Spurrett, David and Ross, Don (2004) Three ways of worrying about 'causation'. [Preprint]
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Our point of departure is Russell’s (1913) argument for the ‘complete extrusion’ of the word ‘cause’ from the philosophical vocabulary. We argue that at least three different types of philosophical project concerning ‘cause’ should be carefully distinguished, and that failures to distinguish them lie at the root of some apparently recalcitrant problems. We call them the ‘cognitive’, the ‘scientific’ and the ‘metaphysical’.
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|Keywords:||Causation, information, anticipation, metaphysics of causation|
|Subjects:||General Issues > Causation|
|Depositing User:||David Jon Spurrett|
|Date Deposited:||29 Mar 2004|
|Last Modified:||07 Oct 2010 11:12|
Available Versions of this Item
- Three ways of worrying about 'causation'. (deposited 05 Aug 2003)
- Three ways of worrying about 'causation'. (deposited 29 Mar 2004)[Currently Displayed]
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