Norton, John D. (2006) Induction without Probabilities. In:  LSE-Pitt Conference: Confirmation, Induction and Science (London, 8 - 10 March, 2007).
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A simple indeterministic system is displayed and it is urged that we cannot responsibly infer inductively over it if we presume that the probability calculus is the appropriate logic of induction. The example illustrates the general thesis of a material theory of induction, that the logic appropriate to a particular domain is determined by the facts that prevail there.
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|Item Type:||Conference or Workshop Item (UNSPECIFIED)|
|Additional Information:||For updates, please go to http://www.pitt.edu/~jdnorton|
|Keywords:||Confirmation Induction Determinism Bayes Probability|
|Subjects:||General Issues > Confirmation/Induction|
Specific Sciences > Physics > Classical Physics
General Issues > Determinism/Indeterminism
|Conferences and Volumes:|| LSE-Pitt Conference: Confirmation, Induction and Science (London, 8 - 10 March, 2007)|
|Depositing User:||John Norton|
|Date Deposited:||23 Dec 2006|
|Last Modified:||07 Oct 2010 11:14|
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