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The Tacking by Disjunction Paradox: Bayesianism versus Hypothetico-deductivism

Moretti, Luca (2005) The Tacking by Disjunction Paradox: Bayesianism versus Hypothetico-deductivism. [Preprint]

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    Abstract

    Hypothetico-deductivists have struggled to develop qualitative confirmation theories not raising the so-called tacking by disjunction paradox. In this paper, I analyze the difficulties yielded by the paradox and I argue that the hypothetico-deductivist solutions given by Gemes (1998) and Kuipers (2000) are questionable because they do not fit such analysis. I then show that the paradox yields no difficulty for the Bayesian who appeals to the Total Evidence Condition. I finally argue that the same strategy is unavailable to the hypothetico-deductivist.


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    Item Type: Preprint
    Additional Information: This paper has been published in Erkenntnis 64(1), pp. 115-138. (The original publication is available at www.springerlink.com)
    Keywords: Confirmation paradox, tacking by disjunction, Bayesianism, Hypothetico-deductivism, total evidence, Gemes, Kuipers, Grimes
    Subjects: General Issues > Confirmation/Induction
    Depositing User: Luca Moretti
    Date Deposited: 13 May 2005
    Last Modified: 07 Oct 2010 11:13
    Item ID: 2289
    URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/2289

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