Ainsworth P (2009) Newman's objection. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 60(1):135171

Bell J (2004) Against  Measurement'. In: Speakable and Unspeakable in Quan tum Mechanics, Cambridge University Press, pp 213231 Boesch B (2017) There Is a Special Problem of Scientic Representation. Phi losophy of Science 84(5):970981

Bokulich A (2016) Fiction As a Vehicle for Truth: Moving Beyond the Ontic Conception. The Monist 99(3):260279, DOI 10.1093/monist/onw004

Bolinska A (2013) Epistemic representation, informativeness and the aim of faithful representation. Synthese 190(2):219234, DOI 10.1007/s11229-012 0143-6, URL http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11229-012-0143-6

Bueno O, French S (2011) How Theories Represent. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 62(4):857894

C A Da Costa N, French S (2003) Science and Partial Truth: A Unitary Ap proach to Models and Scientic Reasoning. Oxford University Press USA

Cartwright N (1983) How the Laws of Physics Lie, vol 34. Oxford University Press

Chakravartty A (2001) The semantic or model-theoretic view of theories and scientic realism. Synthese 127(3):325345

Contessa G (2007) Scientic representation, interpretation, and surrogative rea soning. Philosophy of Science 74(1):4868

Demopoulos W, Friedman M (1985) Bertrand Russell's the Analysis of Mat ter: Its Historical Context and Contemporary Interest. Philosophy of Science 52(4):621639

Dummett M (1978) Truth and Other Enigmas, vol 31. Harvard University Press

Elgin M, Sober E (2002) Cartwright on Explanation and Idealization. Springer Netherlands, Dordrecht, pp 165174, DOI 10.1007/978-94-017-1009-1_9

van Fraassen B (1980) The Scientic Image. Oxford University Press

van Fraassen B (2008) Scientic Representation: Paradoxes of Perspective, vol 70. Oxford University Press

van Fraassen B, Ransanz P (1985) On the Question of Identication of a Scien tic Theory (A Reply to "Van Fraassen's Concept of Empirical Theory" by Pérez Ransanz). Critica 17(51):21  29

French S (2014) The Structure of the World: Metaphysics and Representation. Oxford Univeristy Press, Oxford, United Kingdom

French S, Ladyman J (1999) Reinating the semantic approach. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 13(2):103121

French S, Saatsi J (2006) Realism about Structure: The Semantic View and Nonlinguistic Representations. Philosophy of Science 73(5):548559 Frigg R (2006) Scientic representation and the semantic view of theories. Theo ria 21(1):4965

Giere R (1991) Explaining Science: A Cognitive Approach. Philosophical Re view 100(4):653656

Giere R (2010) Scientic perspectivism, paperback ed edn. Univ. of Chicago Press, Chicago, oCLC: 934432475

Halvorson H (2012) What Scientic Theories Could Not Be. Philosophy of Sci ence 79(2):183206

Kripke S (1980) Naming and Necessity. Harvard University Press

Ladyman J, Ross D (2007) Every Thing Must Go: Metaphysics Naturalized. Oxford University Press

Laudan L (1981) A Confutation of Convergent Realism. Philosophy of Science 48(1):1949

Lutz S (2015) What Was the Syntax-Semantics Debate in the Philosophy of Science About? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91(2)

Massimi M (2018) Four Kinds of Perspectival Truth. Philosophy and Phe nomenological Research 96(2):342359, DOI 10.1111/phpr.12300, URL http://doi.wiley.com/10.1111/phpr.12300

Maudlin T (1995) Three Measurement Problems. Topoi 14(1):715

McMullin E (1985) Galilean idealization. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 16(3):247273, DOI 10.1016/0039-3681(85)90003-2

Miller A (2003) The Signicance of Semantic Realism. Syn these 136(2):191217, DOI 10.1023/A:1024742007683, URL http://link.springer.com/10.1023/A:1024742007683

Morgan M, Morrison M (1999) Models as Mediators: Perspectives on Natural and Social Science. Cambridge University Press

Psillos S (1999) Scientic realism: how science tracks truth. Philosophical issues in science, Routledge, London ; New York

Putnam H (1980) Models and reality. Journal of Symbolic Logic 45(3):464482

Ruyant Q (2019) Structural Realism or Modal Empiricism? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science

Saatsi J (2016) Models, Idealisations, and Realism. Springer International Pub lishing, Cham, pp 173189, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-28163-6_10

Shalkowski SA (1995) Semantic Realism. Review of Metaphysics 48(3):511  538 Suppe F (1989) The semantic conception of theories and scientic realism. Uni versity of Illinois Press, Chicago

Suppes P (1960) A comparison of the meaning and uses of models in mathe matics and the empirical sciences. Synthese 12(2-3):287301

Suárez M (2003) Scientic representation: Against similarity and isomorphism. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 17(3):225244

Suárez M (2004) An inferential conception of scientic representation. Philoso phy of Science 71(5):767779

Suárez M (2015a) Deationary representation, inference, and practice. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 49:3647, DOI 10.1016/j.shpsa.2014.11.001, URL https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0039368114001095

Suárez M (2015b) Representation in Science, vol 1. Oxford Uni versity Press, DOI 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199368815.013.25, URL http://oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199368815.001.0001/oxfordhb9780199368815-e-25

Suárez M, Cartwright N (2007) Theories: Tools versus models. Studies in His tory and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 39(1):6281

Thomson-Jones M (2012) Modeling without Mathematics. Philosophy of Science 79(5):761772

Winther RG (2015) The Structure of Scientic Theories. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy