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POPPER, KUHN, LAKATOS AND AIM-ORIENTED EMPIRICISM

Maxwell, Nicholas (2001) POPPER, KUHN, LAKATOS AND AIM-ORIENTED EMPIRICISM. [Preprint]

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    Abstract

    In this paper I argue that aim-oriented empiricism (AOE), a conception of natural science that I have defended at some length elsewhere, is a kind of synthesis of the views of Popper, Kuhn and Lakatos, but is also an improvement over the views of all three. Whereas Popper's falsificationism protects metaphysical assumptions implicitly made by science from criticism, AOE exposes all such assumptions to sustained criticism, and furthermore focuses criticism on those assumptions most likely to need revision if science is to make progress. Even though AOE is, in this way, more Popperian than Popper, it is also, in some respects, more like the views of Kuhn and Lakatos than falsificationism is. AOE is able, however, to solve problems which Kuhn's and Lakatos's views cannot solve.


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    Item Type: Preprint
    Keywords: Popper Kuhn Lakatos scientific method scientific rationality falsificationism paradigm revolution progress metaphysics research programme knowledge
    Subjects: General Issues > Confirmation/Induction
    General Issues > Philosophers of Science
    Specific Sciences > Physics
    General Issues > Structure of Theories
    General Issues > Theory Change
    Depositing User: Nicholas Maxwell
    Date Deposited: 29 Apr 2001
    Last Modified: 07 Oct 2010 11:10
    Item ID: 251
    URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/251

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