Douglas, Heather (2006) Norms for Values in Scientific Belief Acceptance. In:  Philosophy of Science Assoc. 20th Biennial Mtg (Vancouver) > PSA 2006 Contributed Papers.
Although a strict dichotomy between facts and values is no longer accepted, less attention has been paid to the roles values should play in our acceptance of factual statements, or scientific descriptive claims. This paper argues that values, whether cognitive or ethical, should never preclude or direct belief on their own. Our wanting something to be true will not make it so. Instead, values should only be used to consider whether the available evidence provides sufficient warrant for a claim. This argument is made for all relevant values, including cognitive, ethical, and social values. The rational integrity of science depends not on excluding some values and including others in the reasoning process, but of constraining all values to their proper role in belief acceptance.
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