Moretti, Luca (2005) The Tacking by Disjunction Paradox: Bayesianism versus Hypothetico-deductivism. [Preprint]
Abstract
Hypothetico-deductivists have struggled to develop qualitative confirmation theories not raising the so-called tacking by disjunction paradox. In this paper, I analyze the difficulties yielded by the paradox and I argue that the hypothetico-deductivist solutions given by Gemes (1998) and Kuipers (2000) are questionable because they do not fit such analysis. I then show that the paradox yields no difficulty for the Bayesian who appeals to the Total Evidence Condition. I finally argue that the same strategy is unavailable to the hypothetico-deductivist.
| Item Type: | Preprint |
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| Additional Information: | This paper has been published in Erkenntnis 64(1), pp. 115-138. (The original publication is available at www.springerlink.com) |
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| Keywords: | Confirmation paradox, tacking by disjunction, Bayesianism, Hypothetico-deductivism, total evidence, Gemes, Kuipers, Grimes |
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| Subjects: | General Issues > Confirmation/Induction |
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| Depositing User: | Luca Moretti |
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| Date Deposited: | 13 May 2005 |
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| Last Modified: | 07 Oct 2010 11:13 |
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| Item ID: | 2289 |
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| URI: | http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/2289 |
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