Snyder, Laura J. (2004) Confirmation for a Modest Realism. In: [2004] Philosophy of Science Assoc. 19th Biennial Meeting - PSA2004: Contributed Papers (Austin, TX; 2004) > PSA 2004 Contributed Papers. (Unpublished)
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Abstract
William Whewell was clearly wrong to claim that his confirmation criterion of consilience was a truth-guarantor. I argue here, however, that even when consilience gives evidence for a theory that turns out to be false, there is an important sense in which consilience shows that the theory has gotten something right. Consilience is a sign that a theory has uncovered something about the natural-kind structure of the physical world. Because of this, Whewell was correct to claim that consilience provides a “criterion of reality.” In this way consilience can play a role in an argument for scientific realism.
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| Item Type: | Conference or Workshop Item (UNSPECIFIED) |
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| Keywords: | Consilience, Whewell, Realism |
| Subjects: | General Issues > Confirmation/Induction General Issues > History of Philosophy of Science General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism |
| Conferences and Volumes: | [2004] Philosophy of Science Assoc. 19th Biennial Meeting - PSA2004: Contributed Papers (Austin, TX; 2004) > PSA 2004 Contributed Papers |
| Depositing User: | Laura J. Snyder |
| Date Deposited: | 22 Aug 2004 |
| Last Modified: | 07 Oct 2010 11:12 |
| Item ID: | 1901 |
| Public Domain: | No |
| URI: | http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/1901 |
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