PhilSci Archive

The Unreliability of Naive Introspection

Schwitzgebel, Eric (2006) The Unreliability of Naive Introspection. In: [2006] Philosophy of Science Assoc. 20th Biennial Mtg (Vancouver) > PSA 2006 Symposia.

[img] Microsoft Word (.doc)
Download (124Kb)

    Abstract

    We are prone to gross error, even in favorable circumstances of extended reflection, about our own ongoing conscious experience, our current phenomenology. Even in this apparently privileged domain, our self-knowledge is faulty and untrustworthy. Examples highlighted in this paper include: emotional experience, peripheral vision, and the phenomenology of thought. Philosophical foundationalism supposing that we infer an external world from secure knowledge of our own consciousness is almost exactly backward.


    Export/Citation:EndNote | BibTeX | Dublin Core | ASCII/Text Citation (Chicago) | HTML Citation | OpenURL
    Social Networking:

    Item Type: Conference or Workshop Item (UNSPECIFIED)
    Additional Information: This paper will be abbreviated and revised with a philosophy of science audience in mind, for the purposes of PSA06
    Keywords: consciousness methodology introspection
    Subjects: Specific Sciences > Psychology/Psychiatry
    General Issues > Experimentation
    Conferences and Volumes: [2006] Philosophy of Science Assoc. 20th Biennial Mtg (Vancouver) > PSA 2006 Symposia
    Depositing User: Eric Schwitzgebel
    Date Deposited: 11 Oct 2006
    Last Modified: 07 Oct 2010 11:14
    Item ID: 2965
    URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/2965

    Actions (login required)

    View Item

    Document Downloads