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Experimental Realism Defended: How Inference to the Most Likely Cause Might Be Sound

Suárez, Mauricio (2005) Experimental Realism Defended: How Inference to the Most Likely Cause Might Be Sound. [Preprint]

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Abstract

On a purely epistemic understanding of experimental realism, manipulation affords a particularly robust kind of causal warrant, which is – like any other warrant – defeasible. I defend a version of Nancy Cartwright’s inference to the most likely cause, and I conclude that this minimally epistemic version of experimental realism is a coherent, adequate and plausible epistemology for science.


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
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Suárez, Mauricio
Additional Information: Forthcoming in L. Bovens and S. Hartmann (eds.), Nancy Cartwright's Philosophy of Science, Routledge.
Keywords: Causal Inference, Experimental Realism, Scientific epistemology
Subjects: General Issues > Causation
General Issues > Philosophers of Science
General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
Depositing User: Mauricio Suárez
Date Deposited: 07 Apr 2005
Last Modified: 18 Aug 2016 22:52
Item ID: 2252
URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/2252

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