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The Unreliability of Naive Introspection

Schwitzgebel, Eric (2006) The Unreliability of Naive Introspection. In: UNSPECIFIED.

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We are prone to gross error, even in favorable circumstances of extended reflection, about our own ongoing conscious experience, our current phenomenology. Even in this apparently privileged domain, our self-knowledge is faulty and untrustworthy. Examples highlighted in this paper include: emotional experience, peripheral vision, and the phenomenology of thought. Philosophical foundationalism supposing that we infer an external world from secure knowledge of our own consciousness is almost exactly backward.

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Item Type: Conference or Workshop Item (UNSPECIFIED)
Schwitzgebel, Eric
Additional Information: This paper will be abbreviated and revised with a philosophy of science audience in mind, for the purposes of PSA06
Keywords: consciousness methodology introspection
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Psychology/Psychiatry
General Issues > Experimentation
Depositing User: Eric Schwitzgebel
Date Deposited: 11 Oct 2006
Last Modified: 07 Oct 2010 15:14
Item ID: 2965

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