Schwitzgebel, Eric (2006) The Unreliability of Naive Introspection. In:  Philosophy of Science Assoc. 20th Biennial Mtg (Vancouver) > PSA 2006 Symposia.
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We are prone to gross error, even in favorable circumstances of extended reflection, about our own ongoing conscious experience, our current phenomenology. Even in this apparently privileged domain, our self-knowledge is faulty and untrustworthy. Examples highlighted in this paper include: emotional experience, peripheral vision, and the phenomenology of thought. Philosophical foundationalism supposing that we infer an external world from secure knowledge of our own consciousness is almost exactly backward.
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|Item Type:||Conference or Workshop Item (UNSPECIFIED)|
|Additional Information:||This paper will be abbreviated and revised with a philosophy of science audience in mind, for the purposes of PSA06|
|Keywords:||consciousness methodology introspection|
|Subjects:||Specific Sciences > Psychology/Psychiatry|
General Issues > Experimentation
|Conferences and Volumes:|| Philosophy of Science Assoc. 20th Biennial Mtg (Vancouver) > PSA 2006 Symposia|
|Depositing User:||Eric Schwitzgebel|
|Date Deposited:||11 Oct 2006|
|Last Modified:||07 Oct 2010 11:14|
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