangleright \gamma]_{M,w} = 1$ and, for some $S$, there is no $w' \in S$ such that $[\beta]_{M,w'} = 1$. Suppose also that outside $S$ there is a $w''$ such that $[\alpha]_{M,w''} = 1$, $[\beta]_{M,w''} = 1$, $[\gamma]_{M,w''} = 0$, and $w''$ belongs to every $S'$ bigger than $S$. In this case $[\alpha \land \beta] \triangleright \gamma]_{M,w} = 0$ because $w''$ violates (a).

FACT 10 $\alpha \triangleright \beta, \beta \triangleright \gamma \not\models \alpha \triangleright \gamma$ (Transitivity $\times$)

Proof. Transitivity fails because it entails Monotonicity, given Superclassicality. Suppose that $\alpha \triangleright \beta, \beta \triangleright \gamma \models \alpha \triangleright \gamma$, and assume that $[\alpha \triangleright \beta]_{M,w} = 1$. Since by fact 2 $[\alpha \land \gamma] \triangleright \alpha]_{M,w} = 1$, from this assumption we get that $[\alpha \land \gamma] \triangleright \beta]_{M,w} = 1$, contrary to fact 9.

6 CONTRAPOSITION AND RIGHT WEAKENING

The facts outlined in sections 4 and 5 are results on which most non-material accounts of conditionals tend to converge: Modus Ponens, Superclassicality, Necessary Consequent, and Impossible Antecedent are widely accepted as sound, while False Antecedent, True Consequent, Linearity, Monotonicity, and Transitivity are widely rejected as counterintuitive. The facts outlined in this section and in the next two, instead, concern principles on which there is no such agreement. The evidential account crucially differs from other non-material accounts with respect to these principles.

One fact that deserves attention concerns Contraposition: ‘If A, then C’ entails ‘If not-C, then not-A’. The evidential account validates Contraposition,

1) Adams [1], p. 166.
so it agrees with the material interpretation in this respect. To illustrate, consider the inference from (1) to (15):

\[(15) \text{If it will shrink, then it is not pure cashmere}\]

This inference seems valid, and the same goes for similar inferences that involve (2) and (3) as premises. More generally, the evidential account validates Contraposition.

**Fact 11** \(a \supset \beta \models \neg \beta \supset \neg a\) (Contraposition \(\checkmark\))

*Proof.* Assume that \([a \supset \beta]_{M,1} = 0\). Then (a), for every \(w'\), if \([a]_{M,w'} = 1\), and there are no \(w''\) and \(S\) such that \(w'' \in S, w' \notin S\), and \([a]_{M,w''} = 1\), then \([\beta]_{M,w''} = 1\), and (b) for every \(w'\), if \([\beta]_{M,w'} = 0\) and there are no \(w''\) and \(S\) such that \(w'' \in S, w' \notin S\), and \([\beta]_{M,w''} = 0\), then \([a]_{M,w''} = 0\). (a) and (b) are respectively (b) and (a) for \(\neg \beta \supset \neg a\). Therefore, \([\neg \beta \supset \neg a]_{M,1} = 1\). □

This fact is a distinctive feature of the evidential account. Unlike the principles considered in the previous two sections, Contraposition is neither widely accepted nor widely rejected. Some theorists of conditionals regard it as counterintuitive. Here is an example due to Stalnaker:

‘If the US halts the bombing, then North Vietnam will not agree to negotiate’. A person would believe that this statement is true if he thought that the North Vietnamese were determined to press for a complete withdrawal of US troops. But he would surely deny the contrapositive, ‘If North Vietnam agrees to negotiate, then the US will not have halted the bombing’.

However, these examples can hardly prove that Contraposition fails in the evidential interpretation. As has been noted by Lycan, Bennett and others, the alleged counterexamples to Contraposition typically involve a concessive reading of the premise. Therefore, they loose their grip on any interpretation which rules out such a reading. This is precisely the case of the evidential interpretation: a conditional is true in the evidential sense only if it is false in the concessive sense. Thus, a conditional that is true solely in the concessive sense, such as ‘If the US halts the bombing, then North Vietnam will not agree to negotiate’, is false in the evidential account. Note that this conditional, unlike (i), does not pass the Chrysippus Test, for it is not the case that the closest worlds in which North Vietnam will agree to negotiate are worlds in which the US keep bombing. If North Vietnam will not agree to negotiate, it is not because the US halts the bombing, but rather in spite of that fact. More generally, insofar as the alleged counterexamples to Contraposition involve a concessive reading of the premise, they do not work in the evidential interpretation because their premise turns out to be false on that interpretation.

A closely related fact concerns Right Weakening, the principle according to which if \(B\) logically follows from \(C\), ‘If \(A\), then \(C\)’ entails ‘If \(A\), then \(B\)’. Right Weakening holds for \(\supset\). However, it does not hold for \(\supseteq\). To see why, consider the following example, taken from Rott:

It makes perfect sense to say ‘If you pay an extra fee, your letter will be delivered by express’, because the fee will buy you a special service. But it sounds odd to say ‘If you pay an extra

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14 Stalnaker [31], p. 39.
15 Lycan [23], p. 34, Bennett [3], pp. 32 and 143-144.
fee, your letter will be delivered’, because the letter would be delivered anyway, even if you did not pay the extra fee. In the evidential interpretation, the first conditional is plausibly true. Very likely, if your letter will be delivered by express, it is because you paid the extra fee. The fulfilment of the Chrysippus Test is key here: among the worlds in which your letter will not be delivered by express, those in which you did not pay the extra fee are closer than those in which you paid it. However, the second conditional may easily be false: it is not in virtue of the payment of the extra fee that your letter will be delivered. Arguably, this conditional does not pass the Chrysippus Test: there is no reason to think that, among the worlds in which your letter is not delivered at all, those in which you did not pay the extra fee are closer than those in which you paid it. The closest worlds in which the letter is not delivered will rather have other kinds of features, like the occurrence of some accident, in virtue of which the delivery failed altogether, regardless of your payment of the extra fee. Therefore, the second conditional does not follow from the first. And since the consequent of the first — once naturally formalized in a propositional language — entails the consequent of the second, this shows that the evidential account invalidates Right Weakening.

The failure of Right Weakening can be proved in more general terms as follows:

**Fact 12** Not: if $\beta \vdash_{PL} \gamma$, then $\alpha \supset \beta \nvdash \alpha \supset \gamma$ (Right Weakening ×)

*Proof.* Right Weakening fails because it entails Monotonicity, given Contraposition. If it were the case that, if $\beta \vdash_{PL} \gamma$, then $\alpha \supset \beta \nvdash \alpha \supset \gamma$, from the assumption that $[\alpha > \gamma]_{M, \omega} = 1$ we would get that $[(\alpha \land \beta) > \gamma]_{M, \omega} = 1$, contrary to fact 9. The reason is that $\alpha \supset \gamma$ entails $\sim \gamma > \sim \alpha$ by fact 11, and $\sim \alpha \nvdash_{PL} \sim \alpha \lor \sim \beta$. By fact 11 $\sim \gamma \supset (\sim \alpha \lor \sim \beta)$ entails $\sim (\sim \alpha \lor \sim \beta) \supset \sim \sim \gamma$, which is logically equivalent to $(\alpha \land \beta) > \gamma$. 

This proof shows the connection between Contraposition and Right Weakening: if Monotonicity fails, then either Contraposition or Right Weakening must fail as well. This is why facts 11 and 12 are closely related.

### 7 Conditional Excluded Middle and Conjunctive Sufficiency

One rather debated principle that holds for $\supset$ is **Conditional Excluded Middle:** for every A and C, either ‘If A, then C’ or ‘If A, then not-C’ is true. Some non-material accounts of conditionals preserve this principle, while others deny it. The key question is whether ‘Not: if A, then C’ entails ‘If A, then not-C’. If it does, then Conditional Excluded Middle straightforwardly follows from Excluded Middle, according to which either ‘If A, then C’ or ‘Not: if A, then C’ is true, otherwise it does not follow.

The evidential account invalidates Conditional Excluded Middle. Consider the following sentences:

(16) If planet nine exists, then the EU will collapse within 5 years

(17) If planet nine exists, then the EU will not collapse within 5 years

Since the existence of planet nine and the collapse of the EU are totally unrelated, (16) and (17) are both false, so the same goes for the disjunction.

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16 Rott [28], p. 6.
of (16) and (17). More generally, \( \neg (\alpha \bowtie \beta) \) does not entail \( \alpha \vdash \neg \beta \), so \( (\alpha \bowtie \beta) \lor (\alpha \vdash \neg \beta) \) does not follow from \( (\alpha \bowtie \beta) \lor (\alpha \vdash \neg \beta) \).

**Fact 13** \( \neg (\alpha \bowtie \beta) \lor (\alpha \vdash \neg \beta) \) (Conditional Excluded Middle \( \times \))

Proof. Suppose that \([\alpha]_{M,w} = 1\) and \([\beta]_{M,w} = 0\). Let \( w' \) be such that \([\alpha]_{M,w'} = 1\), \([\beta]_{M,w'} = 1\), and \( w' \in S \) for every \( S \neq \{w\} \). In this case \([\alpha \bowtie \beta]_{M,w} = 0\) because \( w \) violates both (a) and (b). Moreover, \([\alpha \bowtie \beta]_{M,w} = 0\), for \( w' \) violates (b).

A related principle that holds for \( \supset \) but not for \( \bowtie \) is Conjunctive Sufficiency: ‘\( A \) and \( C \)’ entails ‘If \( A \), then \( C \)’. Even supposing that the antecedent and the consequent of (16) are both true, it does not follow that (16) is true. The same goes for (17). We take the failure of Conjunction Sufficiency to be a plausible result. If \( A \) and \( C \) are totally unrelated, it is definitely false that \( A \) provides a reason to accept \( C \), or that if \( C \) holds, it holds in virtue of \( A \).

**Fact 14** \( \alpha \land \beta \not\vdash \alpha \bowtie \beta \) (Conjunctive Sufficiency \( \times \))

Proof. Suppose that \([\alpha]_{M,w} = 1\), \([\beta]_{M,w} = 1\), and for some \( w' \), \([\alpha]_{M,w'} = 1\), \([\beta]_{M,w'} = 0\), and \( w' \in S \) for every \( S \neq \{w\} \). In this case \([\alpha \land \beta]_{M,w} = 1\). But \([\alpha \bowtie \beta]_{M,w} = 0\), for \( w' \) violates (b).

Conjunctive Sufficiency is related to Conditional Excluded Middle in the following way. If ‘\( \neg \)Not: if \( A \), then \( C \)’ entails ‘If \( A \), then not-\( C \)’, as required in order to derive Conditional Excluded Middle from Excluded Middle, then Conjunction Sufficiency holds. On the assumption that ‘\( A \) and \( C \)’ is true, the supposition that ‘\( \neg \)Not: if \( A \), then \( C \)’ is true leads to a contradiction if it entails ‘If \( A \), then not-\( C \)’, so its negation follows by reductio, which is equivalent to ‘If \( A \), then \( C \)’. Therefore, since Conjunction Sufficiency fails for \( \bowtie \), the same must hold for Conditional Excluded Middle.

Leaving aside the relation between Conjunctive Sufficiency and Conditional Excluded Middle, fact 14 is particularly interesting because it shows that a principled distinction can be drawn between two claims that are usually conflated. One is centering, understood as a condition on the system of spheres based on a metaphysical assumption. The other is Conjunctive Sufficiency, the logical rule just discussed. In the semantic framework offered by Lewis, if one assumes centering, one gets Conjunctive Sufficiency. As Lewis himself suggests, one can avoid this result by replacing centering with a weaker condition, weak centering, that is, by replacing clause 2 of definition 1 with the condition that \( w \) belongs to every sphere around \( w \), without requiring that the innermost sphere is a singleton\(^{17}\). This is why in the literature on conditionals it is quite common to talk about Conjunction Sufficiency and centering as if they were the same thing. However, this coincidence breaks down in our semantic framework: even if one assumes centering, as in definition 1, one does not get Conjunctive Sufficiency. This shows clearly that the question whether Conjunction Sufficiency holds does not reduce to the choice between centering and weak centering.

### 8 Connexivity

The last four principles that we will consider have been extensively discussed in relation to connexive logics. Connexive logics are characterized by two main theses which do not hold for \( \supset \). One is Aristotle’s Thesis: for every \( A \),

\(^{17}\) Lewis [22], p. 29
'Not: if A, then not-A' is true. The other is Boethius's Thesis: 'If A, then C' entails 'Not: if A, then not-C'. Some connexivists have suggested that what is needed to validate Aristotle's Thesis and Boethius' Thesis is a suitable reading of Chrysipppus' claim that a conditional is true when the negation of its consequent is incompatible with its antecedent\textsuperscript{18}.

Although we doubt that Aristotle's thesis and Boethius' thesis hold unrestrictedly, we believe that the idea of connexivity rests on a solid intuition, and that to some extent it is plausible that this intuition goes back to Chrysippus. Consider the following sentence:

(18) If it is snowing, then it is not snowing

It is quite natural to think that there is something wrong in (18). In the material interpretation, however, (18) true when it is not snowing, so our negative reaction can be correct only if it is snowing. This is an odd thing to say. The impression of falsity that we get when we look at (18) has nothing to do with the weather. If we find that there is something wrong in (18), it is not because we look out the window. It seems that (18) is false no matter whether it is snowing. So we find plausible to say that what makes (18) false is that the negation of its consequent is patently compatible with its antecedent.

This is not to say that every conditional of the form 'If A, then not-A' is intuitively false. For example, we have no clear intuitions about (19):

(19) If it is not the case that either it is snowing or it is not snowing, then either it is snowing or it is not snowing

More generally, when A is impossible, it is reasonable to think that 'If A, then not-A' is vacuously true. This is why we doubt that 'Not: if A, then not-A' is always true.

The same goes for Boethius' thesis. For example, it is plausible that if (3) is true, then (20) is false:

(20) If it is snowing, then it is not cold

But it is not obvious that the same holds for any two conditionals of the same form. For example, it is reasonable to think that (21) and (22) are both true:

(21) If it is snowing and it is not snowing, then it is snowing

(22) If it is snowing and it is not snowing, then it is not snowing

More generally, we think that Aristotle's thesis and Boethius' thesis are plausible only insofar as they entail two weaker claims which may be called Restricted Aristotle's Thesis and Restricted Boethius' Thesis: if A is possible, then 'Not: if A, then not-A' is true, and if A is possible, then 'If A, then C' entails 'Not: if A, then not-C'\textsuperscript{19}.

Similar considerations hold for a third connexivist thesis, Abelard's Thesis, according to which 'If A, then C' entails 'Not: if not-A, then C'\textsuperscript{20}. Consider the following sentence:

(23) If it is not pure cashmere, it will not shrink

\textsuperscript{18}McCall [24] and Wansing [35] suggest that the idea of connexity go back to Chrysippus. The relation of inconsistency defined in Nelson [25] has been taken to provide such a reading.

\textsuperscript{19}This is essentially the point made in Iacona [16]. Restricted versions of connexive principles are also considered in Lenzen [21], Kapsner [19], and Unterhuber [32].

\textsuperscript{20}See Estrada González and Ramírez-Cámara [12], pp. 346-348.
It makes perfect sense to think that if (1) is true, then (23) is false. However, there are cases in which two conditionals of this form may reasonably be regarded as true:

(24) If it is snowing, then either it is snowing or it is not snowing

(25) If it is not snowing, then either it is snowing or it is not snowing

More generally, we think that Abelard’s thesis is plausible only insofar as it entails a weaker principle, Restricted Abelard’s Thesis: if C is not necessary, then ‘if A, then C’ entails ‘not: if not-A, then C’.

The evidential interpretation behaves exactly as we would expect. First, (18) is false because it is trivially not the case that the worlds in which it is snowing are more distant from the actual world than those in which it is not snowing. Instead, (19) is vacuously true because its antecedent is impossible. Second, if (3) is true, then (20) is false: if it is cold in the closest worlds in which it is snowing, it cannot be warm in such worlds. Instead, (21) and (22) are vacuously true because its antecedent is impossible. Third, if (1) is true, then (23) is false, because it is impossible that both (1) and (23) pass the Chrysippus Test: if the closest worlds in which it will shrink are worlds in which it is not pure cashmere, it cannot be the case that the closest worlds in which it will shrink are worlds in which it is pure cashmere. Instead, (24) and (25) are vacuously true because their consequent is necessary.

Now we will prove that Restricted Aristotle’s Thesis, Restricted Boethius’ Thesis, and Restricted Abelard’s Thesis hold for $\triangleright$. In order to do so, we will prove a stronger principle, Restricted Selectivity:

**Fact 15** If $\beta \models_{PL} \sim \gamma$, then $\Box \alpha, \alpha \triangleright \beta \models \sim (\alpha \triangleright \gamma)$ (Restricted Selectivity $\checkmark$)

*Proof.* Assume that $\beta \models_{PL} \sim \gamma$, $[\Box \alpha]_{M,w} = 1$, and $[\alpha \triangleright \beta]_{M,w} = 1$. Since $[\Box \alpha]_{M,w} = 1$, $\alpha$ is true in some worlds. Since $[\alpha \triangleright \beta]_{M,w} = 1$, for every $w'$ such that $[\alpha]_{M,w'} = 1$ and there are no $w''$ and $S$ such that $w'' \notin S$, $w' \notin S$, and $[\alpha]_{M,w''} = 1$, then $[\beta]_{M,w'} = 1$. Since $\beta \models_{PL} \sim \gamma$, it follows that $[\sim \gamma]_{M,w'} = 1$. So $[\gamma]_{M,w'} = 0$. Therefore, $[\alpha \triangleright \gamma]_{M,w'} = 0$, and consequently $[\sim (\alpha \triangleright \gamma)]_{M,w} = 1$. $\square$

**Fact 16** $\Box \alpha, \alpha \triangleright \beta \models \sim (\alpha \triangleright \sim \beta)$ (Restricted Boethius’ Thesis $\checkmark$)

*Proof.* This follows directly from Restricted Selectivity. Assume that $[\Box \alpha]_{M,w} = 1$ and $[\alpha \triangleright \beta]_{M,w} = 1$. Since $\beta \models_{PL} \sim \sim \beta$, by fact 15 $[\sim (\alpha \triangleright \sim \beta)]_{M,w} = 1$. $\square$

**Fact 17** $\Box \alpha \models \sim (\alpha \triangleright \sim \alpha)$ (Restricted Aristotle’s Thesis $\checkmark$)

*Proof.* This follows from Restricted Boethius’ Thesis, given Superclassicality. Assume that $[\Box \alpha]_{M,w} = 1$. Since $[\alpha \triangleright \alpha]_{M,w} = 1$ by fact 2, it follows by fact 16 that $[\sim (\alpha \triangleright \sim \alpha)]_{M,w} = 1$. $\square$

**Fact 18** $\Box \sim \sim \alpha, \alpha \triangleright \beta \models \sim (\sim \alpha \triangleright \beta)$ (Restricted Abelard’s Thesis $\checkmark$)

*Proof.* This follows from Restricted Selectivity, given Contraposition. Assume that $[\Box \sim \sim \beta]_{M,w} = 1$ and $[\alpha \triangleright \beta]_{M,w} = 1$. By fact 11 the latter entails that $[\sim \beta \triangleright \sim \alpha]_{M,w} = 1$. So, by fact 15 $[\sim (\sim \beta \triangleright \sim \alpha)]_{M,w} = 1$, given that $\sim \alpha \models_{PL} \sim \alpha$. This means that $[\sim \beta \triangleright \alpha]_{M,w} = 0$. But if so, $[\sim \alpha \triangleright \beta]_{M,w} = 0$ as well, for $\sim \beta \triangleright \alpha$ and $\sim \alpha \triangleright \beta$ have the same truth conditions (switch (a) and (b) as in the proof of fact 11). Therefore, $[\sim (\sim \alpha \triangleright \beta)]_{M,w} = 1$. $\square$

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21 See Huber [14], p. 534.
Sections 4-8 show some important logical properties of $\triangleright$. These properties characterize the evidential interpretation as distinct from other interpretations. The first thing that must be noted is that, in terms of strength, the evidential interpretation lies between the strict interpretation and the material interpretation: $□(α \triangleright β)$ entails $α \triangleright β$, and $α \triangleright β$ entails $α \triangleright β$.

**Fact 19** $□(α \triangleright β) \vDash α \triangleright β$ (Strict to Evidential ✓)

*Proof.* Assume that $[□(α \triangleright β)]_{S,w} = 1$. Then, for every $w'$, if $[α]_{S,w'} = 1$, then $[β]_{S,w'} = 1$, and for every $w'$, if $[β]_{S,w'} = 0$, then $[α]_{S,w'} = 0$. Therefore, $[α \triangleright β]_{S,w} = 1$.

**Fact 20** $α \triangleright β \vDash α \triangleright β$ (Evidential to Material ✓)

*Proof.* Assume that $[α \triangleright β]_{S,w} = 1$. Then, for some $S$, there is no $w' \in S$ such that $[α]_{S,w'} = 1$ and $[β]_{S,w'} = 0$. Since $w \in S$, $[α \triangleright β]_{S,w} = 1$.

The evidential interpretation differs from the strict interpretation in that it invalidates Monotonicity and Transitivity, as we saw in section 5. So there is a clear sense in which the evidential interpretation is weaker than the strict interpretation.

A second and more interesting point is that the evidential interpretation significantly differs from the suppositional interpretation advocated by Adams, Stalnaker, Lewis, and others. In the suppositional interpretation, a conditional means that its consequent is credible enough given its antecedent. That is, on the supposition that its antecedent holds, there are good chances that its consequent holds. Just as the evidential interpretation, the suppositional interpretation lies between the strict interpretation and the material interpretation. But it is weaker than the evidential interpretation: if a conditional is true in the evidential sense, then it is true in the suppositional sense, but not the other way round. Truth in the suppositional sense is defined solely in terms of the Ramsey Test, so it holds no matter whether Chrysippus Test is satisfied.

The relation between the evidential interpretation and the suppositional interpretation can be expressed more precisely by adopting the symbol $\Rightarrow$ for the latter interpretation, that is, by assuming that, for any two formulas $α, β$, any model $M$, and any world $w$, $[α \Rightarrow β]_{M,w} = 1$ if and only if condition (a) of clause 6 of definition 3 is satisfied. On this assumption, we have the following equivalence:

**Fact 21** $[α \triangleright β]_{M,w} = 1$ iff $[(α \Rightarrow β) \land (¬ β \Rightarrow ¬ α)]_{M,w} = 1$

*Proof.* Assume that $[α \triangleright β]_{M,w} = 1$. Since (a) holds for $α$ and $β$, $[α \Rightarrow β]_{M,w} = 1$. Since (b) holds for $α$ and $β$, (a) holds for $¬ β$ and $¬ α$, hence $[¬ β \Rightarrow ¬ α]_{M,w} = 1$. Therefore, $[α \Rightarrow β] \land (¬ β \Rightarrow ¬ α)]_{M,w} = 1$. The proof of the right-to-left direction is similar.

Fact 21 shows that $\triangleright$ is definable in terms of $\Rightarrow$. The opposite is also true, although less trivial, that is, $\Rightarrow$ is definable in terms of $\triangleright$.

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22 Influential analyses of non-material monotonic conditionals have been sometimes integrated in so-called dynamic semantics. A thorough comparison with these approaches would reveal even more divergences from ours. For instance, in Veltman’s theory, presented in Veltman [34], True Consequent is valid while Modus Tollens is not.

23 An advanced analysis of the mutual definability of different kinds of conditional can be found in Raidl [9].
**Fact 22** \( \alpha \Rightarrow \beta \) \(M,w) = 1 \) iff \( [(\alpha \triangleright \beta) \lor (\alpha \land \beta) \lor ((\alpha \lor \sim \beta) \triangleright (\alpha \land \beta))] \(M,w) = 1 \)

**Proof.** Assume that \( [(\alpha \triangleright \beta) \lor (\alpha \land \beta) \lor ((\alpha \lor \sim \beta) \triangleright (\alpha \land \beta))] \(M,w) = 1 \). Then at least one of the three disjuncts is true. If \( [\alpha \triangleright \beta] \(M,w) = 1 \), then (a) holds by definition, so \( [\alpha \Rightarrow \beta] \(M,w) = 1 \). If \( [\alpha \land \beta] \(M,w) = 1 \), then \( w \) verifies both the antecedent and the consequent of (a), while every other world falsifies its antecedent. Therefore, \( [\alpha \Rightarrow \beta] \(M,w) = 1 \). Finally, suppose that \( [(\alpha \lor \sim \beta) \triangleright (\alpha \land \beta)] \(M,w) = 1 \). Then, by (a) either \( \alpha \lor \sim \beta \) is impossible, or the closest worlds in which \( \alpha \lor \sim \beta \) is true are worlds in which \( \alpha \) and \( \beta \) are both true. In the first case \( \alpha \) is impossible, so \( [\alpha \Rightarrow \beta] \(M,w) = 1 \). In the second case, consider any \( w' \) such that \( [\alpha] \(M,w') = 1 \) and there are no \( w'' \) and \( S \) such that \( w'' \in S \), \( w' \notin S \), and \( [\alpha] \(M,w') = 1 \). Moreover, there are no \( w'' \) and \( S \) such that \( w'' \in S \), \( w' \notin S \), and \( [\alpha \lor \sim \beta] \(M,w') = 1 \), otherwise we would not have that the closest worlds in which \( \alpha \lor \sim \beta \) is true are worlds in which \( \alpha \) is true. Since \( w' \) belongs to the closest worlds in which \( \alpha \lor \sim \beta \) is true, and \( \beta \) is true in such worlds, \( [\beta] \(M,w') = 1 \). Therefore, \( [\alpha \Rightarrow \beta] \(M,w) = 1 \).

Now assume that \( [\alpha \Rightarrow \beta] \(M,w) = 1 \). If \( \alpha \) is impossible, then \( [\alpha \triangleright \beta] \(M,w) = 1 \), hence \( [(\alpha \triangleright \beta) \lor (\alpha \land \beta) \lor ((\alpha \lor \sim \beta) \triangleright (\alpha \land \beta))] \(M,w) = 1 \). If \( [\alpha] \(M,w) = 1 \), then \( [\alpha \land \beta] \(M,w) = 1 \), which entails that \( [(\alpha \triangleright \beta) \lor (\alpha \land \beta) \lor ((\alpha \lor \sim \beta) \triangleright (\alpha \land \beta))] \(M,w) = 1 \). So we are left with the case in which \( [\alpha] \(M,w) = 0 \) and \( \alpha \) is true in some world other than \( w \). In this case, either \( [\beta] \(M,w) = 0 \) or \( [\beta] \(M,w) = 1 \). If \( [\beta] \(M,w) = 0 \), then (b) holds for \( \alpha \) and \( \beta \), so \( [\alpha \triangleright \beta] \(M,w) = 1 \), and consequently \( [(\alpha \triangleright \beta) \lor (\alpha \land \beta) \lor ((\alpha \lor \sim \beta) \triangleright (\alpha \land \beta))] \(M,w) = 1 \). If \( [\beta] \(M,w) = 1 \), then again it may happen that (b) holds for \( \alpha \) and \( \beta \), for it may be the case that the closest worlds in which \( \beta \) is false are worlds in which \( \alpha \) is false. Leaving aside that possibility, we get that both (a) and (b) hold for \( \alpha \lor \sim \beta \) and \( \alpha \land \beta \). (a) holds for \( \alpha \lor \sim \beta \) and \( \alpha \land \beta \) for the following reason: since (a) holds for \( \alpha \) and \( \beta \), the closest worlds in which \( \alpha \lor \sim \beta \) is true cannot be worlds in which \( \alpha \) is true and \( \beta \) is false, and since (b) does not hold for \( \alpha \) and \( \beta \), the closest worlds in which \( \alpha \lor \sim \beta \) is true cannot be worlds in which \( \alpha \) and \( \beta \) are both false; so the closest worlds in which \( \alpha \lor \sim \beta \) is true must be worlds in which \( \alpha \) and \( \beta \) are both true. (b) holds for \( \alpha \lor \sim \beta \) and \( \alpha \land \beta \) because \( \alpha \lor \sim \beta \) is false in \( w \), the closest world in which \( \alpha \land \beta \) is false. Therefore, \( [\alpha \lor \sim \beta] \triangleright (\alpha \land \beta) \) \(M,w) = 1 \), and consequently \( [(\alpha \triangleright \beta) \lor (\alpha \land \beta) \lor ((\alpha \lor \sim \beta) \triangleright (\alpha \land \beta))] \(M,w) = 1 \). \( \square \)

The difference between the evidential interpretation and the suppositional interpretation emerges clearly if we consider the principles discussed in sections 6-8. As explained in section 6, the evidential interpretation validates Contraposition. The examples that are usually taken to show that Contraposition fails, such as the inference about the US and North Vietnam, typically include concessive conditionals as premises, so they do not work if conditionals are understood evidentially. Concessive conditionals are false in the evidential sense because they do not pass the Chrysippus Test. By contrast, the suppositional interpretation invalidates Contraposition. The same examples work if conditionals are understood suppositionally, for their premises turn out to be true. Concessive conditionals may be described as conditionals that are true just in case they are true in the suppositional sense but not in the evidential sense\(^\text{24}\).

Right Weakening produces opposite results: while the evidential interpretation invalidates it, the suppositional interpretation validates it. The examples that can rightfully be taken to show that Right Weakening fails, such as the inference about the letter, work only if conditionals are understood evidentially. In the evidential understanding, the conclusions of such

\(^{24}\) This is in line with the analysis of “even if” suggested in Douven [9], p. 119.
inferences are false because it does not pass the Chrysippus Test. Instead, the same examples do not work if conditionals are understood suppositionally, for their conclusions turn out to be true.

As explained in section 7, the evidential interpretation invalidates Conditional Excluded Middle and Conjunctive Sufficiency. The schema ‘Either if A then C, or if A then not-C’ has apparently false instances which involve violation of the Chrysippus Test, and the inference from ‘A and C’ to ‘If A, then C’ seems invalid for the same reason. The suppositional interpretation differs with respect to both principles. Although its core idea — Ramsey’s original idea — by itself does not entail Conditional Excluded Middle, and can be developed in the way suggested by Lewis, a natural reading of that idea accords perfectly well with Conditional Excluded Middle: to say that C does not hold on the supposition that A holds is to say that not-C holds on that supposition, so if ‘If A, then C’ is false, ‘If A, then not-C’ must be true. This is the reading adopted by Adams and Stalnaker. The suppositional interpretation also validates Conjunctive Sufficiency: if A and C actually hold, then it is obviously the case that there are good chances that C holds on the supposition that A holds.

Finally, the evidential interpretation validates Restricted Aristotle’s Thesis, Restricted Boethius’ Thesis, and Restricted Abelard’s Thesis. The suppositional interpretation agrees with it on the first two theses, but it crucially differs with respect to the third. Again, the crux is Chrysippus Test. Consider (11). Since (11) is acceptable in the suppositional sense, if we replace its antecedent with ‘You don’t drink a beer’ we obtain a conditional which is also acceptable in the suppositional sense: there are good chances that its consequent holds on the supposition that its antecedent holds.

Not only the account outlined in this paper differs from the suppositional theories of conditionals in the way explained, but it also differs in important respects from some recent attempts to provide a non-monotonic theory of conditionals based on the notion of support. One is Rott’s treatment of “difference-making” conditionals, which adopts a strengthened version of the Ramsey Test in the context of the classical theory of belief revision. Rott’s account, like ours, invalidates Monotonicity and Right Weakening. Unlike ours, however, it does not retain Contraposition, even though Contraposition is consistent with the rejection of Monotonicity, provided that Right Weakening fails. This result has no obvious intuitive rationale. Once the concessive reading of ‘if then’ is ruled out, and the alleged counterexamples such as that considered in section 6 lose their grip, it is no longer clear what reason one may have for rejecting Contraposition.

The other example is Douven’s epistemic analysis of conditionals, which relies on a notion of evidential support defined in terms of degrees of belief. Douven’s account yields a considerably weak logic, in which several widely accepted principles, including Modus Ponens, turn out to be invalid. Therefore, it significantly differs from our account, which preserves Modus Ponens and other basic principles.

10 TRUTH AND ASSERTIBILITY

In this paper we have pursued a truth-conditional approach to conditionals, that is, we have defined the evidential interpretation by specifying the conditions under which a conditional is true on that interpretation. More

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25 Rott [28].
26 Douven [9], ch. 5.
specifically, truth has been defined relative to worlds, as in any standard
modal language. Accordingly, the notion of logical consequence adopted to
illustrate the logical features of the evidential account is also standard.

This is not the only possibility, however. As is well known, an alternative
route is available, whereby truth conditions are deliberately avoided, and
logical principles are derived from the notion of assertibility. This is the
route followed by Adams in his influential work on conditionals. According
to Adams, ‘If A, then C’ is assertible to the extent that the probability of C
conditional on A is high. In this analysis, the degree of assertibility of ‘If
A, then C’ relative to a probability distribution $P$ is thus $P(C|A)$, and the
corresponding degree of “uncertainty” is 1 minus the degree of assertibility.
Apart from specific limitations in the expressive power of the underlying
language, the logic of the suppositional interpretation is then preserved
in the assertibility approach provided that a valid inference is defined as
having the sum of the uncertainties of the premises as an upper bound for
the uncertainty of the conclusion under any probability assignment\(^{27}\).

Adams’s account of the assertibility of a conditional offers a plausible
interpretation of the Ramsey Test. The idea of our Chrysippus test, however,
is not conveyed by this approach. In fact, a very high assertibility of ‘If
A, then C’ is compatible with a comparably high probability of A given
not-C, as illustrated by the case of (11). So it seems that a conditional can be
highly assertible even if the negation of its consequent is not at odds with its
antecedent in a most natural sense. All this is standard and well received in
the literature, especially among authors who — unlike us — are skeptical
either about possible worlds or about the very idea of truth as applied to
conditionals\(^{28}\). More generally, the logic of the suppositional interpretation
largely survives across the divide between accounts based on truth versus
assertibility conditions, and this is quite rightly taken as a sign of the strength
of that interpretation. It is then an interesting question whether something
similar can be said with respect to the evidential intepretation.

Interestingly, this is indeed the case. The key point is to give an analogue
representation of the assertibility of a conditional. For the limiting cases
where $P(C) = 1$ or $P(A) = 0$, the default option is to follow Adams again
and posit the assertibility of ‘If A, then C’ to be (vacuously) maximal (i.e.,
1). Besides, earlier work in the probabilistic analysis of evidential support
supplies an effective solution for the more interesting cases where $P(C) < 1$
and $P(A) > 0$, namely, equating the degree of assertibility of ‘If A, then C’
given a certain probability distribution $P$ with

$$
\frac{P(C|A) - P(C)}{1 - P(C)}
$$

if $P(C|A) \geq P(C) > 0$, and 0 otherwise. Intuitively, this is a measure
of the proportion of the initial uncertainty of C (that is, $1 - P(C)$) that is
cancelled by the upward jump (if any) of the probability of C due to A (that
is, $P(C|A) - P(C)$)\(^{29}\). So ‘If A, then C’ turns out to be at least minimally
assertible only if the supposition of A increases the probability of C. Crucially,
this account of the assertibility of ‘If A, then C’ does combine the ideas of the
Ramsey and the Chrysippus test. Here is why. Suppose that the assertibility
of ‘If A, then C’ relative to $P$ is higher than a given threshold value, say,
higher than 0.8. Then, on very mild background assumptions, one can prove

\(^{27}\) Adams [1], Adams [2].
\(^{28}\) For example Kahle [18], or Edgington [10].
\(^{29}\) See Crupi and Tentori [5], and Crupi and Tentori [6].
both that the probability of C given A is also higher than 0.8 and that the
probability of A given not-C is lower than 1 − 0.8 = 0.2. So a high degree
of assertibility of ‘If A, then C’ as just defined implies both that C is highly
probable given A and that not-C makes A improbable, thus being at odds
with it.

Once the assertibility of an evidential conditional is characterized in
probabilistic terms, one can apply Adams’s idea of validity and check what
logical principles are thus validated. In an extended investigation along this
lines, we have shown that the resulting logic implies exactly the same pattern
of validities and invalidities derived from our truth-conditional discussion
above \(^30\). So the evidential interpretation is similar to the suppositional
interpretation in this important respect: its specific logical behaviour is
robust across alternative frameworks and can be motivated even without the
modal apparatus employed here.

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\(^{30}\)Crupi and Iacona [4].


