Abstract

In this paper I examine the epistemic function of agent-based models (ABMs) of scientific inquiry, proposed in the recent philosophical literature. In view of Boero and Squazzoni’s (2005) classification of ABMs into case-based models, typifications and theoretical abstractions, I argue that proposed ABMs of scientific inquiry largely belong to the last category. While this means that their function is primarily exploratory, I suggest that they are epistemically valuable not only as a temporary stage in the development of ABMs of science, but by providing insights into theoretical aspects of scientific rationality. I illustrate my point with two examples of highly idealized ABMs of science, which perform two exploratory functions: Zollman’s (2010) ABM which provides a proof-of-possibility in the realm of theoretical discussions on scientific rationality, and an argumentation-based ABM (Borg et al., 2019, 2017b, 2018), which provides insights into potential mechanisms underlying the efficiency of scientific inquiry.

1 Introduction

Computational modeling has in recent years become an increasingly popular method for the study of social aspects of scientific inquiry. In particular, agent-based models (ABMs) have been used as simulations of scientific inquiry, allowing for the examination of various socio-epistemological
issues: from norms guiding scientists facing a disagreement, to different social mechanisms that impact the efficiency of inquiry, to the division of cognitive labor, etc. Such a computational turn in social epistemology of science emerged from a more general trend of formal modeling of scientific inquiry, initiated at the end of the last century. Originating in economic approaches to social epistemology, formal models of science provided a fruitful ground for the exploration of the dynamics between the individual and group rationality, which had previously been studied primarily with qualitative methods. While first ABMs studying scientific inquiry emerged in sociology of science (e.g. Edmonds, 2008; Gilbert, 1997), they kicked off in social epistemology and philosophy of science with the pioneering works of Zollman, 2007, 2010, Weisberg and Muldoon, 2009, Grim, 2009; Grim et al., 2013; Douven, 2010 (building on the well-known Hegselmann and Krause’s (2002) model), De Langhe, 2014, among others.

A common feature of ABMs developed in social epistemology and philosophy of science is that they are simple, ‘thin’ representations of scientific inquiry (Pöyhönen and Kuorikoski, 2016). The primary appeal of such models is that they allow for an easy insight into possible causal mechanisms underlying the phenomenon in question. The less components a model includes, the easier it gets to study causal dependencies between the given components. Nevertheless, such simplicity comes at a price: the model will likely end up being highly idealized, making it difficult to determine its relation to the real world. More precisely, the more idealized a model is, the harder it gets to exactly determine target phenomena it adequately represents.

Despite their highly idealized character, many of the ABMs proposed in the literature have been motivated by concrete episodes from the history of science, suggesting potential explanations of the given cases (Holman and Bruner, 2015; O’Connor and Weatherall, 2018; Weatherall, O’Connor, and Bruner, 2018; Zollman, 2010). This has had two significant consequences for the reception of ABMs of science. On the one hand, these models have been considered to be primarily aiming at explaining real-world phenomena or at least providing ‘how-possibly explanations’ or ‘proofs of possibility’ that should be applicable to the given cases. On the other hand, the lack of robustness analysis of the given findings has cast doubt on their link to real-world phenomena, and hence on the relevance of these results for actual

\[^{1}\text{For a recent overview of formal models of scientific inquiry see Šešelja, Straßer, and Borg, 2020.}\]

\[^{2}\text{Of special relevance here is the work by Kuhn, Lakatos, Feyerabend, Laudan, and others who advanced historicist theories of scientific rationality (Nickles, 2017).}\]
scientific inquiry (even in a how-possibly way). As a result, it has been suggested that the vast majority of ABMs developed in philosophy of science are currently only exploratory, rather than explanatory (Frey and Šešelja, 2018b), and that they need to be ‘thickened’ and enhanced by empirical data to provide insights into actual scientific inquiry (Martini and Pinto, 2016).

Altogether, the current state of ABMs of science is such that it is unclear what their exact function is, unless we link them more directly to real-world phenomena. The aim of this paper is twofold. On the one hand, I examine different strategies of relating ABMs of science to actual scientific practice and I specify challenges that these strategies face. On the other hand, I introduce a classification of ABMs of science, which will help in providing a clear epistemic function to highly-idealized exploratory models without necessarily assigning them a mere temporary stage. The basic idea behind the latter is that ABMs may be explanatory of theoretical phenomena, which are nevertheless interesting as conceptual explorations of scientific rationality taken in abstracto.

I will start with Boero and Squazzoni’s (2005) classification of ABMs in general, and with a critical look to it, classify ABMs of scientific inquiry (Section 2). In Section 3 I discuss some of the central procedures necessary for relating these ABMs to actual scientific practice. In Section 4 I assess ABMs proposed in the philosophical literature in view of the preceding discussion and argue that they are theoretical abstractions, performing exploratory roles. In Section 5 I illustrate these functions in terms of two examples: Zollman’s (2010) model, and the argumentation-based ABM of scientific inquiry (Borg et al., 2019, 2017a, 2017b, 2018). While the first model plays the role of providing a proof of possibility in the realm of scientific rationality, the second model plays the role of pointing to new hypotheses about mechanisms relevant for the efficiency of scientific inquiry. Section 6 concludes the paper.

2 Classifying ABMs of science

To explicate the difference between simple (or ‘thin’) and complex (or ‘thick’) models, it is useful to take a look at the classification of ABMs

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3 Similar worries have been directed at ABMs in social sciences, see e.g. Arnold, 2014.
4 Beside explanation and exploration there may be various other functions of ABMs, see Edmonds, 2017; Edmonds et al., 2018.
5 Thanks to Daniel Singer for bringing to my attention adjectives ‘thin’ and ‘thick’, which are sometimes used to describe simple and complex ABMs.
introduced by Boero and Squazzoni, 2005, in terms of the degree of specificity of the purported target, and the degree of complexity of the given model. The authors distinguish between case-based ABMs, typifications and theoretical abstractions—on the spectrum ranging from complex and specific models to simple and general ones. While the two dimensions of classification—specificity and complexity—may not necessarily coincide (as I'll argue later on in this section), of special interest for our current purposes is the dimension of specificity of the purported target. Let’s take a closer look at each of these categories and see how they apply to ABMs of science.

On one end of the spectrum, we have **case-based ABMs** of scientific inquiry, aiming to represent concrete cases from the scientific practice. Their target is thus a phenomenon that is restricted in terms of space and time and other empirical information, specific for the given scientific episode. As such, these ABMs tend to be ‘thick’ representations of science since they are calibrated towards the given empirical scenario and hence, they include a variety of details relevant for it.

The second type of ABMs—**typifications**—aim to represent a class of empirical phenomena. They aim at capturing key properties of the given type, while abstracting away from particularities of each individual phenomenon. Hence, a model designed to represent a certain type of scientific inquiry (for instance, an inquiry characterized by deceptive information sharing among scientists, or an inquiry that occurs in the context of theoretical diversity), would fall in this category, characterized by mid-level specificity.

Finally, at the other end of the spectrum we have **theoretical abstractions**: these are simple, highly idealized models, which often have purely exploratory function: testing new ideas, extending existing frameworks, etc. In contrast to typifications, theoretical abstractions are based on numerous

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6 For instance, an ABM of scientific collaboration presented by Zamzami and Schifferauerova, 2017, which aims at examining knowledge transmission and productivity of inquiry, is calibrated on nanotechnology journal publications in Canada, and hence, it can be considered a case-based ABM.

7 Another way to understand typifications is in terms of Max Weber’s ‘ideal types’—theoretical constructs that are formed by a “one-sided accentuation” of specific aspects of a given class of individual phenomena. As such, an ideal type does not represent a mere average of properties characteristic of the empirical phenomena, but an idealization that cannot be found in the real world (Weber, 1904 [1949] p. 90). At the same time, ideal types diverge from empirical phenomena in clearly designated ways, which separates them from the next category—theoretical abstractions. I am grateful to the anonymous reviewer for pointing the similarity between typifications and Weberian ideal types to me.

8 For a discussion on different exploratory functions of models see Gelfert, 2016, Chapter 4, for exploratory functions of simulations see Arnold, 2008, Chapter 6 (see also Footnote 21).
idealizations, to the extent that it is unclear in which ways exactly they diverge from empirical phenomena. As I suggest below, most ABMs in recent philosophical literature fall into this category.\footnote{The most prominent example of this class of ABMs in social sciences is Schelling’s model of social segregation (Schelling, 1971).}

As mentioned above, Boero and Squazzoni assume that complexity correlates with specificity, and simplicity with generality. However, this may not necessarily be the case.\footnote{As Edmonds and Moss, 2004 argue, simplifying a model won’t necessarily make it more general. Edmonds suggests that simplification will lead to a greater generality of the model only if it satisfies one of the following conditions: “When what is simplified away is essentially irrelevant to the outcomes of interest …; When what is simplified away happens to be constant for all the situations considered …; When you loosen your criteria for being approximately right hugely as you simplify …” (Edmonds, 2018).} While simple models abstract away from a number of issues characteristic of the represented target, the idealizations they are based on may pull just as much towards generality as they can towards specificity. Similarly, complex models are not necessarily more specific. A higher number of parameters may increase the complexity of a model, but also the capacity of the model to adequately zoom in on the given target, including a general one (e.g. by obtaining a result that remains robust under various changes in the given parameters). Whether the results of the model represent a narrow or a wide class of phenomena can be determined only by means of adequate validation procedures. The next section tackles this issue.

3 ABM validation: determining the adequate target

The literature on the validation of ABMs is vast (for recent discussions see Beisbart and Saam, 2018; Casini and Manzo, 2016; Gräbner, 2018; Thicke, 2019). The aim of this section is not to give an exhaustive list of validation methods suggested to this end.\footnote{In addition to validation, ABMs also require a process of verification, the aim of which is to evaluate how accurate the program of the model is (see e.g. Cooley and Solano, 2011).} For the current purposes it will suffice to give an overview of some of the central strategies that have been suggested in this context, and which are necessary for showing that a given ABM of scientific inquiry is a case-based model or a typification. For either of these ABM types, what needs to be validated is the link between the model and a given class of empirical phenomena (in case of typifications) or a concrete phenomenon (in case of case-based ABMs). Such a phenomenon is specified
in the interpretation of the ABM as its purported target. The following two types of mutually interwoven processes represent central methodologies of validation: on the one hand, robustness analysis, and on the other hand, the process of empirically embedding the model.

Before I turn to them, it is important to note which kinds of targets of simulations are of philosophical interest. First, we can imagine a simulation that is descriptively adequate (e.g. representing a particular case-study) and which may be of sociological interest. However, such a simulation will be philosophically interesting only if we can use it to examine counterfactual dependencies, in view of which we can draw normative conclusions about the given phenomenon. In other words, simulations become useful for philosophical purposes once they represent a space of possibilities. Since such possibilities can range from empirical to merely logical ones, the main challenge for drawing information that is relevant for the real-world phenomena is determining which kind of possibility the model represents. That is, unless we can specify which context precisely the given model represents, it will be impossible to draw information concerning counterfactual dependencies, such that we can reliably relate them to real-world phenomena. Unsurprisingly, this is especially challenging in case of highly idealized models, where it is unclear how ‘counterfactually distant’ from the real world a given model is. The following procedures help in addressing this challenge.

3.1 Robustness analysis

Two particularly relevant types of robustness analysis are the following ones:

a) **Sensitivity analysis**: a method of examining the robustness of results under changes in parameters of the model (Thiele, Kurth, and Grimm, 2014). It is used to determine the scope of parameters within which results of simulations remain stable.

b) **Derivational robustness analysis**: a method of examining the robustness of results under the changes in idealizing assumptions of the model (Lehtinen, 2017; Railsback and Grimm, 2011; Ylikoski and Aydinonat, 2014, p. 302-306). Since the robustness analysis of this kind can be rather complex and tedious, rather than starting from the model and altering each of its assumptions separately, it may be more efficient to examine the robustness of results by employing an altogether new model, which is structurally

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12See Verreault-Julien, 2018 for a discussion on different types of how-possibly explanations and their relation to the represented possibilities.

13See also Kuhlmann, 2020 who discusses such an analysis in the context of ABMs as a “multiple-model robustness analysis”.

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different, while it aims at the same target phenomenon.

While the robustness analysis serves to explore the stability of results under various changes in the model, an output of such an analysis will not necessarily help us in validating the link between the model and its purported target. On the one hand, if the robustness analysis shows that the results are highly stable and that they hold under numerous changes, this may indicate that the model is representative of a large scope of phenomena, which makes it more likely that it also represents the specific target in question. On the other hand, the results may indeed be sensitive to a variety of parameter changes, in which case we need some interpretative tools to determine which results are representative of which phenomenon exactly. For instance, if it turns out that the results of a certain ABM of scientific inquiry hold only under certain parameter values, then we need some way of translating the parameters in the model into real-world values in order to determine what exactly the model tells us about actual scientific practice. In other words, what is needed is a link between the model and empirical information. This is done by empirically embedding the model.

3.2 Empirical embeddedness

In order to guide the robustness analysis towards the purported target phenomena of case-based ABMs and typifications, our methods need to be empirically embedded. Casini and Manzo, 2016 suggest three trends in the literature on ABMs, which have been used to this end: a trend towards theoretical realism, a trend towards empirical calibration and a trend towards empirical validation. Let’s see how these strategies apply to the validation of ABMs of scientific inquiry.

a) The first strategy—enhancing theoretical realism—suggests that models be built in view of relevant psychological and sociological theories (Casini and Manzo, 2016, p. 23). We may add that with respect to ABMs of science, an important source of such theoretical background are accounts proposed in traditional methodology of science and social epistemology. In particular, when deciding how to represent different aspects of inquiry, and which sim-

\[\text{More precisely, the authors discuss these trends as conducive to the validation of models and their capacity to warrant causal inference. They also note that due to practical limitations these strategies may not always be available, in which case ABM validation should proceed by means of theoretical explorations, which include the two above mentioned robustness analyses, as well as 'dispersion analysis' (the examination of the stochastic character of the results) and 'model analysis' (the examination of events, behaviors and feedbacks executed within the model, which aim towards transparency of the coded processes).} \]
plifications may turn out problematic, we may profit from ideas proposed in this literature. For instance, if we are modeling decision-making of scientists concerning a line of inquiry they are to pursue, different assessments discussed by philosophers of science can be useful. Similarly, if a model aims at representing the context of scientific disagreements, insights from the literature on peer disagreement may be helpful. This information can be used for guiding the construction of both models tackling novel phenomena, and models aimed at examining the robustness of existing ABMs.

b) The second strategy—empirically calibrating ABMs—consists in using concrete numerical information as an input for parameters of the model. In other words, empirical data is used to build micro-specifications of a given ABM (Boero and Squazzoni, 2005), either when constructing novel models or when examining the robustness of the existing ones. Such data can range from the number of agents that represent a given scientific community, to their specific distribution on the given epistemic landscape, to the time span of a given inquiry, to the epistemic success of the represented scientific theories, etc. There are different possible sources of such information. First, historical knowledge about scientific episodes may be essential for an adequate representation of a given case-study by a case-based ABM. Similarly, historical information about different episodes may be informative of ABMs that aim to be typifications (for instance, representing inquiry in a certain scientific discipline). Second, sociological studies about past or contemporary scientific episodes may also provide valuable data. Finally, recent study of bibliometric data is a particularly promising avenue for empirical calibration of ABMs of science. Be it case-based ABMs or typifications, bibliometric data may serve as an input for an average number of agents in a given domain, their distribution across different sub-topics, their citation behavior (which may suggest lines of communication and type of social networks across the given community), their relative impact (in terms of ci-

15For instance, Nickles’ (2006) distinction between the heuristic appraisal and epistemic appraisal motivates the behavior of agents in an argumentation-based ABM of science (Borg et al., 2017a, 2018).

16For example, Douven, 2010 builds an ABM to examine some of the norms suggested in the informal literature on peer disagreements. Moreover, future ABMs of scientific disagreements could make use of the notion of higher-order evidence and its role in scientific disagreements (Straßer, Šešelja, and Wieland, 2015), which has so far largely remained absent from ABMs of science (for a recent discussion concerning ABMs of scientific disagreements see Šešelja, 2019).

17For a recent example see Frey, Šešelja, and Straßer, 2020 who use historical information about the mid-twentieth century research on peptic ulcer disease to examine the robustness of Zollman’s (2010) ABM as a case-based model.
c) The third strategy—empirically validating ABMs—consists in the analysis and comparison of a simulated macro behavior with the real-world macro behavior (Boero and Squazzoni, 2005). For instance, if a model aims at representing a certain episode from the history of science, then given specific initial conditions, the macro behavior of simulated agents should correspond to the historical knowledge about the given case-study. Such a procedure may be especially useful if combined with theoretical realism and empirical calibration, which can together guide the sensitivity analysis (by examining the macro behavior for the parameter values relevant for the given case or type of inquiry), and the derivational robustness analysis (by examining the output given the assumptions relevant for the given case or type of inquiry).

4 Taking stock of ABMs of science: valid unless proven otherwise?

Looking at ABMs developed in the field of philosophy of science, we may notice that the vast majority of them are designed as intentionally simple: by simplifying the representation of scientific inquiry in terms of factors that are included in the model we can have an easier insight into causal dependencies between these factors. Moreover, how general or specific they are has remained largely open. On the one hand, as mentioned in Section 1, these models have frequently been taken as providing potential explanatory mechanisms of concrete episodes from the history of science. On the other hand, validation procedures establishing the link between models and respective case studies have been typically omitted: the majority of them have not been subjected to any systematic robustness analysis or the process of empirical embedding, which would relate them to concrete cases of scientific inquiry.

Moreover, for those ABMs that prima facie display a plausible social

\footnote{The above mentioned model by Zamzami and Schiffauerova, 2017 is a case in point.}

\footnote{It is important to note that models aiming to provide potential explanations of concrete historical episodes shouldn’t be understood as providing Lakatosian rational reconstructions. Their aim is more modest since they can at most offer a potential rational reconstruction of the given episode. Such a reconstruction would offer a candidate explanation, which has a sufficient degree of plausibility, but which requires an empirical confirmation in order to count as an actual explanation, allowing for an actual rational reconstruction.}
mechanism and for which no further validation seems necessary, there is typically the danger of triviality. If the simulation displays a process which plausibly holds for the real-world phenomenon in virtue of our knowledge of that phenomenon, where any further robustness analysis of the simulation seems unnecessary, then we may ask: why run the simulation in the first place? As Arnold, 2008 argues: “the results [of simulations] should not already be deducible without any model or simulation from the empirical description of the process.” (p. 191).

Hence, ABMs lacking robustness analysis—sensitivity analysis and derivational robustness analysis—cannot be reliably considered (non-trivial) case-based models or typifications. Accordingly, the assumption of validity unless proven otherwise is unsuitable as a guideline for the interpretation of non-trivial ABMs. Just like with any scientific claim, justification needs to proceed in terms of evidence (obtained by reliable methods), where the burden of proof is on those proposing an interpretation of a model, which assigns it a representational power with respect to real-world phenomena. The reason why validity cannot be granted without robustness-based evidence lies in the highly idealized nature of these models. Even if the model seems plausible, some of its underlying assumptions may be representative only of a relatively small subset of the given target phenomena.

In contrast, theoretical abstractions may not be representative of any real-world phenomena, but they may rather show how a given socio-epistemic mechanism occurs under certain theoretical conditions, even though such conditions may be unlikely in any realistic context of scientific inquiry, nor allowing for interesting counterfactual inferences about real-world phenomena. The latter will be the case if the model is so idealized and simplified to the point of being too counterfactually distant from actual scientific practice, so that no relevant inferences about actual science can be drawn from it.

Altogether, this means that the majority of these models fall into the category of theoretical abstractions, performing only exploratory function. 

20 For instance, different representations of knowledge acquisition may result in strikingly different outcomes: e.g. representing scientists as gathering information by making pulls (each of which is success or a failure) from a given probability distribution as in Zollman-inspired ABMs of science (see below Section 5.1) may lead to different findings than if agents gather information about different parts of the given rivaling theories, where some parts of each theory are defensible or indefensible (see e.g. Borg et al., 2019).

21 Arnold, 2008 classifies simulations according to their purpose, dividing them into those employed at the ‘conceptual level’ and those employed at the ‘application level’. The former are then distinguished into proof-of-possibility simulations and exploratory simulations, while the letter include predictive simulations and explanatory simulations.
As a result, they cannot be reliably used for making inferences about any concrete real-world phenomena. More precisely, some consequences of the current exploratory status of ABMs of science are:

1. *They cannot be reliably used as case-based models:* this means that without systematic validation procedures (and possibly also further enhancements) these ABMs are insufficiently reliable as representations of any concrete case of scientific inquiry.

2. *They cannot be reliably used as typifications:* this means that without systematic validation procedures (and possibly also further enhancements) these ABMs are insufficiently reliable as representations of any class of scientific inquiry.

3. What is more, making these models *more complex* won’t necessarily make them more adequate candidates for the above two categories.

While claims 1. and 2. are supported by the discussion in the previous and this section, let me turn now to claim 3. Even though the majority of highly-idealized ABMs in the philosophical literature are simple in character, making these models more complex—by adding assumptions and parameters—isn’t a straightforward path to their validation. Just like in case of simple ABMs, the link between complex models and their real-world targets needs to be warranted if the model is to become a case-based ABM or a typification. Moreover, there is a trade-off between the kinds of robustness analysis that pose a challenge to the validation of simple models in contrast to the complex ones. On the one hand, in case of simple models, a small number of parameters makes the sensitivity analysis relatively easy. In contrast, derivational robustness analysis presents a challenge for simple models since it requires a construction of new ABMs (either as enhancements of the existing one or as newly constructed models). On the other hand, the situation with complex models is reverse: while derivational robustness analysis can be easy at least in the sense that by removing certain assumptions from the model we can get alternative ABMs, sensitivity analysis is challenging due to a large number of parameters that constitute a complex simulation. To elevate this difficulty, different types of screening procedures, which facilitate sensitivity analysis, have been suggested in the literature on simulations (see Thiele, Kurth, and Grimm, 2014).

(p. 187). In the current paper I use the term ‘exploratory’ in the sense of Arnold’s first larger category (conceptual level simulations) mainly because proof-of-the-principle ABMs tend to be toy-models, not necessarily referring to any real-world phenomena, and as such, they are exploratory of the given conceptual space.
5 What can we learn from theoretical abstractions?

If theoretical abstractions primarily serve an exploratory function (either by exploring a conceptual space and providing a proof-of-principle, or by exploring a causal space of mechanisms relevant for real-world phenomena), what exactly can we learn from them? In this section I illustrate insights of this kind by means of two highly-idealized ABMs of science: one of which has provided a proof-of-possibility in the realm of theoretical discussions on the tension between the individual and group rationality, and one of which has provided novel insights into possible mechanisms underlying the efficiency of scientific inquiry.

5.1 Zollman’s modeling in view of bandit problems

One of the most prominent classes of ABMs of science are Zollman’s (2007; 2010) models. Inspired by (Bala and Goyal, 1998), the models represent scientific inquiry by employing the so-called bandit problems. Bandit problems, well known in the field of statistics and economics, concern situations in which a gambler (or a group of gamblers) is trying to maximize their payoff when confronted with multiple slot machines (bandits) that have different probabilities of success. Analogously, we can imagine a scientist confronted with multiple rivaling hypotheses, trying to determine which one is the best. At the beginning of the simulation, scientists are assigned random prior probabilities for two rivaling hypotheses, each of which has a designated objective probability of success, unknown to the agents-scientists. Agents always choose to pursue a theory which they consider to be better. Throughout the simulation they update their beliefs in view of their own findings, and by receiving information from other agents with whom they are connected in a social network. Zollman employs three types of social networks (the so-called cycle, wheel and the complete graph) and his results suggest that the degree of connectedness of the scientific community is inversely proportional to the success of scientists in converging on the

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22I describe here Zollman’s (2010) model, which is a generalized version of his (2007) one.

23Every round an agent makes 1,000 pulls, each of which can be a success or failure, where the probability of success is given by the objective probability of success of the respective theory. Agents then update their beliefs via Bayesian reasoning (modeled by means of beta distributions), in view of their own success and the success of other agents with whom they are linked in a social network.
objectively better hypothesis. The reason why a fully connected community often fails in converging on the best hypothesis is that initial findings by scientists may be misleading, but due to the full connectedness, they may spread quickly throughout the whole community, resulting in a premature abandonment of the objectively better hypothesis.

Zollman’s model is indeed highly-idealized: it abstracts away from different types of interactions among scientists (e.g. mere exchange of obtained evidence vs. critical interaction), it assumes that scientists always prefer a better hypothesis without any inertia towards their previous choice of inquiry, etc. Moreover, the results of his runs pass neither sensitivity analysis nor derivational robustness analysis. On the one hand, Rosenstock, O’Connor, and Bruner, 2017 have shown that as soon as certain parameter values are slightly changed (e.g. the values for the objective probability of success assigned to two hypotheses), all networks are equally successful. On the other hand, Frey and Šešelja, 2018a have shown that changing some of the assumptions in the model (e.g. adding the idea that scientists don’t abandon their current hypothesis as soon as they learn that the rivaling one is superior since they have a ‘rational inertia’ towards the former) changes Zollman’s results as well. In view of these findings, it is difficult to argue that Zollman’s ABM represents a typical context of scientific inquiry, or that we can draw from it normative conclusions about actual scientific practice.

Nevertheless, the model still provides philosophically valuable insights: it illustrates a case of the tension between individual and group rationality as a theoretical notion, that is, irrespective of how realistic such a scenario is. As such, it contributes to the conceptual exploration of rationality, where it is legitimate to push some assumptions to extreme in order to observe their consequences. We do the same in case of epistemic modal logic, for instance, which includes the ‘positive introspection axiom’, according to which if one knows p then one knows that one knows p, and which has been criticized as highly problematic (see e.g. Williamson, 2002, p. 114-134). Yet, epistemic logic is nonetheless considered a valuable contribution to attempts at formally modeling knowledge. As explorations of rationality these models are philosophically valuable since they tell us something about the theoretical phenomena they represent. In case of Zollman’s model, we have learned about conditions under which a certain degree of connectedness of a social network, representing information flow among scientists, may be epistemically harmful. Whether these conditions ever occur in the real world

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I am indebted to Christian Straßer for an inspiring discussion that resulted in a number of ideas appearing in this section.
is a separate question.

In this sense, Zollman’s ABM provides a proof-of-possibility that individual and group rationality may not always go hand-in-hand, and that communication structure may be an underlying mechanism leading to this tension. While his models can of course serve the purpose of grounding further enhancements that aim at providing normatively relevant information about actual scientific research, it doesn’t get its epistemic value primarily from such a temporary heuristic role. To the contrary: I suggest that its primary role consists in explaining the above mentioned theoretical phenomenon.

5.2 Argumentation-based ABM (ArgABM)

Inspired by Abstract Argumentation Frameworks, Borg et al.’s (2017; 2017; 2018) model represents scientific inquiry as an argumentative exchange between scientists pursuing rivaling research programs. Throughout each run of the simulation agents-scientists explore an ‘argumentative-landscape’, gradually discovering arguments in favor or against their current theory. Each theory (or a research program) is represented as consisting of a number of arguments. These arguments are represented abstractly, as nodes in a directed graph, connected via a ‘discovery relation’. The discovery relation represents paths that agents take when moving on the landscape, from one argument to another. Moreover, arguments belonging to one research program can attack arguments of one of the rivaling programs. The landscape then consists of different argumentative (rooted) trees, with nodes as arguments and edges as discovery relation, where an argument in one tree may attack an argument in another tree (see Figure 1).

Roughly speaking, an argument in a theory is considered defended if it is not attacked, or if there is another defended argument in the same theory, which attacks the attacker-argument. Moreover, the landscape is

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25 Abstract Argumentation Frameworks were pioneered by Dung, 1995 and previously used for the modeling of scientific debates by Šešelja and Straßer, 2013. In what follows I give an informal overview of ArgABM. For all the details see the original papers on the model.

26 All theories are trees of the same size, i.e. consisting of the same number of arguments.

27 More precisely, we call a subset of arguments $A$ of a given theory $T$ admissible iff for each attacker $b$ of some $a$ in $A$ there is an $a'$ in $A$ that attacks $b$. Since every theory in the model is conflict-free (in the sense that no two arguments in the same theory attack one another), it can easily be shown that for each theory $T$ there is a unique maximally admissible subset of $T$ (with respect to set inclusion). An argument $a$ in $T$ is said to be defended in $T$ iff it is a member of this maximally admissible subset of $T$. 

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pre-defined in such a way that one theory is the best in the sense that it is fully defended from all its attackers in the objective landscape. Over the course of a run, agents gather knowledge about the objective landscape, which consists of arguments in favor of each theory, and attacks on these arguments. In addition to gathering knowledge on their own, they also learn about the landscape from other agents with whom they are linked in a social network. In view of this knowledge, agents evaluate the theories. A run is successful if agents manage to converge on the objectively best theory.

Figure 1: An example of an argumentative landscape consisting of 2 theories (or research programs). Darker shaded nodes represent arguments that have been investigated by agents and are thus visible to them; brighter shaded nodes stand for arguments that aren’t visible to agents. The biggest node in each theory is the root argument, from which agents start their exploration via discovery relation, which connects arguments within one theory. Arrows stand for attacks from an argument in one theory to an argument in another theory (Borg et al., 2019).

As the authors explicitly state, ArgABM was primarily designed as an exploratory model, aimed at testing the robustness of previously proposed ABMs of scientific interaction (such as Zollman’s ones). While it has more parameters than Zollman-inspired ABMs, and it allows for more assump-

28The model employs an additional, more permissive criterion of success, according to which agents are successful if the best theory is at least as populated as any of the rivaling theories.
tions to be integrated in the model, it still lacks the validation procedures discussed in Section 3.

The results obtained by ArgABM suggest that more connected groups perform significantly better than the less connected ones under a variety of conditions. And while these findings appear contrary to conclusions drawn from Zollman’s ABMs, the authors caution that structural differences between these ABMs may indicate that each model represents a specific kind of inquiry. This is the first important exploratory result of ArgABM: different ABMs of science may be representing different types of inquiry, which means that more research should be done towards determining the specific context of inquiry represented by each of the models.

Second, a recent iteration of ArgABM by Borg et al., 2019 examines different evaluation procedures underlying theory-choice performed by scientists. For instance, scientists may prefer a theory that has more defended arguments than its rivals. Alternatively, they may prefer a theory that has a lower number of undefended arguments (which can be understood as anomalies in the given theory). As the authors show, these assessments may result in different preference orders on the given theories, and in strikingly different outcomes of the simulation. Hence, this result is a novel insight into a potential mechanism that may impact the efficiency of scientists. While the link between the modeled evaluations and actual scientific practice (i.e. evaluations underlying theory-choice performed by actual scientists) remains an open question, this result points to the significance of a factor that has previously often been omitted from ABMs of science.

Before closing this section, let me add that one could argue that just like Zollman’s model, ArgABM actually provides a proof-of-possibility for different theoretical phenomena (the relation between the degree of connectedness of scientists and their efficiency, the relative performance of different evaluation procedures underlying theory-choice, etc.). Indeed, the two exploratory functions discussed here are closely related: a proof-of-possibility may also be an insight into a potential novel mechanism, and the other way around. In fact, the exact function a model performs is largely a matter of the context in which it is proposed, including initial motivations for developing the model and ways in which it is employed: as the first model tackling a given question, a model designed to test the robustness of previous proposals, etc.

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An exception is the epistemic landscape ABM proposed by Currie and Avin, 2018, which represents the diversity of methods preferred by scientists during their inquiry.
6 Conclusion

In this paper I have analyzed a class of highly-idealized ABMs of scientific inquiry, proposed in the literature in philosophy of science and social epistemology, suggesting they should be considered as exploratory models. To this end, I have argued that the majority of these models belong to the category of theoretical abstractions, which means that what they represent is unspecified. As a result, these models cannot be reliably used for drawing inferences about actual scientific practice, at least as long as they don’t pass an adequate validation procedure. Such a procedure consists in different types of robustness analysis, guided by the process of empirically embedding the model towards its purported target. Nevertheless, I have argued that in the lack of such validation procedures, theoretical abstractions are still epistemically valuable by being informative of theoretical phenomena, i.e. by providing conceptual insights about scientific rationality and the process of scientific inquiry.

Finally, it is important to notice that insights obtained by such exploratory ABMs might have been overlooked were these models immediately calibrated towards concrete cases of scientific inquiry. This suggests that exploratory ABMs are not just a preliminary stage in the development of empirically validated models, merely providing the ground for an eventual epistemic benefit. While they do play that role as well, their additional function consists in providing conceptual explorations of scientific rationality and revealing potential causal mechanisms underlying scientific inquiry, which may remain a blind spot in those ABMs that are immediately informative of real-world phenomena.

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