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Empirical Success or Explanatory Success: What does Current Scientific Realism Need to Explain?

Doppelt, Gerald (2003) Empirical Success or Explanatory Success: What does Current Scientific Realism Need to Explain? In: [2004] Philosophy of Science Assoc. 19th Biennial Meeting - PSA2004: Contributed Papers (Austin, TX; 2004) > PSA 2004 Contributed Papers. (In Press)

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    Abstract

    Against the well-known objection that in the history of science there are many theories that are successful but false, Psillos offers a three-pronged defense of scientific realism as the best explanation for the success of science. Focusing on these, I criticize Psillos’ defense, arguing that each prong is weakened when we recognize that according to realist rebuttals of the underdetermination argument and versions of empiricism, realists are committed to accounting for the explanatory success of theories, not their mere empirical adequacy or instrumental reliability. I conclude by indicating how ‘explanationist’ realism might be recast to accommodate my arguments.


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    Item Type: Conference or Workshop Item (UNSPECIFIED)
    Keywords: Anti-Realist Scientific Realism Philosophy of Science
    Subjects: General Issues > Philosophers of Science
    General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
    Conferences and Volumes: [2004] Philosophy of Science Assoc. 19th Biennial Meeting - PSA2004: Contributed Papers (Austin, TX; 2004) > PSA 2004 Contributed Papers
    Depositing User: Gerald Doppelt
    Date Deposited: 12 Oct 2004
    Last Modified: 07 Oct 2010 11:12
    Item ID: 1992
    Publisher: Gerald Doppelt
    Public Domain: No
    Conference Date: November 18-21, 2004
    Conference Location: Austin, Texas
    URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/1992

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