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Computer Simulations in Game Theory

Weirich, Paul (2006) Computer Simulations in Game Theory. In: [2006] Models and Simulations (Paris, 2006). (Unpublished)

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    Abstract

    A computer simulation runs a model generating a phenomenon under investigation. For the simulation to be explanatory, the model has to be explanatory. The model must be isomorphic to the natural system that realizes the phenomenon. This paper elaborates the method of assessing a simulation's explanatory power. Then it illustrates the method by applying it to two simulations in game theory. The first is Brian Skyrms's (1990) simulation of interactive deliberations. It is intended to explain the emergence of a Nash equilibrium in a noncooperative game. The second is Skyrms's (2004) simulation of the evolution of cooperation. It is intended to explain cooperation in assurance games. The final section suggests ways of enhancing the explanatory power of these simulations.


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    Item Type: Conference or Workshop Item (UNSPECIFIED)
    Keywords: Game theory
    Subjects: General Issues > Models and Idealization
    Conferences and Volumes: [2006] Models and Simulations (Paris, 2006)
    Depositing User: Paul Weirich
    Date Deposited: 01 Jun 2006
    Last Modified: 07 Oct 2010 11:14
    Item ID: 2754
    Public Domain: No
    Conference Date: June 12-13, 2006
    Conference Location: Paris
    URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/2754

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