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Carnap’s Logical Empiricism, Values, and American Pragmatism

Mormann, Thomas (2006) Carnap’s Logical Empiricism, Values, and American Pragmatism. In: UNSPECIFIED.


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Abstract. Value judgments are meaningless. This thesis was one of the notorious tenets of Carnap’s mature logical empiricism. Less well known is the fact that in the Aufbau values were con-sidered as philosophically respectable entities that could be constituted from value experiences. About 1930, however, values were banished to the realm of meaning-less me-taphysics, and Carnap came to endorse a strict emotivism. The aim of this paper is to shed new light on the question why Carnap abandoned his originally positive attitude concerning values. It is argued that Carnap’s non-cognitivist attitude was the symptom of a deep-rooted and never properly dissolved tension be-tween his conflicting inclinations towards Neokantianism and Lebensphilosophie. In America Carnap’s non-cognitivism became a major obstacle for a closer collaboration between lo-gical empiricists and American pragmatists. Carnap’s persisting ad---herence to the dualism of practical life and theoretical science was the ultimate reason why he could not accept Morris’s and Kaplan’s pragmatist the-ses that cognitivism might well are compatible with a logical and empiricist scientific philosophy.

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Item Type: Conference or Workshop Item (UNSPECIFIED)
Mormann, Thomas
Keywords: Carnap, Logical Empiricism, American Progmatism, Values
Subjects: General Issues > Logical Positivism/Logical Empiricism
Depositing User: Thomas Mormann
Date Deposited: 09 Oct 2006
Last Modified: 07 Oct 2010 15:14
Item ID: 2947

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