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The Paradox of Conceptual Novelty and Galileo’s Use of Experiments

Van Dyck, Maarten (2004) The Paradox of Conceptual Novelty and Galileo’s Use of Experiments. In: [2004] Philosophy of Science Assoc. 19th Biennial Meeting - PSA2004: Contributed Papers (Austin, TX; 2004) > PSA 2004 Contributed Papers. (Unpublished)

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    Abstract

    Starting with a discussion of what I call Koyré’s paradox of conceptual novelty, I introduce the ideas of Damerow et al. on the establishment of classical mechanics in Galileo’s work. I then argue that although the view of Damerow et al. on the nature of Galileo’s conceptual innovation is convincing, it misses an essential element: Galileo’s use of the experiments described in the first day of the Two New Sciences. I describe these experiments and analyze their function. Central to my analysis is the idea that Galileo’s pendulum experiments serve to secure the reference of his theoretical models in actually occurring cases of free fall. In this way Galileo’s experiments constitute an essential part of the meaning of the new concepts of classical mechanics.


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    Item Type: Conference or Workshop Item (UNSPECIFIED)
    Subjects: General Issues > History of Philosophy of Science
    General Issues > Experimentation
    General Issues > History of Science Case Studies
    Conferences and Volumes: [2004] Philosophy of Science Assoc. 19th Biennial Meeting - PSA2004: Contributed Papers (Austin, TX; 2004) > PSA 2004 Contributed Papers
    Depositing User: Maarten Van Dyck
    Date Deposited: 17 Sep 2004
    Last Modified: 07 Oct 2010 11:12
    Item ID: 1961
    Public Domain: No
    URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/1961

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