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Modal Metaphysics and the Everett Interpretation

Wilson, Alastair (2006) Modal Metaphysics and the Everett Interpretation. UNSPECIFIED. (Unpublished)

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Abstract

Recent work on probability in the Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics yields a decision-theoretic derivation of David Lewis’ Principal Principle, and hence a general metaphysical theory of probability; part 1 is a discussion of this remarkable result. I defend the claim that the ‘subjective uncertainty’ principle is required for the derivation to succeed, arguing that it amounts to a theoretical identification of chance. In part 2, I generalize this account, and suggest that the Everett interpretation, in combination with a plausible view of natural laws, has the potential to provide a reductive theory of metaphysical modality. I defend the resulting naturalistic modal realism, and outline some of its implications for other parts of metaphysics.


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Item Type: Other
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Wilson, Alastair
Additional Information: Manuscript originally produced for a university examination, substantially rewritten. A more compact version will be forthcoming later this year.
Keywords: modality possibility Everett many-worlds modal realism necessity possibility
Subjects: General Issues > Laws of Nature
General Issues > Determinism/Indeterminism
Specific Sciences > Physics > Quantum Mechanics
Depositing User: Alastair Wilson
Date Deposited: 16 Feb 2006
Last Modified: 07 Oct 2010 15:13
Item ID: 2635
Public Domain: No
URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/2635

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