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Presentism and Quantum Gravity

Monton, Bradley (2005) Presentism and Quantum Gravity. [Preprint]

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      Abstract

      There is a philosophical tradition of arguing against presentism, the thesis that only presently existing things exist, on the basis of its incompatibility with fundamental physics. I grant that presentism is incompatible with special and general relativity, but argue that presentism is not incompatible with quantum gravity, because there are some theories of quantum gravity that utilize a fixed foliation of spacetime. I reply to various objections to this defense of presentism, and point out a flaw in Gödel’s modal argument for the ideality of time. This paper provides an interesting case study of the interplay between physics and philosophy.

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      Item Type: Preprint
      Keywords: constant mean curvature, fixed foliation, Mark Hinchliff, Gordon Belot, John Earman, Craig Callender, Kurt Gödel
      Subjects: Specific Sciences > Physics > Relativity Theory
      Specific Sciences > Physics > Quantum Mechanics
      Specific Sciences > Physics > Quantum Field Theory
      Depositing User: Bradley Monton
      Date Deposited: 19 May 2005
      Last Modified: 07 Oct 2010 11:13
      Item ID: 2308
      URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/2308

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