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Subjective Probabilities as Basis for Scientific Reasoning?

Huber, Franz (2004) Subjective Probabilities as Basis for Scientific Reasoning? [Preprint]

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    Abstract

    Bayesianism is the position that scientific reasoning is probabilistic and that probabilities are adequately interpreted as an agent’s actual subjective degrees of belief, measured by her betting behaviour. Confirmation is one important aspect of scientific reasoning. The thesis of this paper is the following: If scientific reasoning is at all probabilistic, the subjective interpretation has to be given up in order to get right confirmation – and thus scientific reasoning in general.


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    Item Type: Preprint
    Additional Information: subjective probability, confirmation, Bayesianism, old evidence
    Subjects: General Issues > Confirmation/Induction
    Depositing User: Franz Huber
    Date Deposited: 04 Sep 2004
    Last Modified: 07 Oct 2010 11:12
    Item ID: 1941
    URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/1941

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