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Norms for Values in Scientific Belief Acceptance

Douglas, Heather (2006) Norms for Values in Scientific Belief Acceptance. In: [2006] Philosophy of Science Assoc. 20th Biennial Mtg (Vancouver) > PSA 2006 Contributed Papers.

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    Abstract

    Although a strict dichotomy between facts and values is no longer accepted, less attention has been paid to the roles values should play in our acceptance of factual statements, or scientific descriptive claims. This paper argues that values, whether cognitive or ethical, should never preclude or direct belief on their own. Our wanting something to be true will not make it so. Instead, values should only be used to consider whether the available evidence provides sufficient warrant for a claim. This argument is made for all relevant values, including cognitive, ethical, and social values. The rational integrity of science depends not on excluding some values and including others in the reasoning process, but of constraining all values to their proper role in belief acceptance.


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    Item Type: Conference or Workshop Item (UNSPECIFIED)
    Subjects: General Issues > Values In Science
    Conferences and Volumes: [2006] Philosophy of Science Assoc. 20th Biennial Mtg (Vancouver) > PSA 2006 Contributed Papers
    Depositing User: Heather Douglas
    Date Deposited: 03 Nov 2006
    Last Modified: 07 Oct 2010 11:14
    Item ID: 3024
    URI: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/3024

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