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Two Causal Mistakes in Wegner's Illusion of Conscious Will

Andersen, Holly (2006) Two Causal Mistakes in Wegner's Illusion of Conscious Will. In: [2006] Philosophy of Science Assoc. 20th Biennial Mtg (Vancouver) > PSA 2006 Contributed Papers.

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    Abstract

    Daniel Wegner argues that our feelings of conscious will are illusory: these feelings are not causally involved in the production of action, which is rather governed by unconscious neural processes. I argue that Wegner's interpretation of neuroscientific results rests on two fallacious causal assumptions, neither of which are supported by the evidence. Each assumption involves a Cartesian disembodiment of conscious will, and it is this disembodiment that results in the appearance of causal inefficacy, rather than any interesting features of conscious will. Wegner's fallacies illustrate two take-away points to heed if making claims about the causal structure of agency.


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    Item Type: Conference or Workshop Item (UNSPECIFIED)
    Keywords: agency, Libet, Wegner, will, causal representation
    Subjects: General Issues > Causation
    Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science
    Conferences and Volumes: [2006] Philosophy of Science Assoc. 20th Biennial Mtg (Vancouver) > PSA 2006 Contributed Papers
    Depositing User: Dr. Holly Andersen
    Date Deposited: 21 Oct 2006
    Last Modified: 07 Oct 2010 11:14
    Item ID: 3008
    URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/3008

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