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Representation: the Problem for Structuralism

van Fraassen, Bas C. (2004) Representation: the Problem for Structuralism. In: [2004] Philosophy of Science Assoc. 19th Biennial Meeting - PSA2004: Contributed Papers (Austin, TX; 2004) > PSA 2004 Symposia. (In Press)

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    Abstract

    What does it mean, to embed the phenomena in an abstract structure? Or to represent them by doing so? The semantic view of theories runs into a severe problem if these notions are construed either naively, in a metaphysical way, or too closely on the pattern of the earlier syntactic view. Constructive empiricism and structural realism will then share those difficulties. The problem will be posed as in Reichenbach’s The Theory of Relativity and A Priori Knowledge, and realist reactions examined, but will be argued to dissolve upon scrutiny.


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    Item Type: Conference or Workshop Item (UNSPECIFIED)
    Subjects: General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
    Conferences and Volumes: [2004] Philosophy of Science Assoc. 19th Biennial Meeting - PSA2004: Contributed Papers (Austin, TX; 2004) > PSA 2004 Symposia
    Depositing User: Bas C. van Fraassen
    Date Deposited: 25 Nov 2005
    Last Modified: 07 Oct 2010 11:13
    Item ID: 2498
    Public Domain: No
    Conference Date: Nov. 2004
    Conference Location: Austin TX
    URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/2498

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