Maxwell, Nicholas (2001) Popper, Kuhn, Lakatos, and Aim-Oriented Empiricism. UNSPECIFIED.
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In this paper I argue that aim-oriented empiricism (AOE), a conception of natural science that I have defended at some length elsewhere, is a kind of synthesis of the views of Popper, Kuhn and Lakatos, but is also an improvement over the views of all three. Whereas Popper's falsificationism protects metaphysical assumptions implicitly made by science from criticism, AOE exposes all such assumptions to sustained criticism, and furthermore focuses criticism on those assumptions most likely to need revision if science is to make progress. Even though AOE is, in this way, more Popperian than Popper, it is also, in some respects, more like the views of Kuhn and Lakatos than falsificationism is. AOE is able, however, to solve problems which Kuhn's and Lakatos's views cannot solve.
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|Keywords:||Scientific rationality, Popper, Kuhn, Lakatos, methodology, scientific progress, falsificationism, empiricism, metaphysics, philosophy of physics, research programmes.|
|Subjects:||General Issues > Confirmation/Induction|
General Issues > Theory Change
General Issues > Philosophers of Science
|Depositing User:||Nicholas Maxwell|
|Date Deposited:||06 Jan 2006|
|Last Modified:||07 Oct 2010 11:13|
Available Versions of this Item
- POPPER, KUHN, LAKATOS AND AIM-ORIENTED EMPIRICISM. (deposited 29 Apr 2001)
- Popper, Kuhn, Lakatos, and Aim-Oriented Empiricism. (deposited 06 Jan 2006)[Currently Displayed]
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