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A minimal construal of scientific structuralism

Brading, Katherine and Landry, Elaine (2005) A minimal construal of scientific structuralism. In: [2004] Philosophy of Science Assoc. 19th Biennial Meeting - PSA2004: Contributed Papers (Austin, TX; 2004) > PSA 2004 Symposia. (Unpublished)

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    Abstract

    The focus of this paper is the recent revival of interest in structuralist approaches to science and, in particular, the structural realist position in philosophy of science . The challenge facing scientific structuralists is three-fold: i) to characterize scientific theories in ‘structural’ terms, and to use this characterization ii) to establish a theory-world connection (including an explanation of applicability) and iii) to address the relationship of ‘structural continuity’ between predecessor and successor theories. Our aim is to appeal to the notion of shared structure between models to reconsider all of these challenges, and, in so doing, to classify the varieties of scientific structuralism and to offer a ‘minimal’ construal that is best viewed from a methodological stance.


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    Item Type: Conference or Workshop Item (UNSPECIFIED)
    Keywords: structuralism structural realism semantic view of theories models
    Subjects: General Issues > Structure of Theories
    General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
    Conferences and Volumes: [2004] Philosophy of Science Assoc. 19th Biennial Meeting - PSA2004: Contributed Papers (Austin, TX; 2004) > PSA 2004 Symposia
    Depositing User: Katherine A. Brading
    Date Deposited: 29 Jan 2005
    Last Modified: 07 Oct 2010 11:13
    Item ID: 2181
    Public Domain: No
    Conference Date: November 2004
    Conference Location: Austin, Texas
    URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/2181

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