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Two Causal Mistakes in Wegner's Illusion of Conscious Will

Andersen, Holly (2006) Two Causal Mistakes in Wegner's Illusion of Conscious Will. In: UNSPECIFIED.

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Abstract

Daniel Wegner argues that our feelings of conscious will are illusory: these feelings are not causally involved in the production of action, which is rather governed by unconscious neural processes. I argue that Wegner's interpretation of neuroscientific results rests on two fallacious causal assumptions, neither of which are supported by the evidence. Each assumption involves a Cartesian disembodiment of conscious will, and it is this disembodiment that results in the appearance of causal inefficacy, rather than any interesting features of conscious will. Wegner's fallacies illustrate two take-away points to heed if making claims about the causal structure of agency.


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Item Type: Conference or Workshop Item (UNSPECIFIED)
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Andersen, Holly
Keywords: agency, Libet, Wegner, will, causal representation
Subjects: General Issues > Causation
Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science
Depositing User: Dr. Holly Andersen
Date Deposited: 21 Oct 2006
Last Modified: 07 Oct 2010 15:14
Item ID: 3008
URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/3008

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