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Probability Disassembled

Norton, John D. (2006) Probability Disassembled. [Preprint]

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    Abstract

    While there is no universal logic of induction, the probability calculus succeeds as a logic of induction in many contexts through its use of several notions concerning inductive inference. They include Addition, through which low probabilities represent disbelief as opposed to ignorance; and Bayes property, which commits the calculus to a ‘refute and rescale’ dynamics for incorporating new evidence. These notions are independent and it is urged that they be employed selectively according to needs of the problem at hand. It is shown that neither is adapted to inductive inference concerning some indeterministic systems.


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    Item Type: Preprint
    Keywords: Induction confirmation probability indeterminism Bayes
    Subjects: General Issues > Confirmation/Induction
    General Issues > Determinism/Indeterminism
    Depositing User: John Norton
    Date Deposited: 13 May 2006
    Last Modified: 07 Oct 2010 11:14
    Item ID: 2740
    URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/2740

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