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Modal Metaphysics and the Everett Interpretation

Wilson, Alastair (2006) Modal Metaphysics and the Everett Interpretation. UNSPECIFIED. (Unpublished)

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      Abstract

      Recent work on probability in the Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics yields a decision-theoretic derivation of David Lewis’ Principal Principle, and hence a general metaphysical theory of probability; part 1 is a discussion of this remarkable result. I defend the claim that the ‘subjective uncertainty’ principle is required for the derivation to succeed, arguing that it amounts to a theoretical identification of chance. In part 2, I generalize this account, and suggest that the Everett interpretation, in combination with a plausible view of natural laws, has the potential to provide a reductive theory of metaphysical modality. I defend the resulting naturalistic modal realism, and outline some of its implications for other parts of metaphysics.

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      Item Type: Other
      Additional Information: Manuscript originally produced for a university examination, substantially rewritten. A more compact version will be forthcoming later this year.
      Keywords: modality possibility Everett many-worlds modal realism necessity possibility
      Subjects: General Issues > Laws of Nature
      General Issues > Determinism/Indeterminism
      Specific Sciences > Physics > Quantum Mechanics
      Depositing User: Alastair Wilson
      Date Deposited: 16 Feb 2006
      Last Modified: 07 Oct 2010 11:13
      Item ID: 2635
      Public Domain: No
      URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/2635

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