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Ramsey-Sentence Realism as an Answer to the Pessimistic Meta-Induction

Newman, Mark (2004) Ramsey-Sentence Realism as an Answer to the Pessimistic Meta-Induction. In: [2004] Philosophy of Science Assoc. 19th Biennial Meeting - PSA2004: Contributed Papers (Austin, TX; 2004) > PSA 2004 Contributed Papers. (In Press)

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    Abstract

    John Worrall recently provided an account of epistemic structural realism, which explains the success of science by arguing for the correct mathematical structure of our theories. He accounts for the historical failures of science by pointing to bloated ontological interpretations of theoretical terms. In this paper I argue that Worrall’s account suffers from five serious problems. I also show that Pierre Cruse and David Papineau have developed a rival structural realism that solves all of the problems faced by Worrall. This Ramsey-sentence realism is a significant advance in the debate, but still ultimately fails for its incomplete account of reference.

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    Item Type: Conference or Workshop Item (UNSPECIFIED)
    Keywords: Structural Realism; Pessimistic Induction; Ramsey-Sentence;
    Subjects: General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
    Conferences and Volumes: [2004] Philosophy of Science Assoc. 19th Biennial Meeting - PSA2004: Contributed Papers (Austin, TX; 2004) > PSA 2004 Contributed Papers
    Depositing User: Mark Newman
    Date Deposited: 03 Oct 2004
    Last Modified: 07 Oct 2010 11:12
    Item ID: 1975
    Public Domain: No
    URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/1975

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