In philosophical thought experiments, as in ordinary discourse, our understanding of verbal case descriptions is enriched by automatic comprehension inferences. Such inferences have us routinely infer what else is also true of the cases described. We consider how such routine inferences from polysemous words can generate zombie intuitions: intuitions that are ‘killed’ (defeated) by contextual information but kept cognitively alive by the psycholinguistic phenomenon of linguistic salience bias. Extending ‘evidentiary’ experimental philosophy, this paper examines whether the ‘zombie argument’ against materialism is built on zombie intuitions. We examine the hypothesis that contextually defeated stereotypical inferences from the noun ‘zombie’ influence intuitions about ‘philosophical zombies’. We document framing effects (‘zombie’ vs ‘duplicate’) predicted by the hypothesis. Findings undermine intuitions about the conceivablebility of ‘philosophical zombies’ and address the philosophical ‘hard problem of consciousness’. Findings support a deflationary response: The impression that principled obstacles prevent scientific explanation of how physical processes give rise to conscious experience is generated by philosophical arguments that rely on epistemically deficient intuitions.

1. Introduction

Words matter. Sometimes, they matter in ways they should not. We will investigate how logically equivalent formulations in philosophical thought experiments promote different inferences that lead to different judgments about hypothetical cases. ‘Evidential’ experimental philosophy uses the exposure of such ‘framing effects’ to argue against reliance on thought experiments, in philosophy and beyond (for reviews, see Machery, 2017, pp.77-89; Mallon, 2016). We extend this research program to challenge an influential thought experiment that suggests there is a ‘hard problem of consciousness’ – a principled explanatory gap between physical facts and conscious experience that prevents scientific explanations of why and how physical processes give rise to conscious experience (Chalmers, 1996; Levine, 1983). This problem has dominated philosophical discussion of consciousness for more than twenty years.

---

1 Forthcoming in Cognition. For helpful comments on previous drafts, we thank the editor and three anonymous reviewers for Cognition as well as David Chalmers, Rodrigo Diaz, Paul E. Engelhardt, Eyuphan Ozdemir, Kevin Reuter, and audiences at the 3rd Conference of the Experimental Philosophy Group Germany, the Corpus Fortnight of the Australasian Experimental Philosophy Group, and the 94th Joint Session of the Aristotelian Society and Mind Association. Sara Gottlieb and Tony Peressini kindly shared unpublished frequency data with us. Dan Simpsonbeck and Esther Marshall annotated corpora in Study 1C. This research was supported by internal grants from the University of East Anglia and Victoria University of Wellington.
and attracted attention from across cognitive science and from the general public. The problem arises from supposedly widely shared intuitive judgments (Chalmers, 2018). The most fundamental of these judgments are conceivability judgments, in particular judgments concerning the conceivability of ‘philosophical zombies’ (beings that are physico-behaviourally identical to us, but lack conscious experience). We ask whether, and why, these conceivability intuitions are vulnerable to framing effects.

We develop a psycholinguistic account that identifies a previously unrecognised source of framing effects: the linguistic salience bias (Fischer & Engelhardt, 2017; 2019; 2020; Fischer, Engelhardt, & Sytsma, 2020) that affects inferences from words with distinct, but related senses (polysemes) – which account for about 40% of English words (Byrd et al. 1987). Linguistic salience bias generates ‘zombie intuitions’: intuitions that are ‘killed’ (defeated) by contextual information but kept cognitively alive by the bias. We conducted three corpus studies, four surveys, and an experiment to develop and assess the hypothesis that conceivability intuitions about philosophical zombies are zombie intuitions – namely, vulnerable to framing effects that are due to linguistic salience bias. Whereas the mere exposure of framing effects only supports the conclusion that the intuitive judgments at issue are unreliable, explanations invoking salience bias help adjudicate between conflicting judgments.

Our study extends ‘evidential’ experimental philosophy by identifying a previously unrecognised source of framing effects, extending their investigation to conceivability judgments (that are challenging to study experimentally), and demonstrating the usefulness of the approach by debunking conceivability intuitions at the root of a prominent philosophical problem. We now review the ‘hard problem of consciousness’ (Sect. 1.1), the influential ‘zombie argument’ at the root of the problem (Sect. 1.2), and the linguistic salience bias we suggest is implicated in the intuitions on which this argument builds (Sect. 1.3). The findings of our main study (Sect. 2) will challenge the core argument for the existence of the ‘hard
problem’ – and illustrate consequences for the methodology of philosophical thought experiments, quite generally (Sect. 3).

1.1. *The ‘hard problem of consciousness’*

The ‘hard problem of consciousness’ is the problem of explaining ‘why and how … physical processes in the brain give rise to conscious experience’ (Chalmers, 2018, p.6; *cf*. Chalmers, 1996; Nagel, 1974; Levine, 1983). We can distinguish the *scientific* ‘hard problem’ of developing pertinent explanations (review: Wu, 2018) and the *philosophical* ‘hard problem’ of explaining how such explanations are *as much as possible* in the light of philosophical ‘problem intuitions’ which suggest that any scientific explanation is bound to fall short of what is required (Block, 1995; Sytsma 2009).

The most fundamental of these ‘problem intuitions’ are modal intuitions. Modal intuitions assert it is logically possible that physical events which actually co-occur with conscious experiences fail to be accompanied by conscious experiences (in philosophical zombies) or co-occur with different experiences (in inverted-spectrum cases) (Chalmers, 2018, p.12). In the standard dialectic (e.g., Chalmers, 1996, pp.93-108), modal judgments support (i) explanatory and (ii) metaphysical ‘problem intuitions’: (i) If it is possible that certain physical events occur in the absence of conscious experience (in philosophical zombies), then their explanation cannot explain why these events actually go with conscious experience; and (ii) if facts about conscious experience are not logically determined by facts about the physical world, their reductive explanation is impossible, and we cannot identify conscious with physical phenomena (at any rate, not with the standard strategy). Modal intuitions are therefore the most fundamental of the ‘problem intuitions’ that generate the philosophical ‘hard problem’. While labelled ‘intuitions’, modal judgments are, in turn, defended by so-called ‘conceivability arguments’ that proceed from intuitions about the conceivability of philosophical zombies (or inverted spectra). These conceivability intuitions
constitute the ultimate intuitive foundation of the philosophical ‘hard problem’.

The hard problem can be rendered empirically more tractable by considering why thinkers think there is a hard problem (or why they think it is so hard), if in fact they do. This question (frequently called the ‘meta-problem of consciousness’) calls for an explanation of the relevant problem intuitions, in ‘topic-neutral’ terms that do not invoke phenomenal consciousness (Chalmers, 2018, p.16). Debunking explanations of problem intuitions, which reveal we have no warrant to accept them, will help ‘dissolve’ the philosophical hard problem, namely, help show that we have no right to believe there are principled obstacles to scientific explanations of why and how physical processes give rise to conscious experience. We target conceivability intuitions about philosophical zombies (Sect. 1.2) and develop a ‘topic-neutral’ psycholinguistic explanation to debunk these intuitions (Sects. 1.3-1.4).

1.2. The zombie argument

The zombie argument invokes conceivability intuitions to argue for the logical possibility of ‘philosophical zombies’ (see Kirk, 2019, for a review). The physical facts about such a ‘zombie’ are just the same as those about an actual human being: The zombie’s body, including its brain, is physically indistinguishable from the human’s, molecule for molecule. The same functionally characterised psychological states are realised in both creatures and produce the same outputs or effects for the same inputs. Accordingly, the zombie’s physical behaviour is exactly the same as the human’s. But, unlike the human, the zombie lacks conscious experience – there is nothing it is like to be the zombie, and ‘all is dark inside’. This scenario is meant to be logically possible – regardless of whether it is consistent with laws of nature (or ‘nomologically possible’).

Conceivability arguments infer logical possibility from conceivability (e.g., Descartes, 1641; Locke, 1700/1979; Jackson, 1982; Kripke 1972/1980). The zombie argument (Chalmers, 1996) assumes that philosophical zombies are conceivable. The simplest version
starts out from the conceivability intuition that ‘It is conceivable that biological beings with bodies like ours behave just like us and yet do not enjoy any conscious experience.’ It further assumes that what is conceivable is logically possible. It infers from these two assumptions that philosophical zombies are logically possible. Both assumptions are controversial. We will empirically examine the conceivability intuition in the first assumption (criticized by, among others, Dennett, 1995; Kirk, 2008; Marcus, 2004; Thomas, 1998; cf. Woodling, 2014).

Different versions of the argument employ different notions of conceivability. Stronger notions of conceivability make the conceivability assumption more controversial but the inference from conceivability to possibility more compelling (Kirk, 2019). In response to this challenge, the argument’s chief proponent, Chalmers (2002; 2010), elaborated epistemic notions of conceivability potentially strong enough to license the inference to logical possibility: A proposition or statement S is epistemically conceivable when it is conceivable that S is actually the case, for all we know a priori (Chalmers, 2002, p.157). Such conceivability can be negative or positive. The latter is the better guide to possibility (Chalmers 2002, p.160):

S is positively conceivable for a thinker when the thinker ‘can imagine a coherent situation that verifies S, where a situation verifies S when, under the hypothesis that the situation actually obtains, the [thinker] should conclude that S’ (Chalmers, 2010, p.146).

According to Chalmers, conceivability needs to be established in two stages (Chalmers, 2002, pp.147-148): First, a thinker intuitively judges that a statement S passes the relevant test for conceivability, and reflectively endorses this judgment. For positive conceivability, this means conducting what we will call the

POSCON TEST: A thinker tries to imagine a situation that verifies S, hypothetically assumes that this situation is actual (rather than counterfactual), and intuitively assesses whether it follows from that assumption that S is the case (cf. Chalmers, 2002, pp.157-158).
For example, the thinker tries to imagine a ‘zombie scenario’ and assesses whether, if the scenario is actual, it will be the case that there are biological beings with bodies like ours, who behave just like us, but do not enjoy any conscious experience. This test yields intuitions about whether the imagined situation verifies the target statement (‘There are biological beings…’). S is ‘*prima facie* conceivable’ if and only if the verification intuitions are positive and are reflectively endorsed. Such reflectively endorsed intuitions provide defeasible evidence for genuine conceivability. In a second stage, theorists examine and exclude potential defeaters. These include philosophical arguments that question the apparent coherence or imaginability of the relevant situation (Chalmers, 2010, pp.154-155) – and debunking explanations of the initial verification intuition.

In a classic survey of professional philosophers’ beliefs, Bourget and Chalmers (2014) used agreement ratings to determine whether philosophers believe that philosophical zombies are conceivable: 16% of respondents judged philosophical zombies inconceivable, about 60% deemed them conceivable. (The remainder declared themselves agnostic or unfamiliar with the literature or found the question too unclear.) While it is unclear how many respondents (if any) rehearsed the POSCON test, these findings provide initial evidence that philosophical zombies are prima facie conceivable for academic philosophers. We now build up to a debunking explanation of conceivability assessments that stands to defeat any evidence provided by verification intuitions or agreement with conceivability claims.

### 1.3. Linguistic salience bias

To meet specific research needs, philosophers often give new senses to words that already have well-established uses in ordinary discourse. The zombie argument introduces a new sense of ‘zombie’, now recognised by the *Oxford Dictionary:* As Chalmers explains, the argument applies the word to beings that are identical with us in every physical and

---

behavioural respect, ‘quite unlike the zombies to be found in Hollywood movies’ (Chalmers, 1996, p.95). The new sense’s explanation thus explicitly cancels various implications from the word’s dominant ‘Hollywood’ sense (e.g., that the ‘zombies’ have rotting bodies, lifeless faces, etc.). But established habits of thought may make it difficult to apply new explanations consistently. Dennett (1995, p.322) suggested that ‘when philosophers claim that zombies [in their new sense] are conceivable, they invariably underestimate the task of conception (or imagination), and end up imagining something that violates their own definition.’ We will develop and experimentally test a psycholinguistic explanation that lets us understand when and why competent thinkers fail to abide by their own definition of ‘zombie’.

When people hear or read utterances, they immediately deploy knowledge about the world, to interpret the utterances (Elman, 2009; 2011). Stereotypes are implicit knowledge structures in semantic memory that encode information about statistical regularities observed in the physical or discourse environment (McRae & Jones, 2013). Stereotypes can be associated with individual nouns and verbs (and are then also known as ‘prototypes’ or ‘situation schemas’, respectively). As traditionally conceived, such stereotypes represent clusters of weighted features that come to mind first when we encounter those words and are diagnostic or predictive of the relevant categories (Hampton, 2006). As evidenced by priming experiments (review: Lucas, 2000), single words (‘tomato’) activate stereotypical features (red) rapidly (within 250ms) (review: Engelhardt & Ferreira, 2016). Nouns and verbs together (‘The mechanic checked…’) can swiftly activate complex stereotypes that encode information about recurrent situations (car inspections) and are not activated by individual words on their own (Bicknell et al., 2010; Matsuki et al., 2011).

Activated stereotypes support automatic stereotypical inferences to attributions of stereotypical features (the tomato talked about is red). In co-operative communication (Grice 1989), such defeasible inferences are made by hearers and anticipated by speakers (Levinson 2000; cf. Garrett & Harnish 2007): Speakers typically skip mention of stereotypical features
but make deviations from stereotypes explicit (‘the green tomato’). In the absence of such explicit indications to the contrary, hearers assume the situation talked about conforms to the relevant stereotypes, treating the most specific stereotypes activated (say, about car inspections) as the most relevant. Stereotypical inferences that clash with contextual information or background knowledge can be suppressed within one second (Fischer & Engelhardt, 2017; cf. Faust & Gernsbacher, 1996). Less dramatically, initial activation simply decays in the absence of contextual support (Oden & Spira, 1983). Together with the rapid deployment of the most specific stereotypes, these mechanisms ensure that stereotypical inferences are highly context-sensitive, and that contextually inappropriate inferences hinder comprehension and further reasoning only rarely.

A complication arises, however, from the way many polysemous words are processed (for reviews, see Eddington & Tokowicz, 2015; Vicente, 2018). In general, polysemes activate a unitary representation of semantic information that is deployed to interpret utterances which use the word in different senses (Maegregor, Bouwsema, & Klepousniotou, 2015; Pylkkänen, Llinás, & Murphy, 2006). The findings about how words cue world knowledge for rapid deployment in utterance interpretation (see above) suggest a unitary representation is typically built around stereotypical features associated with the word. Different senses can sometimes be generated by rules (as in metonymy) and sometimes not (as in metaphor). In the latter case, of ‘irregular polysemy’, the unitary representation consists in overlapping clusters of semantic features (Brocher, Foraker, & Koenig, 2016; Klepousniotou et al., 2012), and may include overlapping stereotypes.

For example, the dominant sense of ‘zombie’ is made up of the features that contribute to the ‘Hollywood’ stereotype. This includes the typical features (I) attacks and eats humans, rotting body, and infected as well as (II) reanimated, lacks free will, and lifeless face, (III) dead inside, move slowly, and dumb (see Appendixes A-B) and lacks conscious experience (Appendix D). One subordinate sense is associated with the partially overlapping ‘voodoo’
stereotype. This excludes (I) but includes features from (II) and (III) and adds features *is under a magic spell* and *under others’ control*. Another subordinate sense, the metaphorical sense (‘Before my morning coffee, I am a zombie’), is not associated with a distinct stereotype but shares features (III) with the dominant sense.

The verbal stimulus activates the features shared by related senses quickly and strongly, regardless of context, while the activation of unshared features is a function of their relative exposure frequency (Brocher et al., 2018): The more often the language user encounters the word in one sense, rather than another, the more strongly the (unshared) features associated with (only) that sense are activated, when the user encounters the word. This baseline activation may be boosted by context (ibid.). Another factor determining strength of activation is prototypicality: Features deemed to make for particularly good examples of the relevant category (say, ‘zombie’) are activated more rapidly and strongly (Hampton, 2006). Strength of activation thus depends on *linguistic ‘salience’*. Unlike the contextual salience involved in familiar salience biases (see Taylor & Fiske, 1978, for a classical review), this is not a contextual magnitude, but a function of relative exposure frequency over time and prototypicality (Giora, 2003).

Due to those processing properties of irregular polysemes, pronounced salience imbalances between their dominant and subordinate senses give rise to bad inferences. When the dominant sense of an irregular polyseme is far more salient than its other senses, the features strongly associated with the dominant sense will be strongly activated by the verbal stimulus, regardless of context. Where the word is used in a subordinate sense which shares some, but not all, of these frequently co-instantiated features with the dominant sense, appropriate interpretation of utterances which use the subordinate sense will require suppression of some of these features, while retaining some others (*cf.* Giora’s (2003) Retention/Suppression Hypothesis). To interpret philosophical uses of ‘zombie’ (which speak of ‘zombies’ that behave like you and me, and have bodies like ours, but lack conscious
experience), we need to suppress stereotypical features including *attacks and eats humans*, and *has a rotting body*, while retaining the feature *lacks conscious experience*. But frequently co-occurring component features of an activated stereotype exchange lateral cross-activation (Hare et al., 2009; McRae et. al., 2005). Where such cross-activation of contextually irrelevant components complements their initial strong activation due to salience, their complete suppression is impossible. Merely partially suppressed features continue to support inferences – e.g., from ‘Fred is my zombie twin’ to *Fred attacks humans*.

This creates a *linguistic salience bias* (Fischer & Engelhardt, 2019; 2020): When

(i) one sense of an irregular polyseme is much more salient than all others,

(ii) interpretation of utterances using a subordinate sense requires suppression of features associated with that dominant sense, and

(iii) some, but not all, of the features strongly associated with the dominant sense are contextually relevant

then

(1) contextually cancelled stereotypical inferences supported by the dominant sense will be triggered by the subordinate use as well, and

(2) these automatic inferences will influence further judgment and reasoning.

In a nutshell: When encountering unbalanced irregular polysemes whose interpretation involves suppression, thinkers are liable to be swept along by stereotypical inferences, even when these are defeated by the context. Contextually inappropriate but persistent inferences predicted by linguistic salience bias have been documented by studies combining eye tracking (measurements of pupil dilations and reading times) and plausibility ratings (Fischer & Engelhardt 2017; 2019; 2020; Fischer, Engelhardt, & Sytsma, 2020).

### 1.4. Hypotheses and preliminary studies

We suggest that linguistic salience bias provides a (debunking) explanation of conceivability
judgments about philosophical zombies: Automatic comprehension inferences shape our verdicts about verbally described cases: they routinely have us infer what else is also true of the cases described. Such defeasible inferences are then integrated (as ‘inferred content’; cf. Machery, 2017, p.13) into the situation model, i.e., the mental representation of the situation talked about, on which further judgment and reasoning about the situation are based (Zwaan, 2016). In this way, defeasible pragmatic inferences, including stereotypical inferences (Levinson, 2000), shape philosophical thought experiments (Saint-Germier, 2021) and arguments (Fischer et al., 2021). Three corpus studies, four surveys, and an experiment examined the suggestion that philosophical uses of the irregular polyseme ‘zombie’ are affected by linguistic salience bias and trigger contextually inappropriate but persistent stereotypical inferences that influence judgments about the conceivability of philosophical zombies.

Preliminary studies (reported in Appendices A-E) established that the three conditions that jointly give rise to the salience bias – (i) to (iii) above – are all met by the word ‘zombie’ and subordinate senses including its philosophical sense. Three corpus studies (see Appendix A) confirmed that, as per condition (i), the ‘Hollywood’ sense of zombie is far more salient than all other senses (accounting, e.g. for over 80% of occurrences in a random sample from the Corpus of Contemporary American English). A typicality rating task (see Appendix B) elicited features stereotypically associated with the dominant sense of ‘zombie’, and confirmed that these include several broadly physical and behavioural features (rotting bodies, lifeless face, etc.), which are cancelled by explanations of the philosophical sense which require that zombies be physico-behaviourally indistinguishable from normal humans. Hence the intended interpretation of philosophical uses of ‘zombie’ requires suppression of those cancelled features, as per condition (ii). A plausibility rating task (see Appendix C) provided evidence that when imaginary beings are characterised as ‘zombies’ people infer these beings lack conscious experience. Two typicality rating studies (reported in Appendices D and E) used
positive and negative consciousness attributions, respectively, to provide evidence that the stereotypes associated with the dominant sense of ‘zombie’ includes the feature lacks conscious experience. This feature is also relevant for the philosophical sense, as per condition (iii). Thus, philosophical uses of ‘zombie’ meet all conditions for linguistic salience bias. We therefore hypothesise that this bias extends to these uses. In other words:

**H1** Competent language users make contextually cancelled stereotypical inferences from philosophical uses of ‘zombie’ and these influence their judgment and reasoning about philosophical ‘zombies’.

This hypothesis requires experimental investigation: Our plausibility rating task (Appendix C) revealed that people automatically infer possession of conscious experience from the information that the beings at issue are physico-behaviourally indistinguishable from ‘normal’ humans (cf. Arico et al., 2011, on inferences from specific behavioral cues). Explanations of the philosophical sense of ‘zombie’ that convey this information will therefore be perceived as cancelling the stereotypical feature lacks conscious experience. This means that a tension is built into the philosophical sense of ‘zombie’, from the start, as the stereotypical feature lacks conscious experience is both contextually relevant and cancelled. Arguably, a similar tension is built into the dominant ‘Hollywood’ sense: Both lacks conscious experience and feels hungry are deemed typical of zombies (Appendices B and E), even though the latter would seem to imply conscious experience. This situation – where a stereotypical feature simultaneously is contextually relevant and cancelled (or inconsistent with another contextually relevant feature) – has not been experimentally investigated before.

**H1** suggests a debunking explanation of the targeted conceivability intuitions: Linguistic salience bias will tip the balance of activation in favor of the stereotypical feature (lacks conscious experience), against the information implied by the cancelling context. This means that if linguistic salience bias applies to ‘zombie’, it will affect how thinkers assess the
positive conceivability of philosophical zombies, with Chalmers’s POSCON test (see above, Sect. 1.2): The zombie argument invites us to try to imagine a situation in which scientists, evolution, or Divine intervention have created ‘zombies’ that possess bodies like ours and behave like us (\(=P\)) but have no conscious experience (\(=\neg Q\)). To assess whether philosophical zombies are prima facie positively conceivable, thinkers should assume that the imagined scenario is actual, and consider whether the relevant statement ‘\(P\&\neg Q\)’ follows from this assumption, so that the imagined situation verifies that statement. As we just noted, people make spontaneous inferences from ‘\(P\)’ to possesses conscious experience (‘\(Q\)’) and will normally take a situation that verifies ‘\(P\)’ to verify ‘\(Q\)’, rather than ‘\(\neg Q\)’. But if salience bias tips the balance of activation in favour of the stereotypical zombie feature ‘\(\neg Q\)’, against the information ‘\(Q\)’ implied by ‘\(P\)’, competent language users will be more willing to accept the situation imagined as verifying both ‘\(P\)’ and ‘\(\neg Q\)’, and hence ‘\(P\&\neg Q\)’. Linguistic salience bias will thus promote intuitive verification judgments that provide defeasible evidence for the conceivability of philosophical zombies. To put it more succinctly, in Chalmers’s (2002, p.147) terms:

\[H2\] Linguistic salience bias contributes to rendering philosophical zombies prima facie conceivable.

The finding that the relevant verification judgments are largely due to this bias – and are rarely made when verbal prompts do not give rise to the bias – would undermine their status as evidence of conceivability.

2. Experiment

Our main study examined \(H1\) and \(H2\) and measured the prevalence of conceivability intuitions.
2.1 Predictions

Our hypotheses predict framing effects: In the philosophical sense, ‘zombie’ is logically equivalent to ‘duplicate that is physico-behaviourally indistinguishable but lacks conscious experience’. But ‘duplicate’ lacks the stereotypical associations of ‘zombie’ that are cancelled by the requirement of physico-behavioural indistinguishability. **H1** predicts that when vignettes describe imaginary beings as ‘zombies’, rather than as ‘duplicates’, participants will be more inclined to accept attributions of typical zombie properties that are cancelled by that requirement. Similarly, **H2** predicts that when participants assess the conceivability of beings that are physico-behaviourally indistinguishable from us but lack conscious experience, these beings will prove *prima facie* conceivable for more participants when described as ‘zombies’, rather than as ‘duplicates’. The most straightforward approach would test this prediction by presenting participants with differently phrased zombie scenarios and asking them to judge the conceivability of the imagined beings (‘zombies’ or ‘duplicates’). However, laypeople may not possess or deploy the relevant concept of conceivability.

A *pre-study* examined this possibility (see Appendix F). To qualify as the genuine article, conceivability judgments need to show a strong negative correlation with judgments of contradictoriness: The more clearly contradictory a scenario is, the less conceivable it is. The pre-study therefore presented participants with a philosophical zombie scenario that used the phrase ‘duplicate’ (to avoid further complications) and elicited agreement ratings for judgments of conceivability and contradictoriness. The study revealed there was no significant negative correlation (not even trending towards significance). Over a third of participants declared themselves agnostic (‘neutral’) about the scenario’s conceivability or its contradictoriness. A quarter declared themselves agnostic about both. A further quarter either agreed or disagreed with both questions (found the scenario both contradictory and conceivable or both non-contradictory and inconceivable). Clearly, laypeople are not sufficiently proficient with the relevant notions to make the elicitation of explicit judgments
of conceivability – or contradictoriness (essential to negative conceivability) – a useful format for studying conceivability.

We therefore implement Chalmers’s POSCON test (Sect. 1.2) to assess prima facie positive conceivability: Our participants read a vignette that uses either the word ‘zombie’ or ‘duplicate’ in inviting them to imagine the creation of beings that are physico-behaviourally indistinguishable from us (\(=P\)) but where ‘all is dark inside’ (\(=\neg Q\)). The vignette thus seeks to prompt participants to imagine philosophical zombies (if they can). The vignette places the scenario in the future of the actual world and encourages participants to consider the scenario they imagine as actual. A subsequent agreement rating task then elicits judgments about what will be true if that scenario is actual, and thus tests to what extent participants take the scenario they imagine to verify attributions of lack of consciousness as well as attributions of typical and atypical zombie properties. Agreement ratings thus provide evidence that the beings they imagine fit descriptions including ‘\(P \& \neg Q\)’ and qualify as philosophical zombies. In this setting, the hypothesis \(H1\), that salience bias extends to philosophical uses of ‘zombie’, makes a prediction about mean agreement ratings for typical zombie features that are cancelled by the requirement of physico-behavioural indistinguishability and about mean ratings for features consistent with the requirement but atypical for zombies:

\[\text{Prediction 1}\] Participants will agree more strongly with attributions of typical zombie features (like T1-T3 below) and agree less strongly with attributions of atypical features (like A1-A3 and A-D below), in the Zombie than the Duplicate condition.

The hypothesis \(H2\), that salience bias promotes positive verification judgments, concerns a binary choice (agreement vs non-agreement with judgments), rather than strength of agreement. \(H2\) therefore yields a prediction about proportions (rather than means): more participants in the Zombie than the Duplicate condition will accept the imagined situation as verifying both ‘\(P\)’ and ‘\(\neg Q\)’, where agreement with ‘\(\neg Q\)’ materialises as disagreement with
consciousness attributions. I.e.:

**Prediction 2**: More participants will simultaneously (i) agree that the imagined beings are physico-behaviourally indistinguishable from normal humans and (ii) disagree with consciousness attributions (like A-D below), in the Zombie than the Duplicate condition.

2.2. Methods

**Participants**: Participants were recruited through advertising on Google for a free personality test, which was administered after the main task. While there are notable benefits to employing such a ‘push strategy’ (see Appendix B), attention tends to be lower than with paid participants (Haug, 2018). We therefore employed an attention check in addition to comprehension checks conceptually required by our research questions (see below). Participants were restricted to native English-speakers raised in North America, 16 years of age or older, with at most minimal training in philosophy. 638 participants met these restrictions. 28.5% of these participants failed the attention check. A further 38.3% failed at least one of the demanding comprehension checks. This left 247 participants.3 Though substantive, the exclusions did not affect key findings (see Appendix G).

**Materials**: Each participant read the following vignette, using either the word ‘zombie’ or ‘duplicate’:

Imagine that in the future scientists are able to exactly scan a person’s body, including their brain, at the molecular level. Using this information, they can then create an exact physical duplicate of that person’s body and brain, molecule by molecule. The resulting [‘zombie’/duplicate] will have a body and brain just like the original person’s. The [zombie/duplicate] will also behave just like that person.

3 These participants were 73.3% women (1 non-binary), mean age 42.2 years (16-84 years).
But, when it comes to the [zombie/duplicate], all is dark inside.

Imagine that scientists successfully scan and duplicate an average person in this way. What, if anything, do you think the resulting [zombie/duplicate] would be like?

The vignette includes a literal statement of Chalmers’s proposition P and employs a familiar metaphor to state ~Q. P is stated by ‘The resulting [‘zombie’/duplicate] will have a body and brain just like the original person’s. The [zombie/duplicate] will also behave just like that person.’ Scare quotes around the first occurrence of ‘zombie’ indicate the word is used here in a special sense, as a synonym of ‘exact physical duplicate’ in the previous sentence. This implicitly cancels all assumptions of similarity between these ‘zombies’ and Hollywood zombies. ~Q is stated by the final sentence ‘… all is dark inside.’

The metaphorical formulation (also used by Chalmers, 1996, p.96) was chosen because subsequent items will ask participants to rate attributions of conscious experience (A-D below). Including in the vignette direct negations of these statements would have invited responses based on shallow processing (Ferreira, Bailey, & Ferraro, 2002; Sanford et al., 2006), i.e., without attempting to integrate information from different parts of the vignette. This would have created the risk of subsequent responses to consciousness attributions being based only on statements of ~Q and failing to take into account the information about physico-behavioural indistinguishability (P). This would have prevented us from interpreting responses as evidence for or against H2. The metaphorical formulation promotes deeper cognitive engagement with the vignette and facilitates responses to items that take into account all relevant information. This allows us to interpret subsequent responses to consciousness attributions as relevant to H2 (see Sects. 3.1 and 3.4 for further discussion).

Participants rated agreement with statements using a 7-point scale (anchored at 1 with ‘totally disagree’, at 4 with ‘neither agree nor disagree’, and at 7 with ‘totally agree’).
Statements included four attributions of consciousness:

A The [zombie/duplicate] would be capable of having conscious experiences.
B The [zombie/duplicate] would have an inner mental life, including feelings and emotions.
C The [zombie/duplicate] would sentient and experience its surroundings and sensations.
D There is something it would feel like to be the [zombie/duplicate].

In addition, participants rated three statements attributing clusters of typical zombie features (T1-T3) and three statements attributing clusters of atypical zombie features (A1-A3), obtained through a prior typicality rating study (see Appendix B):

T1 The [zombie/duplicate] would have a rotting body and attack and eat humans.
T2 The [zombie/duplicate] would move slowly and have a lifeless face.
T3 The [zombie/duplicate] would lack free will and feel no joy.
A1 The [zombie/duplicate] would be capable of being sad and feeling hate.
A2 The [zombie/duplicate] would think and be intelligent.
A3 The [zombie/duplicate] would be capable of being happy, singing, smelling flowers, and feeling love.

T1 and T2 are clearly cancelled by the vignette’s statement of physico-behavioral indistinguishability (P), T3 arguably so.

*Design and procedure:* Participants were administered demographic questions, the rating task, and a ‘big five’ personality test, in this order. Demographic questions included questions concerning educational attainment (highest level completed), level of education in relevant subjects of study (philosophy, psychology and the brain sciences, natural sciences), and religiosity (participation with an organized religion). In the main task, we manipulated a single variable (*term*) with two levels (‘zombie’ vs ‘duplicate’), between subjects. Nine items (T1-T3, A1-A3, consciousness attributions A-C) and an attention check were presented below
the vignette on the same page, giving participants the opportunity to consult the vignette before answering. Items were presented in random order. To identify those participants who responded in awareness of the contextual information ‘P’ that cancels several stereotypical inferences from ‘zombie’, we added a second page with two comprehension checks:

1. According to the story, the [zombie/duplicate] has a brain just like the original person.
2. According to the story the [zombie/duplicate] behaves differently from the original person.

The vignette was not repeated, and participants were unable to return to the previous page. (This and the fact that (1) requires agreement and (2) disagreement rendered these checks quite demanding.) Since preliminary studies had provided evidence that participants found the ‘Nagelian’ item D even harder to understand when presented side-by-side with A-C (see Appendix D, esp. Fn.25), we presented this item separately, on the second page. The three items on page two were presented in random order.

To study whether people make contextually cancelled stereotypical inferences that influence further cognition, we need to ensure that participants are aware of the relevant contextual information – here ‘P’ (the imagined beings have bodies like the original person and behave like that person). Where this information clashes with persistent stereotypical inferences, it may be taken into account through suspension of judgment: In response to the subsequent comprehension questions, participants may choose to neither agree nor disagree that the beings have bodies like ordinary humans or behave like us (rating ‘4’). By contrast, incorrect disagreement (‘1’-‘3’) with comprehension check (1) and incorrect agreement (‘5’-‘7’) with check (2) manifest lack of awareness of ‘P’. We therefore excluded from the analysis participants who failed the attention check, disagreed with the first comprehension check, or agreed with the second. Exclusions left 122 and 125 participants, respectively, in the Zombie and Duplicate conditions.
Figure 1. Results for Main Study with means followed by standard deviations below the bar graphs, for zombie (Z) and duplicate (D) conditions; bar graphs showing 95% confidence intervals. Histograms above each bar graph show the frequency distributions of responses across participants for each condition.

2.3. Results and discussion

Findings are presented in Figure 1. Our hypotheses predict an effect of term (‘zombie’ vs ‘duplicate’) for each of our three types of cluster (typical=T1-T3, atypical=A1-A3, consciousness=A-D). We therefore first conducted a two-way mixed ANOVA with term as a between-subjects factor and cluster as a within-subjects factor, controlling for variation between participants across the ten items. Responses to T1-T3 were reverse coded, so that all items were treated as attributing properties atypical of zombies, as per previous typicality ratings. This analysis revealed the predicted main effect of term $F(1,245)=16.61$, $p<.001$, $\eta^2=.028$ and a main effect of cluster $F(2,2219)=52.326$, $p<.001$, $\eta^2=.025$. 
To examine H1 in more detail, follow-up analyses considered item categories individually. These analyses confirmed the predicted effect of term for typical items $F(1,245)=8.478, p=.0039$, $\eta^2=.017$ and atypical items $F(1,245)=12.29, p<.001$, $\eta^2=.033$ (see Appendix G2 for more detail). Next, we examined the consciousness items (A-D). On their intended interpretation, all these items entail possession of conscious experience. Findings from preliminary studies had suggested that participants do not give the intended interpretation to D and had us place this item on page two. We therefore first examined responses to A-C, on page one. To determine whether our participants treated these items similarly, a one-way repeated-measures ANOVA examined ratings for them in the zombie and the duplicate condition separately. There was no effect of item, in either condition (zombie: $F(2,242)=2.187$, $p=.12$, $\eta^2=.005$; duplicate: $F(2,248)=.043$, $p=.96$, $\eta^2=.000$). A follow-up reliability analysis carried out on A-C revealed a high Cronbach’s alpha ($\alpha=0.83$). These findings confirm that participants treated items A-C similarly. We therefore summed the responses. As predicted, a Welch’s t-test revealed that ratings were significantly higher in the duplicate condition than in the zombie condition and the effect size was medium $t(243.41)=3.92$, $p<.001$, $d=.50$, one-tailed. Finally, we even found an effect of term for the remaining Nagelian item D $t(244.5)=2.07$, $p=.020$, $d=.26$, despite evidence that many participants failed to understand this item as intended or at all.\(^4\) Indeed, the term manipulation made a categorial difference to consciousness attributions: While the crucial items A-C were deemed distinctly plausible (mean ratings A-C significantly above ‘4’) in the duplicate condition $t(124)=7.13$, $p<.001$, $d=.64$, two-tailed, they dropped to ‘neutral’ in the zombie condition $t(121)=1.30$, $p=.20$, $d=.12$, two-tailed.

\(^4\) As in previous typicality rating studies (Appendices D and E), we observed marked spikes of neutral ‘4’ ratings for D, from participants who agreed with A-C, which entail D on its intended Nagelian interpretation. Moreover, including D with A-C in a one-way repeated-measures ANOVA similar to the above, we found an effect of item for both conditions (zombie: $F(3,363)=3.003$, $p=.030$, $\eta^2=.011$; duplicate: $F(3,372)=8.049$, $p<.001$, $\eta^2=.029$) not observed for A-C alone.
Finally, the high internal consistency of consciousness items observed across different studies\(^5\) motivated the follow-up question of whether these items capture an underlying folk conception of conscious experience. To address this question, we conducted a latent variable exploratory factor analysis using ordinary least squares to find the minimum residual solution for responses to items A-D. Both parallel analysis and the number of eigenvalues greater than 1 (2.30, 0.96, 0.39, 0.35) indicated a single factor. Factor loadings were high for A-C (0.78, 0.83, 0.77), but low for D (0.17). This indicates that A-C are indeed capturing an underlying latent variable and further justifies our focus on these items in the above analysis.

Present findings confirm *Prediction 1*: Even though relevant stereotypical implications were cancelled by contextual information, attributions of typical zombie properties were accepted more strongly in the Zombie than the Duplicate condition, while attributions of atypical zombie properties, including attributions of conscious experience, were accepted less in the zombie condition. The observed framing effect provides evidence that linguistic salience bias extends to ‘zombie’.

To assess to what extent this bias affects the prima facie positive conceivability of philosophical zombies (as per *H2*), we further restricted our sample and turned from means to frequencies. On Chalmers’s approach, philosophical zombies are thus conceivable by participants if and only if participants take a situation they imagine to verify the crucial statements ‘P’ and ‘~Q’ (Sec.1.2). Participants in our study thus need to assume that the beings imagined are physico-behaviourally indistinguishable from normal humans (‘P’). This means that to assess *H2* we need to work with even stricter restrictions than in the study of salience bias: To study whether people make contextually cancelled stereotypical inferences that influence further cognition, we ‘merely’ had to ensure that participants take into account

---

\(^5\) These are the two typicality rating studies using A-D and negative counterparts, respectively, reported in Appendices D and E, and the main study. Cronbach’s alpha for items A-C: \(\alpha=0.76\) in first typicality study, \(\alpha=0.83\) in main study; for negative counterparts: \(\alpha=0.73\). For items A-D: \(\alpha=0.72\) in first typicality study, \(\alpha=0.73\); for counterparts: \(\alpha=0.74\).
the relevant contextual information. In our experiment, such awareness of the relevant information ‘P’ was consistent with suspension of judgment on our two comprehension-check items (see Sec. 2.2). To conceive of philosophical zombies, however, participants need to agree that these beings have bodies like ordinary people and disagree that their behaviour differs. We therefore further restricted attention to those 188 participants who gave these responses (‘5’-‘7’ and ‘1’-‘3’, respectively) to our two comprehension-check items (rather than ‘4’-‘7’ and ‘1’-‘4’, as before). These participants further need to judge that the imagined scenario verifies the statement (‘~Q’) that the imagined beings lack conscious experience. In our experimental set-up, this verification judgment translates into disagreement with A-D (or at any rate A-C, given the intelligibility issue concerning D). We therefore determined the proportion of these participants (N=188) that disagreed with consciousness attributions A-D (rated them ‘1’-‘3’) in the zombie and the duplicate condition, respectively. Findings are reported in Table 1 (below).

Depending upon the formulation (A-D) used, philosophical zombies seem prima facie conceivable, on Chalmers’s approach (the POSCON test), for roughly 30-40% of our participants – when the imagined beings are called ‘zombies’. Crucially, this figure drops notably, when these beings are described as ‘duplicates’ – to roughly 15-20% of participants. As predicted by H2, the wording thus makes a significant difference to participants’ verification judgments (see χ²-tests for A-C in Table 1). When readily intelligible formulations are used, 38.1% (A), 49.7% (B), and 49.4% (C) of the disagreement with the attribution of conscious experience elicited in the zombie condition disappears in the duplicate condition; calling duplicates ‘zombies’ makes it almost twice as likely (1.62 times for A, 1.99 times for B, and 1.97 times for C) that people will judge that imagined duplicates lack consciousness (and verify both ‘P’ and ‘~Q’), when invited to imagine philosophical zombies (physico-behavioural duplicates where ‘all is dark inside’). This provides evidence that the framing effect observed in previous analyses affects the verification judgments that
provide defeasible evidence for the conceivability of philosophical zombies.

**Table 1.** Percentages of participants disagreeing with consciousness attributions A-D in zombie and duplicate conditions, while accepting physico-behavioural indistinguishability, with statistical comparisons between conditions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>D</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Zombie (N=93)</td>
<td>32.3</td>
<td>39.8</td>
<td>31.2</td>
<td>31.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duplicate (N=95)</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>22.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\chi^2$</td>
<td>3.056</td>
<td>7.875</td>
<td>5.383</td>
<td>1.546</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p-value</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.107</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Finally, we examined two predictions concerning demographic factors. Recent findings showed that salience bias is not mitigated by higher verbal IQ (Fischer, Engelhardt, & Herbelot, ms). Educational attainment is a reasonable proxy for general and verbal IQ: Educational level and numbers of years in education show substantive correlations with general intelligence and vocabulary (Kaufman, Reynolds, & McLean, 1989; Strenze, 2007; Uttl & Pilkenton-Taylor, 2001). We therefore predicted that educational attainment would not notably affect ratings. This was tested by looking at the Spearman’s rho correlation coefficient between summed ratings for attributions A-C and educational level (highest degree) for the maximally restricted sample (N=93 [Z], 95 [D]) using two-tailed tests. We did not find a significant correlation overall ($r_s=.036, p=.62$) or for either the duplicate condition ($r_s=-.036, p=.73$) or the zombie condition ($r_s=.083, p=.42$) individually. Similarly, no significant correlations were found for extent of training in psychology or the brain sciences ($r_s=-.026, p=.72; [Z] r_s=-.065, p=.54; [D] r_s=-.079, p=.44$) or the sciences more generally ($r_s=.11, p=.12; [Z] r_s=.030, p=.78; [D] r_s=.16, p=.13$). (To be maximally conservative, no corrections were applied for multiple tests.)

Second, belief in body-soul dualism is highly correlated with religiosity and influences inferences from descriptions of bodily states to attributions of experience (Gray, Knickman, & Wegner, 2011). Religious participants are more likely to regard a soul distinct from the body
as the locus of conscious experience and to regard such souls as being imparted by God. We therefore expected them to be less likely to infer that a being created by scientists possesses conscious experiences, whether that being is described as a ‘duplicate’ or a ‘zombie’, and predicted negative correlations between religiosity and attributions of consciousness (summed ratings for A-C). Using one-tailed tests, we found the predicted negative correlation overall ($r_s=-.23, p<.001$), and for the duplicate condition ($r_s=-.19, p=.031$) and the zombie condition ($r_s=-.22, p=.019$), individually. Participants self-identifying as more religious were less likely to agree with the consciousness attributions. However, the size of the observed correlations suggests the influence of the relevant cultural beliefs on consciousness attributions was weak.

3. General discussion

3.1 Main findings

We investigated the supposedly widely shared intuitive judgments that provide the key evidence for the positive conceivability of philosophical zombies. In a lay sample free of prior philosophical commitments, we found that these judgments (‘verification judgments’) display framing effects that are due to linguistic salience bias.

Our main study implemented Chalmers’s test procedure for positive conceivability (the POSCON test; see Sect. 1.2) in a way that takes into account the relevant empirical constraints. Participants were tasked with imagining beings that are physico-behaviourally indistinguishable from normal humans but ‘all dark inside’. When the beings to be imagined were described as ‘zombies’ rather than ‘duplicates’, participants were more inclined to attribute typical zombie features to the imagined beings, and less inclined to attribute atypical zombie features. This was so even though the typical features were inconsistent with the contextual information of physico-behavioural indistinguishability, and the atypical properties were consistent with it. These framing effects are evidence of contextually cancelled
stereotypical inferences from philosophical uses of ‘zombie’ (as per H1). Corpus studies and
typicality rating studies established that these uses satisfy the conditions triggering linguistic
salience bias (Sect. 1.4), which can explain such inappropriate inferences (Sect. 1.3). We infer
that the observed framing effects are due to linguistic salience bias. The observed effects were
mainly small, in contrast with the large effect sizes observed in previous studies of the bias
(Fischer & Engelhardt, 2019; 2020). This may be due to the internal tension in the
philosophical sense of ‘zombie’ examined (Sect. 1.4; for psycholinguistic discussion, see
Appendix H).

We observed a framing effect of medium size for attributions of conscious experience:
Markedly more participants were inclined to accept that the imagined beings lack conscious
experience when these beings were described as ‘zombies’ rather than, neutrally, as
‘duplicates’ (as per H2). Depending upon how consciousness attributions were phrased,
participants were 1.6 times to twice as inclined when the vignette spoke of ‘zombies’. We
infer our main conclusion:

(1) In zombie thought experiments using the word ‘zombie’, linguistic salience bias
accounts for up to half of the apparent prima facie positive conceivability of
philosophical zombies.

The moment we described philosophical zombies in less tendentious terms, only few
participants in our lay sample passed Chalmers’s (POSCON) test for positive conceivability:

(2) Depending upon how consciousness attributions were phrased, only 15%-20% of
participants made the requisite verification judgments, when the beings to be imagined
were described neutrally as ‘duplicates’.

Generalisations from this second finding seem open to an objection: To avoid shallow
processing (Sect. 2.2), we used only the metaphor ‘all is dark inside’ to prompt participants to
imagine beings that lack conscious experience (~Q). But our plausibility study (Appendix C)
revealed that ‘all is dark inside’ has an interpretation compatible with possession of conscious experience (‘full of bad thoughts and feelings’). Our vignette offers no contextual support for this interpretation (there is no suggestion that the ‘average person’ getting duplicated is so negative). But other formulations could still have prompted more participants to strain their imagination and come up with scenarios they would have been willing to accept as verifying both ‘P’ and ‘~Q’.

The only related findings available speak against this suggestion: In a study on modal intuitions, Peressini (2014, pp.874-5) used literal formulations to ask participants about the possibility of a ‘medical procedure that would remove your inner experience without affecting your brain, so from the outside you would remain unchanged physically and behaviourally’ and the possibility of ‘a person physically and behaviourally identical to you in all ways but who had no inner experience at all’. Proportions for the (undergraduate) sample (8% and 12%) were yet lower than the relevant proportions in our study (Peressini, personal communication). This may be due to the framing (‘you’ and ‘person’ vs our neutral ‘duplicate’).

Our plausibility rating study confirmed that laypeople make inferences from physico-behavioural indistinguishability (P) to possession of conscious experience (Q) (see Appendix C). In the absence of pragmatic factors relevant only where vignettes explicitly refer to conversational contexts, participants will therefore endorse inferences from lack of conscious experience (~Q) to lack of indistinguishability (~P), i.e., the presence of some physico-behavioural difference (Bonnefon & Villejoubert, 2007). More effective prompting to imagine a scenario verifying ‘~Q’ therefore stands to prevent more participants from agreeing that the requirement of physico-behavioural indistinguishability (P) is met. Comparison with Peressini’s (2014) related findings suggests our vignette was as effective as possible at prompting participants to imagine a being participants are prepared to accept as sporting both key features of philosophical zombies. We conclude that for a majority of our lay participants
philosophical zombies are not prima facie positively conceivable.

3.2 Assessing the zombie argument

These findings help us assess the zombie argument (Sect. 1.2). The zombie argument proceeds from the premise that philosophical zombies are conceivable and infers that such beings are possible. Something is conceivable if its prima facie conceivability is not defeated or ‘undermined’ by further reflection or findings. Hence, ‘to reject the premise, one needs to find something that undermines the prima facie … imaginability’ (Chalmers, 2010, p.154).

We found (1) linguistic salience bias and (2) majority dissent, in a study of positive conceivability, which is the best guide to possibility (Chalmers, 2002, p.160). As we now argue, both findings provide undermining defeaters (Pollock, 1985) that defeat the evidence for conceivability provided by what positive verification judgments we have observed.

Linguistic salience bias renders thinkers unable to fully suppress stereotypical inferences that are cancelled by contextual information – or which they would otherwise take to be cancelled by contextual information – and thus prevents them from taking contextual information into account in the way they would when unaffected by the bias. This neglect of contextual information renders the resulting judgments epistemically deficient and deprives thinkers of warrant for accepting them (for a review of relevant philosophical debate, see Machery, 2017, pp.90-125). In the present case, stereotypical inferences from ‘zombie’ to lacks conscious experience are deemed inconsistent with the contextual information that the ‘zombies’ at issue are physico-behaviourally indistinguishable from normal humans, as evidenced by the inferences from physico-behavioural normality to conscious experience observed in our plausibility rating study (Appendix C). Where thought experiments use the word ‘zombie’, salience bias prevents thinkers from taking this contextual information fully into account when assessing whether the ‘zombies’ they imagine verify not only ‘P’ but also ‘–Q’ (‘The imagined being lacks conscious experience’). Finding (1) implies that this failure
to take essential contextual information sufficiently into account accounts for up to half of the positive verification judgments. The latter provide defeasible evidence that philosophical zombies are ideally positively conceivable. Finding (1) thus provides an undercutting defeater (Pollock, 1985) that undermines this evidence, where it is provided by thought experiments which use the word ‘zombie’.

When considering prima facie conceivability as defeasible evidence for conceivability, we should hence take into account only verification judgments elicited in thought experiments that use more neutral terms like ‘duplicate’. In such a thought experiment, only 15-20% of laypeople found philosophical zombies prima facie positively conceivable (Finding 2). But thought experimentation is not democratic: a bright few may get right what the many get wrong. Our analysis of demographic factors (end Sect.2.3) helps assess whether the 15-20% minority was in a better epistemic position, or possessed better conceptual competence, to address the difficult task. We found that religiosity weakly correlated with increased prima facie conceivability. Training in natural science, or in psychology, did not correlate with consciousness attributions. Nor did educational attainment, which can serve as a proxy for verbal and general IQ (Kaufman, Reynolds, & McLean, 1989; Strenze, 2007; Uttl & Pilkenton-Taylor, 2001). We tentatively infer that the minority was not in a better epistemic position than the majority, nor did they benefit from greater conceptual competence. We accordingly treat this as a case of peer disagreement.

The leading epistemological positions on peer disagreement then lead to the same ultimate conclusion (cf. Machery, 2017, pp.131-136): Participants making divergent verification judgments in the zombie thought experiment will base their endorsement of conflicting intuitive judgments on little, and mostly the same, evidence – mainly features mentioned in the brief case description. According to the ‘Total Evidence view’ (e.g., Kelly, 2011) what it is reasonable to believe depends on both the original, first-order evidence and on ‘higher-order evidence’ afforded by ‘the fact that one’s peers believe as they do’ (p.201).
Where peers arrive at the relevant belief independently (as in our experiment with lay participants), this higher-order evidence is additive (p.205). Where an endorsement is supported by insubstantial first-order evidence, but an overwhelming majority of peers independently arrives at a dissenting judgment, this higher-order evidence will therefore ‘swamp the first-order evidence into virtual insignificance’ (p.203) and render it rational to reject the initial minority judgment. The ‘Equal Weight view’ (e.g., Elga, 2007) accords each peer’s view equal weight in determining what level of credence to give a judgment. Since a large majority disagrees with it, the minority judgment should be given a lot less credence than the majority judgment. On either approach, the evidence for conceivability provided by the minority’s verification judgments is rendered insignificant by their disagreement with the large majority. The Finding (2) of ‘majority dissent’ undermines evidence for the positive conceivability of philosophical zombies, also where this is provided by thought experiments that avoid the word ‘zombie’ (as in our duplicate condition). If our vignette was maximally effective (Sect. 3.1), we can infer that philosophical zombies are not positively conceivable for laypersons.

Our first finding, of salience bias, also undermines what evidence of positive conceivability is provided by survey responses of expert philosophers. In Bourget and Chalmers’s (2014) survey of professional philosophers, 60% of respondents deemed philosophical zombies conceivable, in a question format that was ambiguous between negative and positive conceivability and explicitly referred to ‘zombies’. Against reasonable expectations, also this indirect evidence is undermined by linguistic salience bias: Higher verbal IQ (Carroll, 1993; Deary et al., 2007) and executive functioning (Miyake & Friedman, 2012) can be reasonably expected to shield philosophers’ reflective judgment from being affected by salience bias. Moreover, differences in linguistic diet may reduce the salience imbalances to which they are exposed, in the first place – e.g., philosophers may encounter ‘zombie’ more frequently in its philosophical sense and less frequently in its Hollywood sense
than laypeople. Finally, philosophers’ higher reflectivity, as documented with the Cognitive Reflection Test (Livengood et al., 2010), might prevent them from basing further judgment or reasoning on contextually cancelled default inferences they cannot help making. Even so, framing effects predicted by the salience bias hypothesis have been replicated with professional philosophers, including philosophers exposed to specialist discourse in which salience patterns for words of interest are flipped by comparison with general discourse (Fischer, Engelhardt, & Herbelot, ms). These findings suggest that salience bias affects also expert philosophers’ judgments and reasoning about philosophical zombies, including their survey responses.

While some philosophers, including Chalmers (2018), hold that the philosophical notion of ‘phenomenal consciousness’ captures a folk-psychological concept, empirical studies have provided a more nuanced picture (Peressini, 2014) and evidence to the contrary (Knobe & Prinz, 2008; Sytsma & Machery, 2010; Sytsma, 2016; Sytsma & Ozdemir, 2019). The factor analysis of responses to our consciousness items (Sect. 2.3) added to this evidence: Loadings on the single factor were high for A-C – and very low for the Nagelian formulation D that philosophers use to explain ‘phenomenal consciousness’. This suggests there is a live risk that philosophical concepts (‘phenomenal consciousness’, ‘qualia’, ‘functional role’, etc.) and theories do not make it possible to conceive of duplicates that lack ‘conscious experience’ in the folk sense but, rather, create cognitive artifacts (cf. Machery, 2017, p.90).

To sum up: The two findings of our main study, (1) linguistic salience bias and (2) majority dissent, suggest that philosophical zombies are not positively conceivable for philosophically untrained laypeople and undermine extant evidence for the positive conceivability of philosophical zombies, provided by lay or expert responses. But such conceivability is required to secure the zombie argument’s inference from conceivability to possibility. So far, this argument does not get off the ground.
3.3 Implications for the hard problem of consciousness

The zombie argument is meant to justify the so-called ‘modal intuitions’ that are central to the philosophical hard problem of consciousness (Sect. 1.1): In the standard dialectic (Chalmers, 1996, pp.93-108), proponents of the argument invoke these modal claims to justify acceptance of ‘metaphysical intuitions’ that assert conscious phenomena are distinct from physical events (‘The feeling of pain is a different thing than neural activity in the DPI’) and ‘explanatory intuitions’ that assert physical facts cannot explain phenomenal facts (‘Neural activity in the DPI cannot explain what it is like to feel pain’). Together, these ‘problem intuitions’ suggest that any scientific explanation of how physical processes give rise to conscious experience is bound to fall short of what is required (Block, 1995; Sytsma 2009).

The prevalence of explanatory and metaphysical problem intuitions has recently begun to be studied: Gottlieb and Lombrozo (2018, Study 3A) had participants recruited through M-Turk rate their agreement with claims of the form ‘Science could one day fully explain the following phenomenon’ about various psychological phenomena. Problem intuitions are indicated by disagreement with claims about paradigmatic conscious experiences like ‘having headaches’ (7% of participants) and ‘discerning temperature through touch’ (8%). Low disagreement suggests few participants thought science is in principle barred from explaining the kind of conscious experiences at the heart of the philosophical debate. Diaz (forthcoming) had participants recruited through M-Turk rate their agreement with explanatory claims like ‘The properties of pain are fully explained in terms of neural activity in the DPI’ and metaphysical claims like ‘The feeling of pain is just neural activity in the DPI’. Diaz’s three studies used different claims. Their higher specificity might account for higher disagreement (20-25%) than in Gottlieb & Lombrozo (2018). Even so, none of these problem intuitions was shared by more than a quarter of participants, in any study.

This low prevalence of problem intuitions means that the philosophical hard problem of consciousness is not foisted on us by widely shared folk beliefs or ‘common sense’. Rather,
the impression that scientific explanations of conscious experience are bound to fall short arises from philosophical arguments. The philosophical hard problem of consciousness can therefore be ‘dissolved’ by refuting those arguments and thereby showing that the impression of a principled obstacle to scientific explanation is unwarranted. We refuted the zombie argument that is central to the standard dialectic, by showing that the conceivability assumption it starts from is unwarranted, as it rests on epistemically deficient intuitions.

Our findings support the suggestion that no one mechanism or factor explains all problem intuitions or even solely accounts for any one class of problem intuition (cf. Dennett, 2019). We identified two factors accounting for conceivability intuitions: Linguistic salience bias besetting a comprehension inferences, which can account for up to half of the examined positive conceivability intuitions about ‘zombies’. Religious belief further contributes to such intuitions. The identification of a bias affords a debunking explanation. Religious belief has been repeatedly targeted by naturalistic debunking explanations (for reviews see Leben, 2014; Leech & Visala, 2011). Our findings thus contribute to efforts to ‘dissolve’ the philosophical hard problem by developing complementary debunking explanations of problem intuitions, for each class of such intuitions, that reveal we have no warrant for accepting those intuitions (cf. Arico et al., 2011; Fiala & Nichols, 2019; Graziano, 2019; Webb & Graziano, 2015). The increasingly rich literature on the ‘meta-problem of consciousness’ suggests a variety of partially competing, partially complementary cognitive, linguistic, cultural, historical, and sociological factors that may be implicated in generating one or more classes of problem intuitions (for a review, see Chalmers, 2020a; 2020b).

Further development of these explanations will let us assess the key contention suggested by present findings: The impression that there is a principled obstacle to scientific explanations of how physical processes give rise to conscious experience is generated by philosophical arguments that ultimately rely on epistemically deficient intuitions.
3.4 Future research

The present study initiated the investigation of conceivability intuitions elicited in philosophical thought experiments. It identified several constraints facing future research on such intuitions. Our pre-study suggests that conceivability intuitions cannot be elicited from philosophically untrained participants, by asking whether scenarios are conceivable or contradictory. Our main study trialled an alternative approach that implements Chalmers’s (2002) test for positive conceivability: A vignette prompts participants to imagine a scenario of interest and to consider it as actual. Subsequent agreement ratings elicit judgments about whether the scenario verifies the statement of interest. Given the nature of philosophical conceivability questions, this statement will typically state that features (like our \( P \) and \( Q \)) that typically go together do not do so in the scenario (e.g., that ‘normal’ human bodily behaviour does not go with conscious experience). To describe the scenario of interest, it is often hard to avoid giving new or special senses to polysemous words, whose interpretation requires suppression of stereotypical features associated with the word. This gives rise to linguistic salience bias.

To be able to produce evidence of positive conceivability, the vignette must therefore eschew subordinate uses of polysemes, in particular of words whose stereotypical implications would influence the assessment of the target statement (‘\( P \) and \( \sim Q \)’). Second, the vignette must be effective at prompting participants to imagine a scenario that fits the brief (i.e., verifies both ‘\( P \)’ and ‘\( \sim Q \)’). Third, vignette and items must be phrased or presented in a way that prevents shallow processing, i.e., ensures that participants take all the relevant information (both ‘\( P \)’ and ‘\( \sim Q \)’ into account, when making their verification judgments. The last two requirements are in tension: Including in the vignette, for effectiveness, explicit statements of ‘\( P \)’ and ‘\( \sim Q \)’ risks verification judgments based just on recognition that the item appeared in the vignette, without taking other information into account. Conversely, avoiding explicit statements of ‘\( P \)’ and ‘\( \sim Q \)’ to prevent shallow processing risks to leave participants
without sufficiently clear guidance for the imagination task. The present study negotiated these constraints by using the neutral ‘duplicate’ and resorting to metaphor (‘all is dark inside’ for the relevant instance of ‘~Q’). We would welcome future research, for a start on the conceivability of philosophical zombies, that explores different ways of negotiating these constraints.

3.5 Conclusion

The linguistic salience bias (Fischer & Engelhardt, 2019; 2020) is poised to arise when philosophers give a special sense to words (irregular polysemes) that already have a related, but distinct dominant sense from ordinary discourse – as philosophers frequently do (Fischer et al., 2021). The resulting unwarranted inferences are then bound to lead to wrong conclusions when thinkers use the subordinate sense to talk about cases that pull apart features that usually go together. Many philosophical thought experiments envisage such cases (Machery 2017, pp.116-18). Linguistic salience bias is thus set to vitiate philosophical thought experiments of this kind when they employ unbalanced irregular polysemes in subordinate senses. The bias results in framing effects and generates epistemically deficient zombie intuitions: intuitions that are ‘killed’ (defeated) by contextual information but kept cognitively alive by the bias. This paper documented framing effects. The observed effects show the bias affects judgment and reasoning in philosophical thought experiments that use the word ‘zombie’: It contributes to generating conceivability intuitions about philosophical zombies that few people share when cases are described in neutral terms. Such intuitions about zombies are zombie intuitions. Their exposure as zombie intuitions may contribute to ‘dissolving’ the philosophical hard problem of consciousness: to debunking the impression that principled obstacles prevent scientific explanations of how physical processes give rise to conscious experience, and showing that this impression rests on epistemically deficient intuitions.
References


Chalmers, D.J. (2010). The Two-Dimensional Argument Against Materialism. In his: *The


https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consciousness-neuroscience/