Causal Attributions and the Trolley Problem
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Abstract: In this paper, we consider two competing explanations of the empirical finding that people’s causal attributions are responsive to normative details, such as whether an agent’s action violated an injunctive norm—the counterfactual view and the responsibility view. We then present experimental evidence that uses the trolley dilemma in a new way to investigate causal attribution. In the switch version of the trolley problem, people judge that the agent ought to flip the switch, but they also judge that she is more responsible for the resulting outcome when she does so than when she refrains. As predicted by the responsibility view, but not the counterfactual view, people are more likely to say that the agent caused the outcome when she flips the switch.

Metaphysicians working on causation face a dilemma. On the one hand, injunctive norms are supposed to be irrelevant to what causes what.² As Helen Beebee (2004, 293) puts it, “no philosopher working within the tradition I’m concerned with here thinks that the truth conditions for causal claims contain a moral element.” On the other hand, many philosophers working in the tradition Beebee references have endorsed the claim that accounts of the metaphysics of causation should be informed or constrained by ordinary intuitions, ordinary attributions,
ordinary concepts, common sense, or the like (e.g., Lewis, 1986; Menzies, 1996; Collins, Hall, and Paul, 2004; Hall, 2004; Liebesman, 2011; Paul and Hall, 2013; Halpern and Hitchcock, 2015; Halpern, 2016), and a large body of research indicates that injunctive norms matter for ordinary causal attributions.3

In case after case, participants assign higher causal ratings to an individual who contributes to bringing about a negative outcome when she violates an injunctive norm than when she does not. In the typical cases, this involves an agent violating an injunctive norm through her actions (e.g., Hilton and Slugoski 1986; Alicke 1992; Knobe and Fraser 2008; Hitchcock and Knobe 2009; Sytsma, Livengood, and Rose 2012; Reuter et al. 2014; Kominsky et al. 2015; Livengood, Sytsma, and Rose 2017). But it also occurs when an agent violates an injunctive norm through her inaction. To demonstrate, we presented participants with the following version of the e-mail case tested by Kominsky et al. (2015)4, in which we have changed the norm-violating agent’s action to an inaction:

Billy and Suzy work for a company that has a central computer. Both Billy and Suzy answer incoming calls.

Since incoming calls are logged through the central computer, in order to make sure that one person is always available to answer incoming phone calls, the company issued the following official policy: Suzy is supposed to log into the central computer in the mornings, whereas Billy is supposed to log into the central computer in the afternoons. Further, the policy states that both Billy and Suzy are supposed to log out of the central computer when they are done answering calls.

3 Philosophers working on causation today are divided with respect to the proper target of their inquiry. On the one hand, there are philosophers who we might describe as conceptualists. Conceptualists think that we should either offer an analysis of the ordinary concept of causation or offer a suitably refined explication of it. On the other hand, there are philosophers who we might describe as realists. Realists think that we should identify truths about the causal relation, just as scientists have identified truths about planets and electrons. While the relevance of empirical work is probably most obvious in connection with conceptualist approaches, we believe that philosophers of both conceptualist and realist persuasions should be interested in ordinary causal attributions, though possibly for very different reasons. We discuss these issues in slightly more detail at the end of Livengood and Sytsma (2020). We will not explore possible bridge principles from facts about ordinary causal attributions to philosophical theories of causation in this paper. For discussion of some general strategies, see Sytsma and Livengood (2015).

4 A similar case is presented in Knobe (2006), and variations have been tested in Livengood et al. (2017), Reuter et al. (2014), Icard et al. (2017), and Sytsma (forthcoming-a, forthcoming-b, ms-a).
Unfortunately, a problem has recently developed with the computer system: if two people are logged into the central computer at the same time, some important work e-mails will be immediately deleted.

Yesterday, Billy logged into the central computer in the afternoon. He did not log out when he was done, however, because a pirated movie he wanted to watch was still downloading. This morning, Suzy logged into the central computer to answer incoming calls. Since two people were logged into the central computer at the same time, some important work e-mails were deleted.

Participants were then asked how strongly they agreed or disagreed that “Billy caused the e-mails to be deleted” and that “Suzy caused the e-mails to be deleted,” answering on a 7-point scale running from “Strongly Disagree” to “Strongly Agree.”

In line with previous results, we found that people tended to agree that the norm-violating agent (Billy) caused the e-mails to be deleted (mean=5.54 with a 95% CI of [5.06, 6.02]), but they tended to disagree that the norm-conforming agent (Suzy) caused the e-mails to be deleted (mean=2.44 with a 95% CI of [1.98, 2.90]). Similar results were found in a second study where we made both the norm-violating and the norm-conforming characters inactive. Participants were again statistically more likely to answer that the norm-violating agent caused the problem (mean=5.11 with a 95% CI of [4.55, 5.67]) than that the norm-conforming agent caused the

5 In all studies reported in this paper, responses were collected online through advertising on Google; participants were native English speakers, 16 years of age or older, with at most minimal training in philosophy. Minimal training in philosophy was taken to exclude philosophy majors, those who have completed a degree with a major in philosophy, and those who have taken graduate-level courses in philosophy.

6 Responses were collected from 57 participants—68.4% women, with an average age of 32.8 years, and ranging in age from 16 to 79.

7 Causal ratings for Billy were statistically above the neutral point whether using a t-test (parametric) or Wilcoxon signed rank test (nonparametric): t(56)=6.46, p<.001; V=927, p<.001. By contrast, causal ratings for Suzy were statistically below the neutral point for each test: t(56)=6.81, p<.001; V=83.5, p<.001. And the difference between the two was significant with a large effect size: t(111.82)=9.38, p<.001, Cohen’s d=1.76; W=2837.5, p<.001, Cliff’s delta=0.75. The same statistical tests will be used for subsequent analyses. Going forward, we will say that a rating is “statistically” above or below some value rather than using the awkward expression “statistically significantly.” When we say that some rating was statistically above or below a specific value, we mean that a test of significance rejected the hypothesis of no difference.
problem (mean=2.56 with a 95% CI of [2.10, 3.03]), even though neither took any positive action.\textsuperscript{8} The results of these studies are shown in Figure 1.

\textbf{Study 1: N=57}

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{study1}
\caption{Results of Studies 1 and 2}
\end{figure}

\textbf{Study 2: N=55}

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{study2}
\end{figure}

\textbf{Means}

bars indicate 95% confidence intervals

Taken at face value, these and related empirical findings suggest that the truth conditions for causal claims contain a normative element.\textsuperscript{9} But if this is correct, then either we were wrong to think that injunctive norms are irrelevant to a properly metaphysical account of what causes

\textsuperscript{8} See the supplemental materials for the full text of the probes used in the studies reported in this paper. Responses for Study 2 were collected from 55 participants—76.4% women, with an average age of 29.4 years, and ranging in age from 16 to 72. Causal ratings for Billy were statistically above the neutral point: \(t(54)=3.97, p<.001; V=819.5, p<.001\). Causal ratings for Suzy were statistically below the neutral point: \(t(54)=-6.20, p<.001; V=112.5, p<.001\). And the difference between the two was significant with a large effect size: \(t(104.47)=7.02, p<.001\), Cohen’s \(d=1.34\); \(W=2461.5, p<.001\), Cliff’s delta=0.63.

\textsuperscript{9} By “taken at face value,” here, we mean roughly that ordinary attributions are accurately reflecting an underlying concept that is being competently deployed.
what or we were wrong to think that accounts of the metaphysics of causation should be informed or constrained by ordinary intuitions, ordinary attributions, ordinary concepts, common sense, or the like. On our account, which we call the responsibility view, the ordinary concept of causation does have normative content. Of course, one need not take the empirical findings at face value. One prominent way out of the dilemma is to endorse a counterfactual view, according to which injunctive norms matter to causal attributions because of their effect on our counterfactual judgments but the concept of causation itself has no normative content.

10 An anonymous referee objects that our claim here is too strong. The referee argues that even if one accepts that our ordinary, default concept of causation has normative content, a metaphysical account of causation that lacks normative content might still be informed by our ordinary intuitions. The referee writes, “Particularly when our intuitions are in conflict, metaphysicians often present accounts that contradict some of our intuitions, even while developing accounts that aim to be informed by our intuitions in general.” (We follow the referee here in talking about intuitions, though we would prefer, all else equal, to talk about attributions instead.) We agree with the referee in two respects. First, we agree that metaphysicians can legitimately set aside some intuitions. We think that theorists should take seriously strong, widespread intuitions about cases that are not too far-fetched. Moreover, we think theorists should take seriously population-level patterns of intuitions and the systematic ways in which intuitions are related to various features of the relevant stimuli. Weak or provincial intuitions, intuitions about far-fetched cases, and intuitions that display no interesting patterns of relation with the stimuli might reasonably be given less weight or even no weight at all. However, what we observe in the experimental literature has none of these features. Injunctive norms matter in a wide range of cases. Injunctive norms matter in completely ordinary cases. Intuitions about such cases are often very strong and exhibit interesting patterns of relation with various features of the stimuli. Hence, we think that theorists cannot simply set aside the intuitions. They have to be addressed in some way.

Second, we agree with the referee in thinking that there is a weak sense of what it means to be “informed by” intuitions according to which a purely descriptive, norm-free theory of causation could be informed by normatively-laden intuitions. In one sense, this concession is very minimal. If we take “informed by” in a very weak sense, such that appeals to intuition are appropriate only in a context of discovery—not in a context of justification—then of course normatively-loaded intuitions might inform a norm-free account of causation. But in this sense, so might just about anything. Moreover, if we weaken what is meant by “informed by” in this way, then we lose much of the ordinary practice of theoreticians, wherein appeals to intuition have some adjudicative role. We think, then, that in the context of this conversation, “informed by” should not be understood in such a weak sense. Further, if one had a relatively weak sense of “informed by” in mind, appeals to normatively-laden intuitions will be appropriate for projects in conceptual engineering, but not for projects in metaphysics. There are two related problems here. First, there is a problem of fixing reference. If the influence of injunctive norms is widespread, systematic, and large, then ignoring it risks simply changing the subject: it risks missing its target, offering an account of something other than causation, as ordinarily understood. One could try to fix reference by way of Canberra Planning, but if we’re right about ordinary causal intuitions, Canberra Planning would include the influence of injunctive norms as one of the central features of causation. Second, there is a problem of introspection. One might say that we can simply see when our intuitions are being influenced by normative features of a case and make adjustments as needed. But we do not think it is so easy. Despite the fact that the influence of injunctive norms is widespread, systematic, and large, philosophers have typically been blind to it. And yet, a quick perusal of the literature turns up case after case where there are numerous injunctive norms—e.g. assassins killing kings, murderous villains trying to crush detectives with boulders, soldiers giving orders in battle, children throwing rocks at abandoned buildings, and the like. We do not think we have the sort of introspective access to the structure of our concepts that would be required in order to make the method of cases safe for constructing descriptive, norm-free metaphysical theories of causation.
In this paper, we present new empirical evidence that is predicted by the responsibility view but difficult to square with the counterfactual view. We thereby offer a challenge to metaphysicians who want to avoid the dilemma by way of a counterfactual view.\textsuperscript{11} We consider a case in which people judge that an agent ought to act in a way that would leave her responsible for a bad outcome. We find that people’s causal attributions are strikingly similar to their responsibility attributions. When an agent is said to be responsible for a bad outcome, she is also said to have caused the outcome, even when she is judged to have acted morally. We argue that while the responsibility view directly explains our findings, the counterfactual view predicts the opposite effect.

Here is how we will proceed. We begin in Section 1 by describing the counterfactual and responsibility views. In Section 2, we detail the test case we will focus on—the switch version of the trolley problem—and lay out the competing predictions that our two target views make about it. We report our experimental results in Section 3. Finally, in Section 4 we critically consider how advocates of counterfactual relevance accounts might respond to our findings.

1. Two Explanations
The counterfactual view holds that norm violations matter for ordinary causal attributions because people are more likely to consider counterfactual alternatives where the norm violation is replaced with a norm-conforming event (e.g., Hitchcock and Knobe 2009, Halpern and Hitchcock 2015, Kominsky et al. 2015, Icard et al. 2017). Perhaps the most widely discussed version of this view is the one put forward by Hitchcock and Knobe (2009). They argue that

\textsuperscript{11} There are, of course, other explanations of the effect of norms on ordinary causal attributions that metaphysicians might call on to avoid the dilemma—most notably, Alicke’s bias view (e.g., 1992, 2000; Alicke, Rose, and Bloom 2011) and Samland and Waldman’s pragmatic view (e.g., 2016; Samland et al. 2016). While these views are discussed briefly below, space prevents us from considering them in detail here, but see, for instance, Livengood and Sytsma (2020) and Sytsma (ms-b) for further consideration of the bias view and Sytsma et al. (2019) and Sytsma (forthcoming-b) for further consideration of the pragmatic view.
causal attributions serve to identify suitable intervention points, and norm violations come into play because they affect which counterfactuals are most salient for determining whether or not an intervention point is suitable. The basic idea is that in considering a situation, people think about how the outcome could have been prevented. But they don’t consider just any way the outcome might have been prevented. Instead, they focus on abnormal aspects of the situation in which the outcome has occurred. Specifically, Hitchcock and Knobe hold that “people classify each counterfactual as having a single overall degree of ‘normality’ (taking both statistical and prescriptive considerations into account) and this overall degree of normality ends up affecting people’s sense of whether the counterfactual is relevant or irrelevant” (598). In practice, however, the scenarios tested typically involve varying just one norm, most often an injunctive norm, and the effect is then attributed to that norm violation, taking it to be the dominant consideration.\footnote{This is not always the case, however. For instance, in Sytsma et al. (2012), Livengood et al. (2017), and Sytsma (forthcoming-a, ms-a) we varied both whether an injunctive norm was violated and whether a descriptive norm was violated.}

The basic picture, then, is that people make causal attributions by considering relevant counterfactuals, where this is guided by their overall evaluation of the normality of an alternative state of affairs.\footnote{As Hitchcock and Knobe observe, the thought that norm-violation matters to causal attributions is not new. See for example, Hart and Honoré (1985, Chapter 2, Section IIIA) or Hilton and Sligoski (1986).} People identify the cause(s) of a given effect by testing a collection of counterfactual conditionals where the antecedent says that one of various potential causes (which actually occurred) did not occur and the consequent says that the effect did not occur. People are (implicitly) guided by a single overall normality judgment for each in deciding which counterfactuals to test. Counterfactuals in which the antecedent is more normal than the actual state of affairs are checked first or are given greater weight or are regarded as more salient or more relevant. Hence, causal attributions are guided by judgments of overall normality, and the result of this process serves to identify suitable intervention points. As such, norms play a
significant role in the generation of causal attributions, but the ordinary concept of causation at play in causal attributions is not taken to be a normative concept. Rather, injunctive norms are part of the background against which causal attributions are made, with injunctive norms coming into play when people attempt to identify intervention points in normatively-laden situations.

Let’s illustrate this explanation by applying it to the e-mail case discussed in the introduction. Important e-mails will be deleted if two people are logged into the central system at the same time. Both Billy and Suzy come to be logged into the system, and the e-mails are consequently deleted. When asked about this scenario, participants overwhelmingly agree that Billy caused the outcome, but disagree that Suzy caused the outcome. Why do we find this asymmetry in causal ratings, given that both agents needed to be logged into the system for the e-mails to be deleted? The key difference is that Billy violated company policy, while Suzy followed it. According to the counterfactual view, Billy violating the injunctive norm makes salient the counterfactual alternative on which he follows the policy. If Billy had followed the policy, the e-mails would not have been deleted when Suzy logged into the system. This marks Billy as a clear point for intervention: one obvious way to prevent e-mails from being deleted in the future is to make sure that employees follow the policy.

The counterfactual view treats the ordinary concept of causation at play in causal attributions as descriptive. By contrast, according to our responsibility view, the concept is not purely descriptive but is in fact a normative concept, akin to the concepts of responsibility and accountability. While the counterfactual view holds that injunctive norms impact causal attributions indirectly, working via the counterfactuals that we find relevant, the responsibility view contends that injunctive norms are directly relevant to causal attributions—that our normative evaluations are

part of the content considered when applying the ordinary concept of causation. As such, we hold that when judging that an agent who violates an injunctive norm is more causal, people are not misapplying a purely descriptive concept but are correctly applying a normative concept. Thus, we hold that saying that an agent caused an outcome typically serves to indicate something more than that the agent brought about that outcome or that the agent’s action produced that outcome. Rather, it expresses a normative evaluation of the action in a way that can be roughly captured by saying that the agent is responsible for that outcome or that the agent is accountable for that outcome. The result is that our account offers a straightforward explanation of the findings that causal attributions are sensitive to injunctive norms: it is not surprising that violations of injunctive norms matter for ordinary causal attributions because such attributions express normative evaluations concerning culpability for an outcome.15

To illustrate, consider the e-mail case again. Billy’s inaction and Suzy’s action jointly lead to a bad outcome. But while Billy violates company policy, Suzy follows it. If we want to figure out who should be held accountable for the resulting problem, the answer seems clear: Billy is responsible for the e-mails being deleted, not Suzy. According to the responsibility view, causal attribution is akin to expressing such a judgment of normative responsibility. Billy caused the e-mails to be deleted; Suzy did not. But why is Billy responsible for the outcome and not Suzy? Both agents played a role in the e-mails being deleted. If Suzy had not logged in, the problem would not have occurred; and, if Billy had logged out, the problem would not have

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15 As noted above, there are other explanations of the effect of norms on ordinary causal attributions in the literature, most notably Aliche’s bias view and Samland and Waldmann’s pragmatic view (2015, 2016; Samland et al. 2016). The bias view holds that in making causal attributions people tend to be biased by their desire to praise or blame the agent. The pragmatic view holds that for pragmatic reasons participants in the relevant experiments tend to interpret the causal attributions they are asked about as instead asking about responsibility or accountability. Each of these views might appear similar to the responsibility view at first glance, but they make rather different claims. While the responsibility view holds that causal attributions will generally be similar to blame, responsibility, or accountability attributions, we do not hold that this is due to bias or pragmatic misinterpretation; rather the similarity is due to these attributions applying related normative concepts.
occurred. So why do we hold Billy alone accountable? Billy acted negligently (violating the policy) while Suzy acted responsibly (following the policy). Further, while the problem could have been prevented by Suzy not logging in, this would have created a new problem for the company in that Suzy wouldn’t have been able to answer incoming calls. No such problem would have been created by Billy logging out.

Our explanation of the pattern of findings for the e-mail case makes use of counterfactuals, but unlike the counterfactual view, the responsibility view uses counterfactuals to assess the normative difference between different agents’ behaviors. According to the counterfactual view, ordinary causal attributions are asymmetric because people do not consider equally both what would have happened if Billy had logged out and also what would have happened if Suzy had not logged in. As such, counterfactual saliency might be seen as a type of heuristic that leads to systematically mistaken causal attributions (i.e., a bias) in scenarios like the e-mail case. We do not hold that people’s causal attributions about scenarios like the e-mail case are mistaken. We think they simply follow the dominant usage, which is normatively evaluative. As such, our explanation does not hinge on participants considering one counterfactual rather than another, and we expect participants would tend to arrive at the same judgments if they considered both counterfactuals noted above. In other words, we do not explain the asymmetry in causal ratings in terms of a bias toward one counterfactual, even though we accept that counterfactual reasoning will be involved in normatively assessing each agent’s role in the outcome.

Unfortunately, despite their differences, the counterfactual and responsibility views make the same predictions about a wide range of cases, including many prominent cases from the literature. The reason is that in the typical studies, when an agent contributes to an outcome by
violating an injunctive norm, she is also more responsible for that outcome. However, violations of injunctive norms are not always associated with being responsible for an outcome. And in such cases the two theories plausibly make diverging predictions.

2. The Trolley Problem

In some situations, an agent does the right thing—i.e., acts fully in accord with the relevant moral norms—but nonetheless is more responsible for a negative outcome than if she had done nothing at all. One such case is the switch version of the trolley problem. In the switch case, a runaway trolley is barreling down a track toward five people. An agent stands next to a switch. If the agent flips the switch, the trolley will be diverted onto a sidetrack with one person on it. Hence, the agent is faced with a decision. She can do nothing and allow five people to die, or she can flip the switch so that only the one person on the sidetrack dies. Popular sentiment holds that the agent should flip the switch. In other words, people tend to think that the moral thing for the agent to do—what the agent ought to do—is flip the switch.

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16 The most commonly tested scenarios in the literature are like the e-mail case given above—two agents jointly bring about an outcome with the normative status of the two agents’ behaviors being varied. In such scenarios, when one agent violates an injunctive norm and the other does not, causal ratings are higher for the norm-violating agent. Similarly, causal ratings have been found to be higher for the norm-violating agent compared to a contrasting scenario where neither agent violates a norm. Neither the counterfactual view nor the responsibility view are restricted to explaining scenarios like this, however, but aim to offer a more general explanation of the role of norms in causal attributions. And similar effects have been found for scenarios involving a single principal agent and for scenarios involving more than two agents (e.g., Alicke 1992; Livengood, Sytsma, and Rose 2017; Sytsma forthcoming-a).
17 See Kominsky et al. (2015) and Sytsma (ms-a) for another type of case where the two views make diverging predictions.
18 The trolley problem is typically understood as arising from a comparison between two cases, the switch case and the footbridge case originally given by Thomson (1985), expanding on a scenario from Foot (1978).
19 For instance, in a recent article Williamson (2016, 23) writes that “it is said to be a philosophical intuition that, in the hypothetical scenario, the subject ought to divert the trolley to save five lives at the expense of one,” while Greene (2016, 175) states that it is “a matter of psychological fact” that “people responding to the standard switch case… tend to approve of hitting a switch that will redirect a trolley away from five and onto one.” While many studies in the large empirical literature on judgments about trolley cases ask about whether flipping the switch is “morally permissible” (e.g., Mikhail, 2011; Liao et al., 2012) or “morally acceptable” (e.g., Greene et al., 2009), others ask what the participant would do (e.g., Petrinovich, O’Neill, and Jorgensen, 1993) or what they ought to do (e.g., Bourget and Chalmers, 2014). We return to the question of whether people judge that one morally ought to flip the switch, as opposed to it merely being morally permissible to do so, in Section 4.
Despite being the morally correct action, flipping the switch has a serious, negative consequence: it results in the death of an innocent person. If not for the agent flipping the switch, the person on the sidetrack would not have died. Consequently, we expect that people will be inclined to judge that the agent is at least partially responsible for the resulting death when she flips the switch. In contrast, we expect that people will not see the agent as being comparably responsible for the death of the five when she does not flip the switch. The difference is that while the five were already in harm’s way independently of the agent, the one on the sidetrack is put into harm’s way by the agent’s action. If the agent (through no fault or negligence on her part) had not been present, the five people would have died and the one person would have been safe.

If our judgments about how people will think about the switch version of the trolley problem are accurate, then it is an interesting test case. Both the responsibility and counterfactual views predict an asymmetry in ordinary causal attributions between the variation where the agent flips the switch and the variation where she does not. But the responsibility view predicts that the asymmetry will point in one direction, while the counterfactual view predicts that it will point in the other. Specifically, the responsibility view predicts that people will be more likely to say that the agent caused the outcome when she flips the switch than when she does not flip the switch, but the counterfactual view predicts that people will be less likely to say that the agent caused the outcome when she flips the switch than when she does not flip the switch. Let’s see why.

Start with the counterfactual view. The dominant norm for the agent in this situation would seem to be the moral norm to flip the switch. In thinking about the agent’s situation, the evidence suggests that people will tend to arrive at the judgment that she ought to flip the switch. Hence, in the case where she does not flip the switch, we would expect people to judge that flipping the switch would have been more normal. According to the counterfactual view, they should then be more likely to consider the counterfactual “if the agent had flipped the switch,
then the five workmen would have lived” and to judge that the agent caused those deaths. By contrast, if the agent flips the switch, she is conforming with the norm and people should be less likely to consider the counterfactual “if the agent had not flipped the switch, then the one workman would have lived.” So, the counterfactual view predicts that people will be more likely to say that the agent caused the bad outcome when she refrains (and thereby violates the norm) than when she flips the switch (and thereby conforms to the norm).

The responsibility view makes the opposite prediction: we predict that people will be more likely to say that the agent caused the outcome when she flips the switch than when she does not flip the switch. This prediction follows from the responsibility view when coupled with our guess about how people will judge the agent’s normative responsibility for the outcome in each version of the scenario. On the responsibility view, we expect causal attributions to be similar to judgments of normative responsibility. And in the trolley case, we expect people will find the agent to be more responsible for the outcome when she flips the switch, since the person on the sidetrack was in no danger before the agent intervened. If our expectations about this case are accurate, then the responsibility view predicts that people will be more likely to judge that the agent caused the outcome when she flips the switch than when she does not flip the switch.

3. Testing the Trolley Case

To test the predictions laid out in the previous section, we assessed people’s judgments about two variations on the trolley case—one variation in which the agent flips the switch and one variation in which she refrains from flipping the switch. The vignette for the variation in which the agent flips the switch is given below (again, full probes for all studies are available in the supplemental materials):
A runaway trolley is headed toward five innocent people who are on the track and who will be killed unless something is done. Marcy is too far away to warn the people to get off the track, but she is standing next to a switch that she can flip to redirect the trolley onto a second track. If Marcy flips the switch, the five people on the original track will be saved. However, a bystander is standing on the second track. If Marcy flips the switch, the trolley will hit and kill the bystander.

Marcy flips the switch, redirecting the trolley onto the second track. The trolley hits and kills the bystander, but not the five people.

The vignette for the other variation changes the text in the last two sentences. For each of the vignettes we asked participants about (a) whether the agent acted morally, (b) whether she was responsible for the outcome, and (c) whether she caused the outcome. We used a between-participants design. Each participant was given one of the two vignettes (flip, refrain) and then asked to assess one of the three claims—moral attribution (a), responsibility attribution (b), or causal attribution (c)—using a 7-point Likert scale anchored at 1 with “strongly disagree,” at 4 with “neutral,” and at 7 with “strongly agree.” Responses for Study 3 were collected from 356 participants. Results are shown in Figure 2.

Causal ratings were statistically higher in the flip condition (mean=4.34 with 95% CI of [3.83, 4.85]) than in the refrain condition (mean=2.91 with 95% CI of [2.44, 3.37]). And responsibility ratings (mean=4.50 with 95% CI of [3.99, 5.01]; mean=2.77 with 95% CI of [2.23, 3.30]) were statistically higher than morality ratings (mean=5.08 with 95% CI of [4.68, 5.48]; mean=2.80 with 95% CI of [2.27, 3.33]). Further, causal ratings and responsibility ratings were remarkably similar. This pattern of findings agrees with the predictions of the responsibility view: causal ratings are higher in the flip condition than in the refrain condition, matching the

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20 Participants were 77.0% women, with an average age of 33.7 years, and ranging in age from 16 to 79.
21 t(121.56)=4.16, p<.001, Cohen’s d=0.73 (medium); W=2898, p<.001, Cliff’s delta=0.40 (medium). Ratings in the flip condition are not statistically different from the neutral point: t(55)=1.34, p=0.19; V=546, p=0.23. But ratings for the refrain condition are: t(73)=−4.71, p<.001; V=428, p<.001.
22 Responsibility: t(113.19)=4.72, p<.001, Cohen’s d=0.88 (large); W=2455, p<.001, Cliff’s delta=0.46 (medium). Morality: t(103.19)=4.22, p<.001, Cohen’s d=0.82 (large); W=2016, p<.001, Cliff’s delta=0.44 (medium).
23 Flip: t(113.84)=−0.45, p=0.65, Cohen’s d=−0.083 (negligible); W=1586, p=0.60, Cliff’s delta=−0.056 (negligible). Refrain: t(118.89)=0.39, p=0.70, Cohen’s d=0.069 (negligible); W=2168, p=0.64, Cliff’s delta=0.046 (negligible).
respective responsibility ratings. But the pattern disagrees with the predictions of the counterfactual view. As detailed above, on the counterfactual view we would expect to find an inverse relationship between morality ratings and causal ratings in each condition, resulting in causal ratings being higher in the refrain condition than in the flip condition. As such, the results for the trolley case provide prima facie evidence favoring the responsibility view over the counterfactual view.

**Figure 2:** Results for Study 3

4. Reconsidering the Counterfactual View

The responsibility view offers a simple, direct explanation of the causal ratings in Study 3. By contrast, the most natural predictions for a proponent of the counterfactual view to make do not agree with our observations. Therefore, proponents of the counterfactual view will need to
produce an alternative interpretation or find auxiliary hypotheses that allow them to explain the observed asymmetry in causal ratings.

In this section, we consider four possibilities: first, one might question whether participants’ morality ratings track the relevant normative evaluations; second, one might focus on the difference between acts and omissions as a non-normative factor explaining our results; third, one might argue that there is a normative difference between acting and refraining; and finally, one might note that the outcomes vary between the conditions, with one person dying in the flip condition and five people dying in the refrain condition. We’ll consider each of these possibilities in turn.

4.1 Interpreting the Morality Ratings

We have assumed that when participants gave high ratings to the morality attribution—“Marcy acted morally”—they meant to indicate that Marcy did what she ought to have done and not merely what she was permitted to do. But a proponent of the counterfactual view might argue that participants instead read the attribution in terms of moral permissibility and that judgments about permissibility do not allow us to infer that participants accept the relevant injunctive norm. While it strikes us as decidedly implausible that participants tended to read the morality attribution in this way, we do not think it would matter if they did. The reason is that we not only found that people tended to agree with the attribution in the flip condition, but that they tended to disagree with it in the refrain condition. Let’s assume for the sake of argument that participants did read the morality attribution in terms of moral permissibility. Then it would be plausible to interpret them as tending to hold that it is impermissible to refrain from flipping the switch. And this would seem to establish the norm at issue: the pattern of results indicates that
people tend to hold that Marcy ought to flip the switch, whether we read the morality attribution as intended or in terms of moral permissibility.

4.2 Acts versus Omissions

The counterfactual view does not claim that injunctive norms are the only factors that matter for ordinary causal attributions. As such, proponents might argue that the asymmetry we found in causal ratings for the trolley case are explained by some other factor. Given that some have questioned whether omissions have the same causal status as actions, the most likely response is to note that causal ratings are higher when Marcy acts than when she refrains.\(^\text{24}\) Perhaps our results reflect the fact that people are simply disinclined to treat omissions as causes and that this disinclination overwhelms consideration of injunctive norms in the trolley case.

At first glance, this might not look like a promising response for advocates of the counterfactual view to put forward. After all, it seems that in the refrain condition there is both a relevant counterfactual and a relevant injunctive norm to make it salient. In fact, Henne, Pinillos, and De Brigard (2017, 273) argue that Hitchcock and Knobe’s view predicts that “where omissions violate norms (and there is counterfactual dependence), these will be judged to be causes.” Both of those conditions hold in the refrain condition of the trolley case. And other results in the literature (e.g., Willemsen 2019) also support the prediction that omissions in the trolley case will be judged to be causes.

Recall the variation on the e-mail case that we tested in our first study. Two agents jointly bring about a bad outcome (important e-mails deleted). One agent contributes through a norm-conforming action (logging into the computer system), while the other contributes through a

\(^\text{24}\) For theoretical discussions of causation by omission, see Schaffer (2000); Beebee (2004); Mellor (2004); Lewis (2004); McGrath (2005); Moore (2009); Bernstein (2014). For empirical work, see Livengood and Machery (2007); Wolff, Barbey, and Hausknecht (2010); Clarke et al. (2015); Henne, Pinillos and De Brigard (2017); Bello et al. (2017); Stephan et al. (2017); Khemlani et al. (2018); Willemsen (2019).
norm-violating omission (failing to log out of the computer system). Despite the fact that the norm-violating agent contributed to the outcome via an *omission* while the norm-conforming agent contributed via an *action*, we found a large difference in causal ratings in this case, with participants tending to affirm that the norm-violating agent caused the problem and tending to deny that the norm-conforming agent caused the problem. Further, the results were similar in our second study when both agents contributed via omission.

The results of our first two studies demonstrate both that people are *at least sometimes* willing to attribute causation to agents who fail to do something and that the effect of norms on ordinary causal attributions also *at least sometimes* holds for omissions. In light of such findings, it seems that a compelling explanation of the effect of norms on ordinary causal attributions will need to apply to both actions and omissions. As such, for advocates of the counterfactual view to respond to our results by arguing that they simply reflect a disinclination to treat omissions as causes is not adequate. Advocates of the counterfactual view might argue that while people are *sometimes* willing to treat omissions as causes, they aren’t willing to do so in the trolley case. They would then need to point out some relevant difference between the trolley case and cases where people treat omissions as causes. We do not know what differences between the cases might be called on. Nor do we know what theoretical motivation might be proffered for expecting the two cases to be different. Still, the worry about the act-omission distinction seems salient enough to warrant further testing.

According to the present objection, the asymmetry in causal ratings seen in Study 3 is due to the act-omission distinction. Accepting this, the critic should then predict that the asymmetry will dissipate if we were to focus the vignettes on the shared positive occurrence in each condition—that the agent makes a decision, either the decision to flip the switch or the decision to refrain. To focus attention on the shared positive occurrence, we rewrote the vignettes from
Study 3 to emphasize that the agent (Tom) was faced with a decision. As in our third study, we used a between-participants design with each participant being given one of the two vignettes. In this study, however, every participant assessed the causal attribution.25

We see the same asymmetry in causal ratings as we did in our third study, despite rewriting the vignette to focus on the agent’s decision. Causal ratings were statistically higher when Tom decided to flip the switch (mean=5.28 with a 95% CI of [4.75, 5.80]) than when he decided not to flip the switch (mean=3.30 with a 95% CI of [2.70, 3.90]).26 And both means were statistically different from the neutral point.27 The observed asymmetry is in line with the prediction of the responsibility view, but it runs counter to the prediction of the counterfactual view. Further, the asymmetry did not dissipate relative to what we saw in Study 3. In fact, it deepened: in Study 3 the difference in the means for the causal ratings was 1.43 (4.34 for flip compared to 2.91 for refrain), while the difference in the present study is 1.98 (5.28 for flip compared to 3.30 for refrain).

Figure 3: Results for Study 4

We did not see the asymmetry in causal ratings dissipate in our fourth study relative to our third study, as we would have expected if the act-omission objection were correct. One might

25 Participants were 73.0% women, with an average age of 37.3 years, and ranging in age from 17 to 97.
26 t(105.97)=4.96, p<.001, Cohen’s d=0.95 (large); W=2299, p<.001, Cliff’s delta=0.50 (large).
27 Act: t(57)=4.84, p<.001; V=1033, p<.001. Refrain: t(52)=-2.34, p=0.023; V=294.5, p=0.017.
argue, however, that our results show simply that we didn’t sufficiently redirect attention to the shared positive occurrence. To further direct attention to the shared positive occurrence, we changed the causal statements from our fourth study to ask whether Tom’s decision caused the outcome, while keeping everything else the same. Responses for Study 5 were collected from 110 participants.\textsuperscript{28} Results are shown in Figure 4.

Once again, we see the asymmetry in causal ratings predicted by the responsibility view. Causal ratings were statistically higher when Tom decided to flip the switch (mean=5.34 with a 95\% CI of [4.84, 5.84]) than when he decided to refrain (mean=3.62 with a 95\% CI of [3.06, 4.18]).\textsuperscript{29} And the asymmetry did not dissipate relative to what we saw in Study 3, with the difference in means for the causal ratings (1.72) being similar to what we saw previously (1.98, 1.43).

![Figure 4: Results for Study 5](image)

The results of our fifth study further bolster the case against the objection that the asymmetry in causal attributions between the flip and refrain conditions can be explained away by calling on the act-omission distinction. Focusing attention away from the distinction between acts and omissions, and toward the shared positive occurrence of the agent making a decision,

\textsuperscript{28} Participants were 72.7\% women, with an average age of 37.4 years, and ranging in age from 16 to 80.

\textsuperscript{29} \(t(107.95)=4.59, p<.001\), Cohen’s d=0.86 (large); \(W=2162, p<.001\), Cliff’s delta=0.44 (medium)
did not serve to mitigate the asymmetry in causal ratings. Perhaps we’ve still not done enough to focus attention on the positive occurrence. To further test the objection, in our sixth study we altered the probes to remove the five people from the main track in the flip condition and to remove the person from the sidetrack in the refrain condition. The result is that there is no longer a tradeoff in lives. That is, if Tom had decided to refrain in the flip condition, no one would have died; and, if Tom had decided to flip the switch in the refrain condition, no one would have died. We reasoned that if people are generally unwilling to treat omissions as causes in scenarios like this, then causal ratings in the flip condition should continue to be higher than in the refrain condition. However, that is not what we found.

![Figure 4: Results for Study 6](image)

Responses for Study 6 were collected from 148 participants. Results are shown in Figure 4. Unlike in the previous cases, the mean causal rating in the refrain condition (mean=5.63 with a 95% CI of [5.15, 6.10]) was higher than in the flip condition (mean=5.12 with a 95% CI of [4.53, 5.71]). Further, ratings in the refrain condition were statistically above the neutral point. This indicates that people are in fact willing to treat omissions as causes in

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30 Participants were 60.8% women, with an average age of 40.9 years, and ranging in age from 16 to 82.
31 $t(138.78)=-1.32, p=0.19$, Cohen’s $d=-0.22$ (small); $W=2534, p=0.39$, Cliff’s delta=-0.074 (negligible).
32 Flip: $t(72)=3.79, p<.001; V=1683.5, p=0.0021$. Refrain: $t(74)=6.82, p<.001; V=2080.5, p<.001$. 
trolley cases, just as in the e-mail cases we started with. We conclude that the act-omission distinction does not explain the asymmetry in causal ratings seen in Studies 3, 4, and 5.

### 4.3 Acting is Abnormal

An alternative response is to argue that our original findings for the trolley case are due to people being more likely to think that acting is abnormal, not to people being disinclined to treat omissions as causes, per se. Such a move would harken back to Hitchcock’s (2007) account on which causal attributions depend on specifying default and deviant values for variables in a causal model. In that essay, Hitchcock wrote that “in the case of human actions, we tend to think of those states requiring voluntary bodily motion as deviants and those compatible with lack of motion as defaults” (507). Hitchcock’s (2007) account is readily seen as a precursor to the counterfactual view defended in Hitchcock and Knobe (2009). More recently, Knobe and colleagues (Henne et al. 2019, 158) have pointed out that “existing research suggests that people tend to be especially drawn to consider counterfactuals in which an action is replaced by an inaction rather than counterfactuals in which an inaction is replaced by an action.” As such, advocates of the counterfactual view might try to explain our results by arguing that the counterfactual at issue in the refrain condition will be less likely to be considered than the counterfactual at issue in the flip condition.

Ultimately, we do not believe that this objection fares any better than the general act-omission objection given above. While the imagined response would allow counterfactual relevance to explain our original findings for the trolley case, it would not explain the results in the follow-up studies. First, it would have trouble explaining why causal ratings weren’t higher in the flip condition than in the refrain condition in Study 6. If acting is treated as abnormal enough to overwhelm the effect of the moral norm in the original study, then the counterfactual
view should predict the same type of effect in the last study. But we found just the opposite. Second, if an explanation that treats positive actions as abnormal were correct, then we would expect to see the asymmetry in causal ratings for the trolley case dissipate as we focused attention on the agent’s decision in Studies 4 and 5. But, again, this is not what we found.

4.4 Different Outcomes

Finally, it might be noted that the outcome in the trolley case differs depending on whether the agent flips the switch (the one person on the sidetrack dies) or whether she refrains (the five people on the main track die). And it might then be argued that determining a suitable intervention point depends on which of those outcomes needs to be prevented. The advocate of the counterfactual view might assert that when the agent flips the switch, people will find that the best way to have prevented the outcome of the person on the sidetrack dying would have been for the agent to refrain from flipping the switch. In contrast, when the agent refrains, the advocate of the counterfactual view might assert that people will find that the best way to have prevented the outcome of the five people on the main track dying would have been to instead change something about the trolley. If these assertions are correct, then the counterfactual view would predict that causal ratings would be higher for the agent in the flip condition than in the refrain condition, just as we found.

While this is an interesting response, we do not think it is well-motivated. The main thing to note is that focusing on the separate outcomes in this way does not do justice to the situation described in the trolley case, including the tradeoff facing the agent in making her decision. But comparing the results of Studies 5 and 6 makes clear that people do recognize the dilemma. Doing so, it seems that there are two primary intervention points—an early one (changing something about the trolley) and a late one (changing the agent’s decision). Changing something
about the trolley, such as making it so that it was not out of control in the first place, would not simply prevent the five people on the main track from dying, however, but would remove the threat to them and with it the decision faced by the agent. As such, this intervention would undo either outcome. Changing the agent’s decision, by contrast, would just switch from one outcome to the other.

To explain our pattern of findings, the advocate of the counterfactual view would need to argue that people only latch onto the early intervention point in the refrain condition in the original scenario, while instead latching onto the late intervention point in the flip condition of the original scenario and both conditions in the revised scenario used in Study 6. While this is possible, we do not see a clear theoretical motivation for this prediction. Ultimately, it seems that the counterfactual view should either predict that causal ratings for the agent will be low in both conditions (treating the trolley as the most suitable intervention point to prevent either outcome) or that causal ratings will be higher when the agent refrains than when she acts (treating the agent as the most suitable intervention point to prevent the worse of the two outcomes). But we find neither pattern of results.

5. Conclusion

In this paper, we have described two potential explanations of the fact that injunctive norms matter for ordinary causal attributions and presented new empirical evidence favoring the responsibility view over the counterfactual view. In the switch version of the trolley problem, people judge that the agent ought to flip the switch and yet judge that in doing so she is more responsible for the resulting outcome than if she had refrained. And in line with the prediction given by the responsibility view, but against the predictions of the counterfactual view, people were also more likely to treat the agent as the cause of the outcome when she acted.
We observed in the introduction that metaphysicians working on causation face a dilemma. On the one hand, many philosophers think that accounts of the metaphysics of causation should be informed or constrained by ordinary intuitions, ordinary attributions, ordinary concepts, common sense, or the like. And ordinary attributions are sensitive to injunctive norms. On the other hand, injunctive norms are supposed to be irrelevant to the metaphysics of what causes what. The counterfactual view offers a way out of the dilemma by showing how ordinary causal attributions may be sensitive to injunctive norms without the ordinary, common-sense concept having any normative content. If we are right, however, this way out of the dilemma is blocked.

References


