

Cascade versus mechanism: The diversity of causal structure in science

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According to mainstream philosophical views causal explanation in biology and neuroscience is mechanistic. As the term “mechanism” gets regular use in these fields it is unsurprising that philosophers consider it important to scientific explanation. What is surprising is that they consider it the only causal term of importance. This paper provides an analysis of a new causal concept—it examines the cascade concept in science and the causal structure it refers to. I argue that this concept is importantly different from the notion of mechanism and that this difference matters for our understanding of causation and explanation in science.

1 Introduction According to mainstream philosophical views causal explanation in biology and neuroscience is mechanistic. As the term “mechanism” gets regular use in these fields it is unsurprising that philosophers consider it important to scientific explanation. What is surprising is that they consider it the *only* causal term of importance. Although scientists rely on a wide variety of causal concepts in their explanations, most philosophers assume that all of these concepts can be well-understood with the single notion of “mechanism.” For example, Craver claims that while scientists “say that they discover systems and pathways in the flow of information, and molecular cascades, mediators, and modulators...[t]he term mechanism could do the same work” (Craver 2007, 3). Similarly, Darden and Craver state that scientists “often speak of ‘systems’ and ‘cascades’ to describe what we call, also consistently with the field’s language, ‘mechanisms’ ” (Darden and Craver 2001, 113). This “new mechanist” position claims that “most or all the phenomena found in nature depend on mechanisms” and that it is the “chief business” of science to examine them (Glennan 2017, 1). This expansive notion of mechanism is dominant in the literature and it has held this position for at least the past two decades. Continued support for this view is evident by outright claims in the literature,¹ the common assumption that explanations are either non-causal or mechanistic, and an enormous research program that interprets all causal systems in science as mechanisms, even when they are associated with other causal terms.

A significant challenge for these mainstream views is that scientists cite a variety of causal terms that are not all well-understood with the mechanist program. To clarify this, consider that mechanisms are described as causal structures with distinct features. While debate surrounds which exact features they have, three features that are often viewed as characteristic of mechanisms are (1) constitutive relations, (2) fine-grained detail, and (3) mechanical interactions. These features are also present in the machine analogy, which is often associated with the mechanism concept. However, if mechanisms are causal structures with specific features—whatever these features are—it should be an open question whether *other* causal structures exist with *different* features. This paper explores this question by examining the cascade concept in science. It is argued that the

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¹In addition to the earlier quotes see: (Robins and Craver 2009, 42), (Glennan 2017, 1).

cascade concept is importantly different from the notion of mechanism and that this difference matters for our understanding of causation and explanation in science.

This paper provides an analysis of the cascade concept in science and the causal structure it refers to.² I examine the main features of this causal structure, analogies it is associated with, and strategies used to study it. While scientific work supports distinguishing the cascade and mechanism concepts, this analysis is not merely descriptive. Instead, it provides a theoretical framework for how these concepts should be understood. This framework matters for our assessment of the causal structure of the world, how we study this structure, use it to produce particular outcomes, and communicate about it to others. Before proceeding with this analysis, two clarifications are in order. First, I do not suggest that scientists *always* use these causal terms in the distinct ways indicated in this analysis, but that they *often* do and *should* use them in this way. This reveals normative features of this work and an important way that philosophy can contribute to science, namely, by making suggestions for how these concepts should be understood and used. Second, my analysis of these concepts articulates clear ways in which they differ, but leaves space for some structures in science to be borderline. The presence of such cases should not prevent us from articulating useful categories that distinguish causal structures in the majority of cases, even if the distinction can (in rare cases) be blurred.

One way in which this project differs from mechanist analyses is that it examines causal concepts in a broader set of scientific fields, beyond just biology and neuroscience. This is possible because the cascade concept refers to a causal pattern found in many sciences, including physics, chemistry, biology, psychology and economics. While the mechanism concept is also likely to have broad applicability, most analyses focus on its role in the biological sciences. This point prompts a final clarification. In particular, while this paper argues for a distinction across these causal concepts, it does not deny that mechanism plays an important role in scientific explanation and reasoning. What is denied are the stronger claims that mechanism is the only causal concept of importance for scientific explanation, that all other causal terms can be interpreted as mechanisms, and that all causal explanation fits the mechanist pattern. There have been many many constructive and convincing criticisms of this expansive mechanistic view (Skipper and Millstein 2005; Woodward 2013; Dupré 2013; Skillings 2015; Ross 2021). This analysis is in agreement with these other projects. It aims to build on them and clarify a way forward in understanding causal structure, causal concepts, and causal explanation in biology and science more generally.

2 Causation and mechanism in science. In the current philosophical literature it is common to use “mechanism” to capture a type of causal structure without specifying an account of causation.³ To say that there is a “mechanism” for some effect suggests that, at minimum, there is (i) some set of causal factors that interact to produce this effect, as opposed to a single cause. However, (i) does not specify how this causation among factors should be understood, whether in terms of a regularity, conserved quantity, counterfactual, law-based, powers-based, or any other account

²I use causal “concept” and causal “structure” somewhat interchangeably, as the concept is used to refer to the structure in the world.

³In earlier work, the notion of “mechanism” was associated with Salmon’s causal mechanical model, a type of process theory of causation (Salmon 1984). Current work no longer associates “mechanism” with this work and different accounts of causation are used by different mechanist philosophers.

of causation.⁴ This is reflected by the fact that different philosophical accounts of mechanism rely on different accounts of causation.⁵ This captures an important distinction between “causation” and “mechanism”—mechanism depends on an account of causation and further specifies a type of causal structure.

While having (i) many interacting causes is a minimal feature of mechanisms, we often view “mechanism” as communicating more than this. Philosophical accounts of mechanism are in the business of capturing what more this is. Although there is no consensus on how to understand mechanism, a number of promising characteristics have emerged. These characteristics draw on mechanical and machine-like views of causal systems, which originated with the work of Descartes (Craver and Tabery 2015). A first characteristic feature of mechanisms is that they have a constitutive organization, in the sense of having causal ‘parts’ that constitute the ‘whole’ mechanism. This organization promotes a reductive and hierarchical picture, in which a mechanism’s parts are at a “lower-level” than the “higher-level” behavior produced. This feature also clarifies why scientific mechanisms are often analogized to machines, such as a car engine or watch mechanism, in which a discrete system is comprised of component parts (Levy 2014).⁶ Second, mechanisms are often expected to capture some type of fine-grained causal detail, as opposed to highly abstract relations. This is related to the expectation that mechanisms should clarify “how” a cause produces its effect, as opposed to omitting, abstracting from, or “black-boxing” these details (Craver 2007; Glennan 2017).⁷ We see this in the fact that monocausal relationships and sparse causal networks are rarely considered mechanisms, although they may be instantiated by mechanistic details.⁸ Third, causal relations in mechanisms are often described with mechanical language that emphasizes force, action, and motion. This involves stating that a cause “bends,” “pushes,” or “pulls” another factor, as opposed to just saying that it “causes” some effect. This third feature supports the second because specifying “how” X causes Y and provides more information than just saying “that” X causes Y.

In addition to these features, mechanisms are often studied with particular methods. As many philosophers indicate, mechanisms are studied with decomposition and localization (Wimsatt 1974; Bechtel and Richardson 2010). These methods involve specifying some an explanatory target and then “drilling down” to identify the lower-level component parts that produce this target. In addition to supporting the reductive and hierarchical nature of the mechanism concept, these methods reveal two additional features. First mechanisms are relative to and defined by single effects, as seen in the first step of these methods. Second, mechanisms are relatively discrete systems with boundaries that are dictated by methodological and pragmatic considerations (Craver 2009; Bechtel

⁴One exception to this is found in the work of Glennan (1996), who uses mechanism to provide an account of causation.

⁵As Craver and Tabery (2015) state, “[m]echanists have disagreed with one another about how to understand the cause in causal mechanism”.

⁶While some claim that mechanisms can also have etiological organization, most of the literature focuses on mechanisms with constitutive, part-whole character. This is discussed further in section 5.

⁷To be clear, the claim that (i) mechanisms are causal structures with significant fine-grained detail is distinct from the claim that (ii) more details improve mechanistic (or causal) explanations. I endorse (i), but not (ii). For discussion of this see: (Bechtel and Levy 2013; Glennan 2017; Craver and Kaplan 2018).

⁸There is debate in the new mechanist literature about how “abstract” mechanisms are and which type(s) of organization they have. On narrow definitions, mechanisms are associated with part-whole organization. More expansive accounts, on the other hand, suggest that mechanisms can have various “abstract patterns of organization” (Bechtel and Levy 2013). In this work, I rely on more narrow conceptions of mechanism and consider objections from the expansive view in section 5.

2015).

This account of mechanism successfully captures particular causal structures in biology and neuroscience. However, it should not be viewed as a comprehensive account of all causal structure in these domains. The mechanism concept is better understood as one of many types of causal structure. One way to explore this claim involves examining causal terms that scientists use in descriptions and explanations of natural phenomena. These include causal terms such as “cascade” and “pathway,” which philosophers have traditionally interpreted as mechanisms. This paper provides an analysis of the “cascade” concept and argues that it is importantly different from the notion of mechanism. While cascades meet criterion (i), they lack standard features of mechanisms and have their own distinct characteristics, analogies, and investigative strategies. After introducing and examining the cascade concept in the next two sections, I explore how this concept differs from mechanism, and why this matters for philosophical accounts of causal explanation.

3 Cascade concept: Introduction. The causal world is complex. Scientists encounter systems with many causes, different causes, and causes that interact in varied and dynamic ways. Sometimes, these systems fit particular patterns that repeatedly present in many different contexts. In these cases, it can be useful to describe these patterns, while giving them a name or “linguistic label” that captures their features and implications (Gentner and Smith 2012, 130). This has happened with the cascade concept—this concept refers to a unique causal pattern that occurs in a wide variety of domains. Biologists discuss the blood coagulation cascade, the complement cascade, and cell signaling cascades, to name a few. Psychologists study developmental cascades, ecologists examine trophic cascades, and economists cite cascading failures. In physics and chemistry we find collision cascades, oxidative cascades, cascade showers, and cascade liquefaction. Similar to mechanisms, cascades meet criterion (i) as they contain multiple causes that work together to produce an outcome, as opposed to a single cause. However, when compared to mechanisms, cascades have their own distinct set of characteristics, analogies, and causal investigative strategies.

What exactly is a cascade? I am going to suggest that cascades are causal systems that involve (i) an initial trigger, (ii) sequential amplification, and (iii) stable progression from start to finish. A key feature of these processes is that they involve amplifying steps that convert a small signal into a huge, explosive effect. This is supported by the fact that these systems are analogized to avalanches, the snowball effect, and the ripple effect, which all involve a small cause triggering a large outcome (Deyo 2002; Hougie 2004; Masten and Cicchetti 2010; Dodge et al. 2009). Other common analogies are cascade circuits in electronics with amplifiers arranged in series and natural cascades such as waterfalls, in which a narrow stream of water progressively amplifies in speed and distribution of spread (Macfarlane 1964, 1966). The stable amplification in these systems leads scientists to refer to them as “explosions” that run to their “inevitable conclusion” (Deyo 2002, 23). These three features help explain how cascades can be central to the functioning of various physiological and electronic systems and how, in other cases, they produce widespread, catastrophic damage that “ripples” uncontrollably through a system.

Before examining these three features in detail, it will help to briefly describe an early and influential use of the cascade concept in science. One of the first uses of this concept in modern biology was in reference to blood coagulation. Initiated by some disruption or tear in a blood vessel, coagulation serves to stop blood loss by forming a thick, fibrous clot at the site of injury. In the early 1960s, it was generally accepted that enzymes were involved in clot formation, but it was unclear

exactly how this took place. According to a dominant theory, one main enzymatic “molecular system” was responsible for clot formation, although this theory faced a number of issues. A first issue was that there appeared to be a variety of different enzymes that, when deficient, could each individually cause clotting disorders, as opposed to a single enzyme. Second, it was unclear how a single enzyme system could link the “minute physical stimulus” of vessel damage with the “final enzymatic explosion” of clot formation (Macfarlane 1964, 499). How a single molecular system could produce the many-fold increase in product given a small stimulus remained to be explained.

The field was soon transformed by two similar but independent publications suggesting the “cascade” and “waterfall” models of blood coagulation (Macfarlane 1964; Davie and Ratnoff 1964). Instead of a single enzymatic system these theories postulated a “multiple-factor theory” involving an eight-step sequence of enzyme activations, in which one enzyme activated another, which activated another and so on, in series. This new theory suggested that blood coagulation involved many factors, that these factors that were initiated in succession, and that the final enzyme was amplified relative to the starting material. When these amplified steps were arranged in succession, they could account for the huge explosion of final clotting product, which explained an important and previously mysterious aspect of the clotting process.

A key feature of this new model was amplification—not only at each step, but when organized in succession, a huge overall amplification from start to finish. In fact, MacFarlane—creator of the cascade model—estimated that if each enzyme produced 10 times its own weight in product, that there would be a million-fold overall gain in final clotting material, which is “a figure close to modern observations” (Hougie 2004, 1335). MacFarlane stated that he chose the term “cascade” to capture this amplification feature by relying on an analogy to electrical circuits, in which amplifiers were arranged in series. In this electrical context, “cascade” is understood “as ‘a succession of stages in which each stage derives from, or acts, sometimes cumulatively, upon the product or output of the preceding’ ” (Macfarlane 1966, 591). MacFarlane also emphasized amplification by describing blood coagulation a “biological amplifier” and by comparing this system to a photomultiplier.⁹

“It is probably that such an enzyme sequence would develop a progressive increase in activity from stage to stage. This recalls the principle of the photomultiplier in which one electron striking the first dynode releases several more electrons each one of which releases yet more on striking the second dynode and so on, and it was this analogy which prompted the use of the term “cascade” in the present context. In this concept, the clotting factors thus form a device by which a small stimulus is transmitted as a rising wave of activity to culminate in the large effect of fibrin formation.” (Macfarlane 1966, 596-7)

What was previously criticized as an overly-complex, multi-part enzyme sequence, was now viewed as highly functional and finely tailored to the goals of the system. Soon after publication of the cascade model of blood coagulation this “relatively simple pattern” was applied to other biological systems including visual processing, hormone signaling, and complement initiation in immunology (Macfarlane 1964, 498)(Wald 1965). Discussions of these systems cited the cascade model of blood coagulation, referring to “the same physiological necessity for amplifying a weak signal” (Bowness 1966, 1370). As the cascade notion captured “a composite of all bare facts in a nutshell” it provided

⁹Later work on blood coagulation would show a preference for “cascade” over “waterfall,” as the former was thought to better capture the amplification feature (Hougie 2004, 1231).

“an easy to understand and general concept” (Hougie 2004, 1231). Furthermore, this notion can be “applied to other systems” and remains used in science today, which attests to “the great utility of the concept” (Hougie 2004, 1232).

4 Cascade concept: Features The cascade concept is not just applicable to systems in biology—it is found in many scientific domains including physics, chemistry, psychology, ecology, and economics. Getting a better understanding of this concept requires appreciating its three main features: (i) an initial trigger, (ii) sequential amplification, and (iii) stable progression from start to finish.

4.1 Trigger. A first feature of cascades is that they involve an initial trigger. The notion of a trigger captures a single main cause, which takes on binary values, and reliably produces some outcome of interest. These features are compatible with the trigger’s namesake, the trigger of a firearm (or explosive), which is represented as a single, binary switch that reliably discharges ammunition.

Causal triggers are viewed as an important “first” or “starting” cause of an outcome or sequence of steps. These factors mark the beginning of a cascade even when other upstream and nearby causes exist. Triggers are distinguished from other causes on the basis of being located upstream of the causal steps in question and producing their effects with a high likelihood. Causal triggers typically take on binary “switch-like” values—they are either initiated or not with no in-between. Similarly, a firearm’s trigger is either pulled or not—we do not talk about a trigger being initiated more-or-less, but whether it has been initiated at all (or not). Even if the triggering cause can take on a continuous set of values, scientists will identify some threshold that distinguishes the “on” values from the “off.” For example, in the blood coagulation cascade scientists state that “[b]elow the threshold, the system will not ‘fire’, but above the threshold, explosive propagation will ensue” (Jetsy and Beltrami 2005, 2465). This binary feature of causal triggers is also supported by fact that they are often referred to as “switches” in various scientific contexts (Di Ventura et al. 2006; Mer 2018).

An important feature of causal triggers is that they have significant control over their effects, often producing them with a high likelihood. Due to this, scientists claim that these causes have a “strong” influence and “kick-start” the causal process (Paine 1980; Little et al. 2020). This leads causal triggers to take on significant causal responsibility—they are viewed as having more explanatory power and as being “better predictors” of the downstream outcome than other causes (Herren and McMahon 2018). This is due to the fact that these are single causes that do not share causal power with other factors, they reliably produce some downstream effect, and, in the case of cascades, they produce a large effect of some kind.¹⁰ Also, notice that we also see this trigger feature in the causal systems that scientific cascades are analogized to. An avalanche is triggered by a small amount of snowfall and a ripple is triggered by a drop of water.

4.2 Sequential amplification. The second (and perhaps most important) feature of cascades is sequential amplification. While cascades involve a sequence of amplifying steps it will be helpful to first examine amplification at a single causal step. Amplification refers to a situation in which

¹⁰Of course, the trigger relies on a set of background conditions, but these conditions are likely considered important, common, or typically fixed, such that in them, releasing the trigger reliably leads to the effect.

a small amount of cause produces an amplified or large amount of effect. At the scale of a single causal step two types of amplification should be distinguished. Given some causal factor amplification can involve (1) an increased amount of a single effect, *single-product* amplification, or (2) an increased number of different effect types, *multi-product* amplification.¹¹ An example of single product amplification is found in the blood coagulation cascade, in which an enzyme “a” produces an increased amount of the single product enzyme “b.” An example of multi-product amplification is a natural disaster, such as an earthquake, in which a single insult produces a variety of different downstream effects, such as fires, flooding, landslides, and so on.¹² Both single-product and multi-product amplification capture *one-to-many* cause-effect scenarios, in which every single unit of cause produces many units of effect.

Amplification is often represented as a continuous property as opposed to being all-or-none. In many sciences, there is interest in quantifying amplification “degree” especially for single-product cases. An example from electronics is the “gain” of an electrical circuit, which refers to “the degree to which a signal has been strengthened” from input to output (Saggio 2014, 342). In this case, the gain or “amplification factor” is defined as the ratio of output power (or voltage or current) to input. A second example is the notion of a “multiplier” in economics, which captures the “magnitude of change” in an effect, with respect to its cause. For example, if autonomous spending causes an increase in gross domestic product (GDP), “[t]he multiplier is the ratio of the change in GDP to the change in autonomous spending—that is, the change in GDP divided by the change in autonomous spending that caused the change” (Lipsey and Crystal 2015, 410). Another example of amplification degree is “ R_0 ” or the “basic reproduction number” in epidemiology (Cha et al. 2008). This captures the number of secondary infections caused by a primary infected agent, which represents disease transmissibility. A final example, is the “multiplication coefficient” of branch chain reactions in physics and chemistry (Baskakov 2007; Soustelle 2011). This coefficient captures an increase in reactive species of the product relative to the substrate.

While amplification can take place at a single causal step, cascades involve a sequence of these amplifying steps. This produces *increased* amplification because when amplifiers are organized in succession the overall “gain” of the system equals the product of the gains at each step. For example, if one unit of enzyme “a” produces 10 units of enzyme “b” and one unit of enzyme “b” produces 10 units of enzyme “c,” the overall process has a gain of 100 (producing 100 units of “c” for every single unit of “a”). Similarly, if one insult produces five distinct outcomes, which each produce five other distinct outcomes, the effects balloon-out, multiplying twenty-five fold. The systems that scientific cascades are analogized to also have this sequential amplification feature. The steady increase of a building avalanche, expanding circles in a ripple effect, and increasing product in an enzyme cascade all involve a sequence of amplifying steps.

4.3 Stable progression The third feature of cascades is stable progression. This feature refers to the fact that, once initiated, cascades involve a strength that extends through their sequence of causal steps. In other words, changes in the causal trigger “propel” ensuing steps, such that, once

¹¹Causal amplification is a distinction among causation which should be added to a list of other important and common distinctions (Woodward 2010; Ross 2020). Similarly, the opposing notion of “dampening” should also be added, in which a large cause produces a small effect.

¹²Multi-product amplification is related to a type of causal specificity, which can be called “variable specificity,” in which a single cause is capable of producing many different types of effects (Woodward 2010). A straightforward example is pleiotropy in genetics, in which one gene produces many different outcomes.

a cascade is triggered, its sequence of steps unfold with high probability (Dodge et al. 2009, 23).

This stable progression is related to the sense in which cascades “gain momentum” as they move through a series of steps—the growing amount of reactive product at each step can make downstream steps more likely as there are more reactive factors available to produce the next outcome. This is sometimes referred to as a chain-reaction, in which the effect of one reaction propels another to take place, and so on, in a self-sustaining manner. One implication of this stable progression feature is that, once initiated, cascades can be very difficult to stop. They have the potential to “run-away” or “become uncontrolled” (Bloomfield and Stephens 1996, 168,171). This is very similar to descriptions of snowball effect, in which a small snow fall triggers a growing, unavoidable avalanche. As Stein states, “cascade refers to a process that, once started, proceeds stepwise to its full, seemingly inexorable, conclusion...the danger of a cascade is that it can be inappropriately triggered...once triggered, it is virtually impossible to stop” (Stein 1990).

The three features discussed in this section start to reveal why we are so interested in cascades. We are interested in cascades because they are powerful causal systems. Their power is related to their (a) amplification and (b) stable progression. Cascades produce a huge, expansive outcome and they do so in a way that is difficult to stop. It almost seems that, once triggered, they are destined to run to completion. The power of these causal systems is very useful and also very dangerous. These features allow us to purposely set off a causal process that will have a huge outcome in a way that is nearly impossible to stop. And, for the same reasons, we want to make sure that we do not accidentally set them off in a way that will result in a disastrous outcome. Put another way, “[w]hat makes the study of cascading failures so important is the fact that an actual catastrophe, such as infrastructure collapse, global epidemic or a financial meltdown may happen seemingly without warning, starting from a very small failure” (Smolyak et al. 2020). We have a strong interest in identifying cascades and their triggers because of their explosive effects and nearly unstoppable nature.

4.4 Examples It will help to illustrate the three features of cascades with a number of examples. These examples will show that the cascade concept has broad applicability in science, that it involves similar features and analogies in different contexts, and that a characteristic diagram is used to represent cascades in many different scientific fields. This characteristic diagram contains a fan-out, one-to-many, and branching structure, which captures sequential amplification in these systems.

A first set of examples are enzyme cascades, which are found in biological systems and various technologies. In these cases, one unit of an enzyme “a” produces multiple units of enzyme “b,” each unit of “b” produces multiple units of enzyme “c,” and so on.¹³ Diagrams of these systems depict a fan-out structure, as shown in a of figure 1, in which a small cause leads to a product that grows progressively larger at each step. Amplification in these cascades is typically directed toward some explicit purpose or goal. For example, these cascades can trigger an immediate burst of life-saving clot, in our visual system they can convert minute visual inputs into a larger, more manageable signal for our brain to process, and they can allow trace amounts of hormone to produce large-scale effects on the body. With respect to various technologies, such as polymerase chain reaction (PCR), cascades allow for amplification of trace amounts of key substances so that we can more easily identify and study them.

¹³For example, in hormonal regulation “a single hormone molecule (e.g. epinephrine) can result in the production of millions of product molecules (e.g. glucose)” (MacDonald 2004, 94).




Figure 1: Cascade examples and diagrams. These include (a) cell-signaling cascades in biology (Unglaub Silverthorn 2016, 197), (b) cascading-reactions of nuclear fission in physics (Fox 2020) , (c) trophic cascades in ecology (Freeman et al. 2017, 1105), and (d) cascading disasters in socio-ecological systems (Pescaroli and Alexander 2016, 176).

A second set of cascade examples are “branching chain reactions” in physics and chemistry. These involve nuclear or chemical reactions in which an initial substrate creates multiple products and each product creates many more, and so on, in a “branching,” tree-like structure. A paradigmatic example of this is nuclear fission where an initial “triggering” event—such as the collision of a subatomic particle with an atom—produces an explosive, sequential amplification of reactive products. For example, in the context of uranium substrate, “[f]ission of a single $^{235}_{92}\text{U}$ nucleus produces, on average, three neutrons, each of which can cause another fission if it strikes $^{235}_{92}\text{U}$ nucleus before escaping from the uranium containing substance” (Moore and Pearson 1981, 408). This “cascade of nuclear fissions” is illustrated in figure 1, which captures the characteristic fan-out, one-to-many, and branching structure used to represent cascades (Spyrou and Mittig 2017). Similar diagrams are used to illustrate “cascade reactions” or “branching chain” reactions in chemistry and “collision cascades” in physics (Baskakov 2007; Thompson 2002).¹⁴ The high degree of amplification in these

¹⁴In these and other cascades, the steps (and their products) are referred to in terms of generations (first,

chemical and physics processes is exploited in the creation of explosives (such as fission bombs) and signal detection methods.

A third example are trophic cascades in ecology, in which changes to a “key predator” triggers large-scale effects in an ecosystem (Paine 1980; Ripple et al. 2016; Millstein 2019). In these cases “[t]he loss of a single species can have a devastating ripple effect across an ecosystem,” producing “ripple-effect extinctions” in other species (Holley 2017, 894) (Laurance and Vasconcelos 2009, 37). A well-known example of this is the elimination of the gray wolf population in Yellowstone National Park in the 1920s after excessive hunting (Boyce 2018). The removal of the wolf community triggered a surge in the elk population, which led to excessive loss of downstream species. Rampant elk feeding decimated the willow tree population, which strained and decreased beaver communities, which caused a decreased water table and ultimately reduced various fish populations. Removal of the wolf also diminished various scavenger species as they normally fed on leftover wolf kills. As shown in figure 1, alteration to this single wolf species triggered many effects that cascaded through the ecosystem. The amplification in these systems interests ecologists because they capture how some species exert a “disproportionate influence” on the ecosystem relative to their abundance (Cottee-Jones and Whittaker 2012; Power et al. 1996). This is related to the notions of a “keystone” and “umbrella” species in ecology, in which a single species exerts a stabilizing force (such as a keystone in an arch) or a protective influence over many species (under their “umbrella”) in the ecosystem (Roberge and Angelstam 2004). Just as removal of these species can produce widespread damage, reintroducing them can re-stabilize the ecosystem through the same distributed causal connections.

A fourth set of examples are cascading disasters, in which a man-made accident or natural disaster triggers a sequence of expanding and damaging effects. An example of this is the 2011 Tohoku earthquake in Japan, which triggered a set of secondary insults (a tsunami, power loss, collapse of roadways and railways), which each produced many tertiary effects (failure of nuclear power plants, rupture of dams, etc.), leading to quaternary outcomes (radiation damage), and so on. The sequential amplification feature of cascading disasters is represented in figure 1, which depicts expanding effects after an initial stimulus. In the context of these disasters it is suggested that “a vital factor of the definition of cascades” is the involvement of elements that “amplify each other” and produce an “amplification of damage” (Pescaroli and Alexander 2015, 59). In these cases the potential for a cascading failure is associated with the interdependency of components in a system, such that the failure of one inevitably leads to the failure of another. In particular, it is stated that as systems become “more interdependent, they become more vulnerable to large-scale cascading disruptions” (Pescaroli and Alexander 2016, 180).

As a final example consider the cascade-like spread of infectious diseases, such as Covid-19, which is captured in epidemiology with the basic reproduction number (or R_0). This spread is illustrated with branching diagrams that depict how one person can transmit this disease to multiple people, and each of these individuals can transmit it to many more and so on, in a set of steps that amplify disease occurrence. If this keeps happening disease incidence will balloon out, as a large number of cases will be triggered by single patient. This is a cascade—in this case, disease incidence dangerously amplifies as it spreads through population. If you want to clearly communicate the threat and manner of spread of Covid-19 through the population, you should not call this transmission a mechanism—you should call it a cascade. The cascade concept better captures the amplified spread of this disease through the population, which is what we aim to draw attention

second, third, and so on), similar to biological reproduction or fission processes.

to with these descriptions and illustrations of disease transmission.¹⁵

5 Cascade versus mechanism. How exactly do cascades and mechanisms differ from each other? One answer to this question involves citing the different features and analogies that these causal structures are associated with. Mechanisms involve constitutive relations, cascades do not. Cascades are analogized to the snowball effect, mechanisms are analogized to machines, and so on. While there are many differences between these causal structures, it will help to explicitly discuss a few of these in more detail.

5.1 Differences. A first difference between these concepts is that cascades lack the constitutive, part-whole feature of mechanisms. Mechanisms have a hierarchical structure, in which their lower-level parts produce some higher-level outcome of the whole mechanism.¹⁶ Cascades, on the other hand, are level-agnostic with respect to their causes and effects. Cascades can have causes and effects at the same level, higher-level causes that produce lower-level effects, and lower-level causes that produce higher-level effects.¹⁷ Additionally, the hierarchical nature of mechanisms contributes to the view that they are “discrete” systems with lower-level parts that are contained within higher-levels. Cascades are not confined in this way—they can spill over from one system to another as they ripple through some domain. With cascades the emphasis is on causal influence that moves upstream-to-downstream, without being confined to levels or always moving bottom-up. Cascades have causal influence that is better understood as “relationships between distinct” factors, as opposed to “a whole and its parts” (Craver 2007, 178).

Second, cascades and mechanisms are studied with different investigative strategies. Recall that mechanisms are studied with decomposition and localization, which involves fixing an explanatory target and then drilling down to identify its lower-level causal parts (Bechtel and Richardson 2010). Cascades are not studied in this way for a variety of reasons. First, as indicated above, cascades do not always have lower-level causes that one can drill down to find. Causal factors in cascades can extend across many different levels and scales. Second, the first step of fixing an explanatory target is ill-suited to cascades because—unlike mechanisms—they are not always relative to single outcomes. We see this in cascades with multi-product amplification, in which many effects are produced. Another difference is that when cascades are studied their entire set of effects are not always known, but part of what scientists want to uncover. Instead of starting with an effect and drilling down, a better approach for cascades can involve starting with the trigger and expanding

¹⁵Other examples not discussed in detail are collision cascades, oxidative cascades, and social cascades.

¹⁶As Craver states, “[t]he property or activity at a higher level of mechanisms is the behavior of the mechanism as a whole (the explanandum phenomenon); the parts of the mechanism and their activities are at a lower level” (Craver 2007, 165). This is also seen in (Wimsatt 1974, 686). For more on the organizational properties of mechanisms, see section 5.2

¹⁷Enzymatic cascades are an example of the first type as the cause and effect are both enzymes. An example of higher-level causes producing lower-level effects are energy cascades involved in turbulence, which involve the transfer of energy from “large scales of motion to the small scales” (Richardson 1922, 66). Another example are traumatic experiences that alter gene expression, referred to as “downward cascades” (Masten and Cicchetti 2010, 492). Finally, a cascade example with a lower-level cause that produces a higher-level effect is a hormone cascade, in which a hormone trigger produces some system-level behavior. Another example is a pharmacological intervention that alters behavior, sometimes called an “upward cascade” (Masten and Cicchetti 2010, 492).

out to identify what effects are produced. This requires a system-wide outlook, which contrasts with the more local focus on discrete mechanisms.¹⁸

Finally, studying cascades involves other challenges that are not necessarily present in mechanisms. As it is difficult to stop a cascade once initiated there is often significant focus on experimental manipulations of the causal trigger. This is related to the significance of the causal trigger for prediction, prevention, and control. For example, consider developmental cascades in psychology where triggers in early childhood can cascade into many other outcomes. In this case “the evidence in prevention science indicates a higher return on investment in early childhood interventions”—in other words, targeting upstream portions of the cascade provides more control over downstream outcomes (compared to targeting intermediate or later factors) (Masten and Cicchetti 2010, 491). The amplification and stable progression of cascades have motivated other means of controlling these systems. In an effort to prevent catastrophic large-scale avalanches, scientists will purposefully trigger smaller “controlled” avalanches to reduce excessive snowfall buildup. Similar strategies have been suggested for Covid-19, by exposing “individuals whose probability of developing serious health conditions is low” under “controlled supervision” to reach herd immunity faster (Klement et al. 2020). While the cascade’s trigger receives significant attention for the purposes of prediction, prevention, and control, there are also efforts to identify intermediate causes and background factors that can be manipulated to control cascades even when the trigger has been initiated.

Third, unlike mechanisms, cascades are not expected to contain mechanical or other types of fine-grained causal detail. Various philosophers suggest that identifying a “complete” mechanism requires specifying the “activities” present in causal connections “without leaving gaps, or using filler terms to ‘stand for some-process-we-know-not’ ” (Craver 2007, 113-4). In particular, models that “black box” or abstract from information about “working components” are not sufficiently mechanistic, as “mechanisms are the working components revealed by opening black boxes” (Craver 2007, 113). Overly sparse models fail to meet mechanist standards as one “loses sight of how the nodes work to produce, underlie, or maintain the phenomenon” (Craver and Darden 2013, 91). Clarifying “how” causes produce their effects is very much the business of mechanisms and this is provided by specifying “mechanical” or “activity” information about causal connections.¹⁹

While mechanisms are expected to contain fine-grained and mechanical details, cascades are not. Cascades capture “that” a cause amplifies its effect, but they need not detail “how” this amplification takes place. Appreciating this distinction is important for two main reasons. First, when cascades are explanatory their lower-level mechanistic detail is often unnecessary for the explanation. In these cases, it is the presence of one-to-many amplification that does the explanatory work, not the details of how this amplification is produced. Perturbing the grey wolf population in Yellowstone National Park results in a trophic cascade because of their position in a set of inter-

¹⁸Even if mechanisms can sometimes be studied with methods other than (i) decomposition and localization (say, by “bottom-up” discovery) the point is that (i) is a common way of studying mechanisms (even if not the exclusive way) and it is rarely a suitable way for studying cascades (for the reasons mentioned above).

¹⁹Why can’t cascades be a component of or organizational feature of some mechanisms? Importantly, cascades lack features characteristic of mechanisms, as they do not have (i) part-whole organization and they lack (ii) mechanical “how” detail. So if a causal structure involves a cascade as a component, it would not be viewed as mechanistic because it lacks features that are characteristic of and required for mechanisms. That being said, I do think that mechanisms can involve amplification, which is a sub-feature of cascades. It is possible for a mechanism to involve causal amplification at any step, but it will specify fine-grained details regarding “how” this amplification occurs.

connections in the ecosystem. Disrupting the raven or song bird populations would not have this effect, because they lack a similar interconnected position. Once these higher-level connections in the ecosystem are identified, including lower-level mechanistic information is possible, but unnecessary for the explanation. In the grey wolf trophic cascade, you do not need to know the causal mechanical details of *how* the Elk consumes the willow tree and other plant species, you just need to know *that* it consumes many species, as opposed to few.

Distinguishing these causal structures is also important because, in some cases cascade information explains, while mechanistic information is completely unexplanatory. In order to see this consider that the same cascade can be instantiated by different causal mechanical “how” details. As an example, consider the cascade-like spread of Covid-19 and other infectious diseases. Notice that we use the same branching diagram to represent and explain the amplified spread of Covid-19 in various contexts, even though the mechanisms of spread differ drastically across these contexts. Covid-19 can be spread through different mechanisms of airborne transmission (talking, coughing, sneezing, etc.), contact with contaminated objects (door handles, shared utensils, etc.), and so on. In these cases, the cascade structure is helpful because it communicates that the spread is one-to-many as opposed to one-to-one. This is important because it means the disease is more easily transmitted, harder to control, and that early containment is crucial. All of these are implications of the shared higher-level cascade structure and not lower-level mechanisms (which differ greatly across these systems). If you want to explain covid transmission across these contexts you cannot appeal to lower-level mechanisms because they differs across these cases. However, we can appeal to the cascade causal structure because it is shared across these cases and it captures the main features of this causal spread.

Fourth, while mechanisms are discrete systems in a hierarchical sense, the beginning and end of cascades are more precisely defined. Mechanistic philosophers have claimed that the start and finish of mechanisms are dictated by pragmatic, contextual factors, without representing natural divisions in the world (Craver 2009; Bechtel 2015). The bounds of a mechanism can change depending on goals, interests, and explanatory targets. With cascades, no matter what pragmatic and contextual considerations are involved, we know that their beginning and end have objective features. The cascade begins with a small causal trigger and ends with a large downstream effect.

5.2 Potential objections. This paper suggests that cascades and mechanisms are distinct causal structures—that they are associated with distinct features, analogies, and causal investigative strategies. This differs from common philosophical views that all causal concepts and causal structures in science are well understood as mechanisms.

In completing this analysis it will help to address some potential objections. A first objection states that the discussion in this paper is merely semantic or terminological. This could be used to imply that this analysis is trivial and inconsequential. Who cares whether a causal structure is referred to by one name or another? Who cares whether we call a causal system “cascade” versus “mechanism”? While there are important arguments for how these structures are named (which I discuss soon) this detracts from deeper questions that motivate this analysis and that are viewed as foundational in philosophy. These include: “What types of causal structure are present in the world?” and “Are these structures explanatory?”. Mainstream responses to these questions cite mechanisms, so we are obligated to ask what mechanisms are and what causal system(s) they refers to. This paper answers these questions by specifying two types of causal structure (whatever you want to call them) that are identified in science and that figure in scientific explanations.

This provides a novel and scientifically informed answer to these questions—questions which are not trivial or inconsequential, but that are viewed as foundational in philosophy.

A second objection accepts my distinction between these causal concepts and structures, but claims that mechanisms are more explanatory than cascades. This is often motivated by a *reductive* mechanism position, which views the fine-grained, lower-level detail of mechanisms as providing enhanced explanatory power. A first response to this objection (outlined in the last subsection) asserts that for many explanatory targets mechanistic details are *unnecessary*, while cascade information explains. In these cases, it is the presence of one-to-many amplification that does the explanatory work, not the details of how this amplification is produced. In these cases the mechanistic details can be included, but they do not enhance or improve the explanation.

There is a stronger response to this objection. In some cases, mechanism information is *unexplanatory* in the sense of detracting from the explanation, while the cascade structure explains. This occurs when a group of systems share a cascade structure, but have different mechanisms instantiating this structure. This is seen in explanations of the cascade-like spread of covid in different locations, despite the fact that the causal mechanical details of transmission vary from one context to another. Other examples include physiological cascades (such as visual phototransduction) in which there is the same initial trigger and amplified effect, but the enzymes processing the amplification can differ across instances of the cascade. The reason why these systems exhibit a similar outcome is not explained by lower-level mechanisms, which differ across systems. It is explained by the one-to-many cascade structure that is shared across all cases. We can also make this point in a broader way. Why do trophic cascades, enzyme cascades, and cascading reactions in physics all produce large amounts of some effect? It is not because they all share lower-level mechanisms—their mechanistic and microstructural details differ enormously. The explanation for this is that all of these systems share the same higher-level cascade structure, in which a triggering cause initiates some sequence of one-to-many causal amplification steps.

A third objection to this analysis rejects these distinctions and claims that what I call a “cascade” is really a mechanism. This represents an *expansive* mechanistic position as it proposes that all (or most) causal structures are well understood as mechanisms. This position is associated with views that mechanisms can be abstract and can have various types of organization, beyond part-whole (Craver and Tabery 2015). For example, some suggest that mechanisms are not characterized by any particular organization, but by “organization” in general, thus, any organized causal structures qualifies as a mechanism. On these views, different “abstract patterns of organization” count as mechanisms, including positive feedback loops, causal chains, and so on (Bechtel and Levy 2013). One initial reaction to this objection is that if mechanism is to be a useful concept, it should refer to a causal structure with specific features. The feature “organization” or “any organization” is not specific enough to meet this standard. Most (if not all) causal structures will have some form of organization, leading this broad definition to cover nearly all causal systems. If all causal systems are mechanisms, what use is the “mechanism” concept?

Here is how I think we should respond to this objection. As philosophers we are free to define mechanisms however we like—this is often done according to various standards that we find appropriate. We can define mechanism in a broad way suggested by this objection or in a narrow way as I have done in my analysis. If we choose to define mechanism in this broad way, this comes with various disadvantages. In order to see what these are consider the following. As scientists have explored the world they have identified various causal structures, which they distinguish from one another. Some causal systems have constitutive relations, other are more linear, some have

amplifying effects, others do not, and so on. Part of what this expansive definition suggests is that all of these causal structures are well understood as mechanisms. However, if all of these structures are mechanisms—and they have varying features such that none are characteristic of unique to the mechanism concept—then mechanism just means “complex causal structure” and we might as well replace it with this. This is a problem because we often think that “mechanism” communicates more than this. Thus, a first problem with the broad definition of mechanism is that we lose out on “mechanism” meaning anything more than “complex causal structure” and we usually think that it conveys more than this.

A second problem is that this broad notion of mechanism fails to accurately capture how scientists use causal terminology. This noteworthy because scientific use of this term was an original motivation for many mechanistic accounts of causal explanation (Machamer et al. 2000, 2). What is sometimes overlooked is that scientists often expect descriptions of mechanisms to contain significant causal detail. This is seen in discussions of a drug’s mechanism of action and mechanisms of enzyme catalysis. These mechanisms are expected to provide “a comprehensive understanding of the entire sequence of events” and “detailed knowledge of the causal and temporal relationships among all the steps leading to a specific effect” (Hutchinson 2007, 7) (Ankley et al. 2010, 731). This expectation of significant detail often leads scientists to admit that they do not yet have the complete mechanism of interest although they continue to work toward this.

With the cascade concept scientists often explicitly acknowledge the focus on a sparser causal structure. In early work on the cascade model of blood coagulation, MacFarlane distinguished this model from a more detailed mechanistic understanding. He claimed that the cascade model captured “the gross ways in which [components] interact [rather] than in details of their individual structure” and that this work is distinct from “later detailed investigation of its underlying mechanism in terms of molecular structure” (Macfarlane 1966, 592). Cascade models are similar to other abstract causal systems that only capture “selected key events” and that have “gaps and black boxes in which mechanistic details are either unknown or not needed” (Hutchinson 2007, 1) (Ankley et al. 2010, 732). The fact that scientists reserve the term “mechanism” for highly detailed systems puts pressure on claims that it could “do the same work” as concepts such as “cascade” which refer to systems that are less-detailed and have other unique features.

Third, if we adopt this broad notion of mechanism we lose out on the utility of analogy and analogical reasoning. One advantage of the mechanism and cascade concepts is that they are “linguistic labels” that originate from causal systems we are familiar with in everyday life (Gentner and Smith 2012). Drawing on knowledge of familiar causal structures is a useful way to make complex causal systems in science more cognitively accessible. This allows scientists to highlight features of causal systems that are important for their functioning, behavior, and for the questions of interest. Use of these concepts necessarily depends on background knowledge of the audience—this means that these concepts can mislead if used inappropriately or facilitate understanding when cited at the right time. If the goal is to communicate the steps of a developmental pathway or the sequential growth of a cascade, calling these “mechanisms” can lead to incorrect conclusions about the system. Use of “mechanism” can lead audiences to assume these systems have properties that they lack (reductive character, lower-levels components, and mechanical interactions) and to overlook properties that they have (higher-level causal connections, sequential amplification, flow of material, etc.).

Appreciating the role of these terms in communicating causal information is important for the general project of science communication, how scientists convey their work to various audiences

(experts, lay persons, etc.), and how philosophers formulate and justify their views of the causal structure of the world. This point also has more direct implications for scientific work. In particular, the mechanism and cascade concepts influence theoretical frameworks in science—what causal information is present in the world and what types of causal information are most important (or more important than others). This understanding—and assumptions that all the world’s causal structure is mechanistic or that mechanistic information is the most “fundamental” or important type—influences what types of science are pursued, funded, and viewed as important. A richer perspective on different causal systems allows for a more explicit assessment about which causal systems are prioritized in current scientific work and funding, and whether this prioritization aligns with our scientific goals. This assessment—encouraged by an analysis of diverse causal systems—has the potential to suggest increasing support for projects that capture more abstract, generalizable structures and reexamining the potential for an over-prioritization of mechanism studies.

My responses to this final objection and the expansive notion of mechanism are pointing to a similar worry. This worry is that if mechanism means everything, it starts to mean nothing. Indeed, on some accounts “it seems that mechanisms just are whatever explains whatever happens” and “there is a serious danger of vacuity in [these] treatments of the topic” (Dupré 2013). There are substantial concerns about whether this notion of mechanism can capture the diversity of causal structure in science and whether it does justice to the mechanism concept itself. It should be uncontroversial that “[i]f the concept of a mechanism is to do any work, we must surely have some sense of what isn’t a mechanism” (Dupré 2013). Along these lines, if “mechanism” is more than just a synonym for “causal structure” (which would trivialize the mechanism concept) it should be clear what causal structures do and do not count as mechanisms.

Our world contains different types of causal systems—this is a fact that we cannot deny. Some causal relationships are oriented linearly, others branch out; some causes are fast others are slow; some causes are strong others are weak; some are stable, while others are sensitive. We care about these distinctions, in science and everyday life, because causal structures with different features have different implications. They provide different types of control over outcomes in the world and these are more or less useful given our interests. Scientists are going to study and appreciate these distinctions no matter what they are called. This is harder to do when all causal structures are referred to as mechanisms and “mechanism” loses its meaning. This is easier to do when we accept and appreciate different causal terms, analogies they are associated with, and the distinct causal structures they refer to.

6 Conclusion A considerable amount of philosophical work has focused on the causal structure of the world and how this structure figures in explanation. Many accounts interpret this structure as mechanistic and claim that genuine causal explanations appeal to mechanisms. If mechanism just means “complex causal structure” then these accounts are trivially true. On this reading, causal explanations appeal to mechanisms, of course, but nothing new has been said. However, if mechanism has a non-trivial meaning and refers to a causal structure with particular features—constitutive relations, mechanical interactions, or others—we have good reason to conclude that it alone will fail to capture the diversity of causal structure in science. While all complex causal structures contain causal relations, there is incredible variation when it comes to their other features.

This analysis supports a form of pluralism about causal structures in the world. While this pluralist picture is supported by scientific work, it can be obscured by a default preference for “mechanism” terminology in both science and philosophy. This one-size-fits-all causal concept fails

to capture the diverse causal systems present in the world and it can have unintended consequences—privileging particular types of work, limiting our conception of what the world is like, and how it should be studied. While this paper suggests new ways of understanding causal structure in science, it also raises new questions that have yet to be addressed. For example, there is much more to say about the cascade concept in particular, including how it may differ across contexts, how it relates interconnections within a system (and the concepts of redundancy, modularity, etc.), and the role of background conditions in supporting cascade-like reactions. It should be clear how this structure relates to “the butterfly effect,” positive and negative feedback loops, and systems that involve causal dampening, as opposed to amplification. While other work has argued for the distinctiveness of the pathway concept (Ross 2018, 2021), it will be illuminating to explore whether other non-mechanistic causal structures exist. It seems likely that pathways and cascades only scratch the surface of the diverse types of causal systems in science. Capturing this diversity is necessary for an accurate conception of the causal structure of the world, for a full picture of the methods and reasoning we use in identifying this structure, and a realistic starting point in communicating this structure to various audiences.

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