Schwitzgebel, Eric (2006) The Unreliability of Naive Introspection. In: UNSPECIFIED.
Microsoft Word (.doc)
We are prone to gross error, even in favorable circumstances of extended reflection, about our own ongoing conscious experience, our current phenomenology. Even in this apparently privileged domain, our self-knowledge is faulty and untrustworthy. Examples highlighted in this paper include: emotional experience, peripheral vision, and the phenomenology of thought. Philosophical foundationalism supposing that we infer an external world from secure knowledge of our own consciousness is almost exactly backward.
|Export/Citation:||EndNote | BibTeX | Dublin Core | ASCII/Text Citation (Chicago) | HTML Citation | OpenURL|
|Item Type:||Conference or Workshop Item (UNSPECIFIED)|
|Additional Information:||This paper will be abbreviated and revised with a philosophy of science audience in mind, for the purposes of PSA06|
|Keywords:||consciousness methodology introspection|
|Subjects:||Specific Sciences > Psychology/Psychiatry
General Issues > Experimentation
|Depositing User:||Eric Schwitzgebel|
|Date Deposited:||11 Oct 2006|
|Last Modified:||07 Oct 2010 15:14|
Monthly Views for the past 3 years
Monthly Downloads for the past 3 years
Actions (login required)