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Quantum Sleeping Beauty

Lewis, Peter J. (2006) Quantum Sleeping Beauty. [Preprint]

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    Abstract

    The Sleeping Beauty paradox in epistemology and the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics both raise problems concerning subjective probability assignments. Furthermore, there are striking parallels between the two cases; in both cases personal experience has a branching structure, and in both cases the agent loses herself among the branches. However, the treatment of probability is very different in the two cases, for no good reason that I can see. Suppose, then, that we adopt the same treatment of probability in each case. Then the dominant ‘thirder’ solution to the Sleeping Beauty paradox becomes incompatible with the tenability of the many-worlds interpretation.


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    Item Type: Preprint
    Keywords: Quantum mechanics, many worlds, Everett, probability, Sleeping Beauty paradox
    Subjects: Specific Sciences > Physics > Quantum Mechanics
    Depositing User: Peter J. Lewis
    Date Deposited: 23 Apr 2006
    Last Modified: 07 Oct 2010 11:14
    Item ID: 2715
    URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/2715

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